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Executive summary 
In recent decades, agricultural support of the European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
has increasingly shifted from market price support measures to budgetary payments. This 
development has made support more visible and has raised public attention to the distribution 
of support, which in turn increased political awareness of the topic. Fittingly, the European 
Commission (2012, p. 8f) states in its Report on the Distribution of Direct Aids to 
Agricultural Producers for the financial year 2011 that “direct payments have lost their 
compensatory character over time and have increasingly become a support ensuring a certain 
farm income stability” and that “the proposals for the CAP after 2013 […] aim to reduce the 
discrepancies between the levels of payments obtained after full implementation of the current 
legislation, between farmers, regions and Member States”. 
This interest regarding redistributive effects of agricultural policy is also reflected in the 
scientific literature. Most of the literature in this field, however, is ex-post and static in nature. 
Despite the undoubted usefulness and importance of ex-post analyses, they are of limited use 
when it comes to the evaluation of policies that are planned to be implemented in the future. 
Since the outcomes of future policy reforms cannot be tested in a laboratory counterfactual 
situations have to be constructed artificially. 
Simulation models are tools frequently used for the ex-ante analysis of policy reforms. In 
other scientific areas, e.g. poverty analysis or tax reform analysis, it is quite common to assess 
impacts of macroeconomic shocks on income distribution on a national scale by the 
application of behavioural ex-ante models and referring to the level of individual incomes. 
The level of aggregation is particularly important in the analysis of redistributive effects since 
heterogeneity is exactly the parameter under consideration and the first best level of 
disaggregation for inequality analysis is the individual level. Hence, methods were developed 
to commonly analyse impacts of macroeconomic shocks on an aggregate and individual level 
by combining outputs of macro models with individual data; mostly large population or 
household surveys.  
Similar tools for the measurement of impacts of sectoral or macroeconomic policies on the 
individual farm income level are less frequent for the agricultural sector and, apart from few 
exceptions, ex-ante studies of redistributive effects of agricultural policy are rare. 
Yet, in general, ex-ante policy impact analysis in the agricultural sector has a long tradition. 
The combination of models to jointly assess effects at different levels of aggregation and 
taking behavioural effects into account is very common. Most of the model chains, however, 
take farm groups or average farms into account rather than accounting for effects at the 
individual farm level. Some attempts have been made to combine macro or sectoral models 
with micro models, which incorporate the behaviour of individual farms. Such research, 
however, is often restricted to the analysis of certain types of farms. In general, ex-ante 
analyses of redistributive effects among individual farms on a supra-regional level in the 
sense of evaluating a counterfactual distribution of income with regard to a reference 
xiii 
 
distribution of income including an assessment of progressivity or related concepts can hardly 
be found for the agricultural sector. 
Against this background, the main objective of this work is to develop a tool that is able to 
consistently assess impacts of agricultural policy on individual farm incomes, thereby 
building on existing modelling approaches and thus, taking behavioural effects into account 
for the ex-ante analysis of redistributive effects of agricultural policy. Subsequently, different 
liberalization scenarios are defined and a detailed analysis of redistributive effects is carried 
out for the western German agricultural sector by the application of methodologies borrowed 
from the field of tax progressivity analysis. Thereby, several contributions to the 
understanding of modelling inequality effects are made, methodologically as well as 
empirically. 
The modelling system consists of three layers. At the sectoral and the meso-level two 
previously developed large scale models are applied. The European Simulation Model 
(ESIM) is an agricultural sector model with a strong focus on the CAP. It depicts the world 
agricultural sector – though in different degrees of regional disaggregation – and quantifies 
effects of agricultural policy at the European and member state level. It is, however, unable to 
estimate intra-sectoral income changes at the farm level. The Farm Modelling Information 
System (FARMIS) is a more disaggregate model that depicts the German agricultural sector 
in great detail. It applies 628 homogenous farm groups and is used in the modelling chain to 
estimate impacts on the intra-sectoral distribution of income at the meso-level. The two 
models at the sectoral and meso-level are consistently linked via an iterative solution process. 
After convergence is achieved between ESIM and FARMIS, the integrated results are further 
processed in a micro model, estimating impacts at the individual farm level. The micro model 
has been developed for this study, is static in nature, and relies on the results of the meso-
model.  
After changes in individual incomes are calculated as a first step by the modelling system for 
different scenarios, model results are analysed in a second step by the application of a 
methodology for the measurement of redistributive effects that was originally developed for 
the analysis of tax reforms. Based on the comparison and decomposition of relative and 
absolute Gini coefficients, detailed redistributive impacts of changes in agricultural policy are 
presented. This methodology is applied for the first time in an ex-ante analysis of 
redistributive effects in the agricultural sector to the best knowledge of the author. For the 
analysis, scenario results for the year 2020 are evaluated relative to the income distribution of 
a reference scenario where the CAP is still in place in 2020. 
To account for different conceptual impacts of inequality analysis on results, the analysis is 
carried out at different aggregation levels, for different income classifications, and for income 
data generated in a static way in comparison to data generated by the modelling system.  
It can be stated that inequality effects are robust with regard to the conceptual differences 
tested for, at least in terms of the direction of inequality changes. All calculated liberalization 
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scenarios lead to decreasing absolute income differences among western German farms in 
2020 because high-income farms lose higher absolute amounts of money than small-income 
farms. Relative to their Baseline incomes, however, low-income farms tend to lose a higher 
share compared to high-income farms which leads to increasing relative inequality due to 
liberalization. Only one exemption from this pattern of results exists: if grouped results are 
disaggregated and total household income is considered instead of family farm income.  
With regard to the different policy instruments, it turns out that the abolishment of market 
price support is more progressive in absolute terms and less regressive in relative terms than 
the abolishment of direct payments. This is because income reductions caused by the 
abolishment of market price support is more unequally distributed (a higher share of losses in 
the upper tail of the distribution and a lower share in the lower tail) than losses caused by the 
abolishment of direct payments. 
Additionally, a decomposition of inequality effects of CAP liberalization by subgroups is 
carried out in this work. When the Gini coefficient is decomposed, three inequality 
components can be defined: inequality within subgroups, inequality between subgroup means 
and a term that arises when distributions of subgroups are overlapping. From the overlapping 
term the state of segregation of the farm population with regard to subgroups can be derived. 
Furthermore, a more detailed picture of the underlying processes of inequality changes can be 
revealed with this methodology. 
The analysis is carried out with regard to different grouping criteria. In a first analysis, 
subgroups refer to farm types while in a second analysis, subgroups refer to the region a farm 
is located in. Based on this analysis, the importance of the group of dairy farms for inequality 
effects is discovered. 
Even though the defined minimum requirement of a CAP reform (a positive redistributive 
effect in absolute terms) is fulfilled in all conducted scenarios, it is difficult to give policy 
recommendations based solely on these analyses since redistributive effects are only one 
concern of agricultural policy. The developed modelling tool mainly is suited to observe 
(unintended) distributional effects of CAP reforms, which is not intended to be the sole 
decision criterion, but rather to complement other policy analyses. 
In summary, this work provides an innovative combination and extension of different 
simulation models, which enables the ex-ante measurement of income changes for individual 
farms. This information in turn facilitates the measurement of redistributive effects in the 
agricultural sector taking behavioural effects into account. The new modelling system is able 
to answer questions which might become more relevant for coming reforms of the CAP. In 
combination with advanced methodologies for the measurement of redistributive effects and 
for the decomposition of inequality indices, the tool can provide valuable contributions to the 
development and design of agricultural policy. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Verschiedene Reformen der letzten Jahrzehnte haben die Ausgestaltung der Gemeinsamen 
Agrarpolitik (GAP) der Europäischen Union grundlegend verändert. Traditionelle Instrumente 
der Marktpreisstützung wurden in zunehmendem Maße durch Direktzahlungen an 
landwirtschaftliche Betriebe ersetzt. Diese Entwicklung führte zu einer erhöhten Transparenz 
in der politischen Stützung des Agrarsektors und rückte die Frage der Verteilung von 
Subventionen stärker in den Fokus des öffentlichen Interesses. Die Verteilungsaspekte der 
europäischen Agrarpolitik fanden daraufhin verstärkt Eingang in den politischen Diskurs und 
wurden unter anderem von der Europäischen Kommission in ihrem Bericht zur Verteilung der 
Direktzahlungen an Landwirte für das Geschäftsjahr 2011 aufgegriffen.   
Das gesteigerte Interesse an den Verteilungswirkungen der Agrarpolitik spiegelt sich auch in 
der wissenschaftlichen Fachliteratur wieder. Der Großteil der wissenschaftlichen Arbeiten zu 
diesem Thema besteht jedoch aus ex-post Analysen und wurde ohne Einbeziehung von 
möglichen Verhaltensänderungen einzelner landwirtschaftlicher Betriebe in Reaktion auf 
agrarpolitische Maßnahmen und ihre Effekte durchgeführt. Trotz des unbestrittenen Nutzens 
von ex-post Analysen sind diese jedoch nur von eingeschränktem Wert für die Evaluation der 
Folgen politischer Reformen vor ihrer Umsetzung. Da politische Reformen vorab jedoch nicht 
in einer neutralen Umgebung getestet werden können, müssen kontrafaktische Situationen 
durch die Anwendung von Modellen künstlich erzeugt werden. 
Für diese Art der Politikfolgenabschätzung wird regelmäßig auf Simulationsmodelle 
zurückgegriffen. In anderen wissenschaftlichen Bereichen – beispielsweise in der Analyse 
von Armutseffekten oder in der Analyse von Steuerreformen – ist es gängige Praxis, die 
Auswirkungen makroökonomischer Veränderungen auf die individuelle 
Einkommensverteilung eines Landes durch die Anwendung von Simulationsmodellen vorab 
zu bewerten. Für die Bewertung von Verteilungseffekten ist die Aggregationsstufe des 
verwendeten empirischen Modells essentiell. Da die Heterogenität der Einkommen bewertet 
werden soll, ist die First-Best-Aggregationsstufe für die Analyse von Verteilungseffekten der 
individuelle Einkommensbezieher. Folglich wurden Methoden für die simultane Modellierung 
von Auswirkungen makroökonomischer Änderungen auf hoch aggregiertem und 
individuellem Level entwickelt. Für diese Art von Analysen werden häufig Ergebnisse aus 
Makromodellen mit umfangreichen Haushaltsdatensätzen kombiniert. 
Ähnliche Instrumente für die Bemessung von Auswirkungen sektoraler oder 
makroökonomischer Politiken auf die Höhe individueller Einkommen gibt es weniger oft für 
die Analyse des Agrarsektors. Von seltenen Ausnahmen abgesehen, sind ex-ante Studien zu 
den Wirkungen von Agrarpolitik auf die individuelle Einkommensverteilung im Agrarsektor 
kaum zu finden. 
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Grundsätzlich gibt es jedoch eine lange Tradition in der Entwicklung von Modellen für die 
Politikfolgenabschätzung im Agrarsektor. Auch die kombinierte Nutzung von verschiedenen 
Einzelmodellen für die gemeinsame, konsistente Bewertung von Politikszenarien auf 
verschiedenen Aggregationsstufen ist üblich. Die meisten Modell-Kombinationen beziehen 
sich jedoch auf die Auswertung von Betriebsgruppen oder Durchschnittsbetrieben als 
niedrigste Aggregationsstufe. Es existieren einige Ansätze, die Makromodelle mit 
Mikromodellen verknüpfen, die ihrerseits Verhaltensanpassungen einzelner Betriebe 
abbilden. Viele dieser Studien beschränken sich jedoch auf die Abbildung von bestimmten 
Betriebstypen oder Regionen. Grundsätzlich ist festzuhalten, dass bislang nur sehr wenige 
überregionale ex-ante Analysen von betriebsindividuellen Verteilungseffekten durchgeführt 
wurden. Unter einer Analyse von Verteilungseffekten ist dabei eine vergleichende Bewertung 
verschiedener Einkommensverteilungen unter Zuhilfenahme von Konzepten zur 
Progressivitätsmessung oder verwandter Konzepte zu verstehen. 
Vor diesem Hintergrund ist es Ziel der vorliegenden Arbeit, eine Analysemethode zur 
simultanen und konsistenten Bewertung von agrarpolitisch induzierten 
Einkommensverteilungswirkungen auf aggregierter und betriebsindividueller Ebene im 
Agrarsektor zu entwickeln. Dabei wird auf bereits bestehende Einzelmodelle zur 
Politikfolgenabschätzung zurückgegriffen. Mit der entwickelten Methode werden 
verschiedene Liberalisierungsszenarien der europäischen Agrarpolitik ausgewertet. Eine 
detaillierte Analyse von Auswirkungen auf die betriebsindividuelle Einkommensverteilung 
wird für den westdeutschen Agrarsektor präsentiert. Dabei werden verschiedene methodische 
und empirische Beiträge zum Verständnis der ex-ante Modellierung von Verteilungseffekten 
geleistet. 
Das in der vorliegenden Arbeit entwickelte Modellsystem besteht aus drei verschiedenen 
Stufen. Auf der sektoralen Ebene und dem Meso-Level kommen zwei bereits existierende 
Modelle zur Politikfolgenabschätzung zum Einsatz. Das „European Simulation Model“ 
(ESIM) ist ein Agrarsektormodell mit einem starkem Fokus auf die europäische Agrarpolitik. 
Das Modell wird zur Quantifizierung von agrarpolitisch induzierten Effekten auf europäischer 
Ebene sowie auf Ebene der Mitgliedstaaten verwendet. Aufgrund seiner hohen 
Aggregationsebene kann das Modell jedoch nicht zur Bestimmung von intra-sektoralen 
Einkommensänderungen verwendet werden. Hierzu wird das „Farm Modelling Information 
System“ (FARMIS) hinzugezogen. Letzteres operiert auf einer niedrigeren Aggregationsstufe 
und bildet die Produktionsseite des deutschen Agrarsektors in größerem Detail ab. In dem 
Modell werden 628 homogene Betriebsgruppen verwendet, um intra-sektorale 
Einkommensänderungen auf dem Meso-Level abzubilden.  
Die beiden Modelle werden in einem iterativen Prozess miteinander verlinkt. Nachdem 
Konvergenz zwischen ESIM und FARMIS erreicht ist, werden die Ergebnisse für die 628 
Betriebsgruppen in einem Mikromodell weiter disaggregiert. Das Mikromodell wurde für die 
vorliegende Studie entwickelt. Es handelt sich um ein statisches Modell, das keine eigenen  
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Verhaltensänderungen einzelner Betriebe abbildet und eng auf das FARMIS Modell 
abgestimmt ist. 
Die in einem ersten Schritt unter Anwendung des Modellsystems simulierten 
betriebsindividuellen Einkommensänderungen werden in einem zweiten Schritt analysiert. Zu 
diesem Zweck wird eine Methode zur Messung von Verteilungseffekten angewendet, die 
ursprünglich für die Analyse von Steuerreformen entwickelt wurde. Basierend auf einem 
Vergleich und einer Zerlegung von relativen und absoluten Gini-Koeffizienten können 
detaillierte Aussagen über die Auswirkungen von agrarpolitischen Reformen auf die 
Einkommensverteilung im Agrarsektor getroffen werden. Diese Methode wird nach bestem 
Wissen des Autors zum ersten Mal im Zusammenhang mit einer ex-ante Analyse für den 
Agrarsektor verwendet. Auswirkungen verschiedener Reformszenarien auf die 
Einkommensverteilung im Agrarsektor werden für das Jahr 2020 mit Bezug auf die 
Einkommensverteilung eines Referenzszenarios bewertet, in welchem die GAP nach 
aktuellem Stand im Jahr 2020 implementiert ist. 
Um den Einfluss verschiedener methodischer Ansätze auf die Ergebnisse abzuschätzen, wird 
die Analyse für verschiedene Aggregationslevel, verschiedene Einkommensklassifizierungen 
und verschiedene Arten der Berechnung von Einkommensänderungen (statisch versus 
modellbasiert) durchgeführt. 
Bezüglich der Ergebnisse kann konstatiert werden, dass die getesteten konzeptionellen 
Unterschiede mit einer Ausnahme keinen Einfluss auf die Richtung der Verteilungseffekte 
haben. Die simulierten Szenarien, die einen Abbau der Agrarpolitik beinhalten, führen zu 
einer Verringerung von absoluten Einkommensunterschieden zwischen westdeutschen 
Betrieben im Jahr 2020. Betriebe, die im Referenzszenario ein hohes Einkommen erzielen, 
verlieren durch eine Liberalisierung absolut gesehen mehr Einkommen, als Betriebe mit 
geringerem Einkommen in der Referenzsituation. Relativ gesehen verlieren jedoch Betriebe 
mit geringerem Einkommen einen größeren Anteil ihres Referenzeinkommens in 2020 als 
Betriebe mit höherem Referenzeinkommen. Dieses führt zu einer Vergrößerung von relativer 
Ungleichheit, aber zu einer Verringerung von absoluter Ungleichheit. Für die Abschaffung 
der Marktpreisstützung wird eine stärkere Progressivität in absoluten Werten und eine 
weniger starke Regressivität in relativen Werten gemessen, als für die Abschaffung von 
Direktzahlungen. 
Zusätzlich werden in der vorliegenden Arbeit die Effekte auf die sektorale 
Einkommensverteilung in Effekte für einzelne Untergruppen zerlegt. Durch die Zerlegung des 
Gini-Koeffizienten können drei Ungleichheits-Komponenten unterschieden werden: 
Ungleichheit in den einzelnen Untergruppen, Ungleichheit zwischen den 
Durchschnittseinkommen der Untergruppen und eine Komponente für die Überschneidung 
der Einkommensverteilungen einzelner Untergruppen. Anhand der letzten Komponente kann 
der Grad der Segregation verschiedener Untergruppen bestimmt werden. Außerdem wird 
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durch die Zerlegung ein detaillierteres Bild der zugrundeliegenden Verteilungsprozesse 
gezeichnet. 
Die Zerlegung in Ungleichheits-Komponenten wird anhand verschiedener Kriterien getestet. 
Für eine erste Analyse werden Untergruppen nach Betriebstypen und für eine zweite Analyse 
nach Regionen gebildet. Basierend auf dieser Methode werden beispielsweise starke Einflüsse 
der Gruppe der Milchviehbetriebe auf die Gesamtverteilung aufgedeckt. 
Obwohl die definierte Mindestanforderung an eine GAP-Liberalisierung – ein ausgleichender 
absoluter Verteilungseffekt – in allen Szenarien erfüllt wird, können Politikempfehlungen auf 
der Basis der Modellergebnisse nur eingeschränkt hergeleitet werden, da die 
Verteilungswirkung von Agrarpolitik nur ein Bewertungskriterium unter Vielen ist. Die in der 
vorliegenden Arbeit entwickelte Methode ist hauptsächlich geeignet zur Quantifizierung von 
(unbeabsichtigten) Effekten auf die Einkommensverteilung. Ergebnisse sollten allerdings in 
Kombination mit Kennzahlen verwendet werden, die eine Erreichung weiterer 
agrarpolitischer Ziele wiederspiegeln. 
Zusammenfassend lässt sich sagen, dass die vorliegende Arbeit eine innovative Kombination 
und Erweiterung verschiedener bestehender Simulationsmodelle präsentiert, die eine ex-ante 
Messung betriebsindividueller Einkommensänderungen ermöglicht. Die mit dem 
Modellsystem generierten Ergebnisse wiederum ermöglichen eine Evaluierung von 
agrarpolitisch induzierten Effekten auf die Einkommensverteilung im Agrarsektor unter der 
Berücksichtigung von Anpassungseffekten auf betrieblicher Ebene. Auf Grundlage des 
Modellsystems können Umverteilungsfragen beantwortet werden, deren Bedeutung für 
zukünftige GAP-Reformen weiter zunehmen dürfte. 
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1 Introduction1 
In its early years, the European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was designed to foster 
production and ensure food security, predominantly through high commodity prices, border 
protection and export subsidies. After serious problems such as overproduction, high 
administrative costs, and environmental damages were experienced in the 1970s and 80s, 
fundamental reforms were implemented. Due to a series of reforms, starting with the 
McSharry reform in 1992, the CAP became more market oriented. Classical market price 
support measures as intervention prices and export subsidies were gradually reduced and 
replaced by budgetary payments, so called “direct payments” (DPs). DPs were initially 
introduced to compensate farmers for declining market price support and were coupled to 
production. In 2003 it was decided to decouple most of the payments from production since 
decoupled payments are assumed to be less market distorting than coupled payments 
(European Commission, 2013).  
Moreddu (2011) argues that due to this shift from market price support measures to budgetary 
payments, agricultural support becomes more visible and consequently, the distribution of 
support among farmers has gained more public attention. Fittingly, the European Commission 
(2012, p. 8) states in its annual Report on the Distribution of Direct Aids to Agricultural 
Producers that “direct payments have lost their compensatory character over time and have 
increasingly become a support ensuring a certain farm income stability” and Schmid et al. 
(2006, p. 2) argue that the CAP “has evolved from an allocative towards a distributive 
policy”. Increasing public interest in the distribution of agricultural support and the question 
of ‘who gets what’ is reflected by media coverage (e.g. tagesschau.de, 2009) and in the 
specialized press (e.g. Agra-Europe, 2013, p. 3). Thus, equity issues in the agricultural sector 
also increasingly become an area of political concern. The European Commission (2012, p. 
8f) e.g. claims that “the proposals for the CAP after 2013 […] aim to reduce the discrepancies 
between the levels of payments obtained after full implementation of the current legislation, 
between farmers, regions and Member States”. Already in 1998 OECD ministers of 
agriculture agreed that, among other criteria, measures of agricultural policy should be 
equitable (OECD, 1998). 
Besides growing public and political interest, there are also good economic reasons to analyse 
the effects of agricultural policy on income distribution in the agricultural sector. Mishra et al. 
(2009) for instance refer to links between farm income inequality and technology adaption, 
productivity, sector growth, and further social issues such as family health. 
This interest is also reflected in the scientific literature (see Section 5.2). However, most of 
the literature regarding redistributive effects of agricultural policy is ex-post and static in 
nature. Several studies focus on the distribution of direct payments (e.g. Keeney, 2000; El 
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Benni and Finger, 2012). Fewer authors also take effects of market price support into account 
and aim to assess redistributive effects of the whole system of agricultural support (e.g. 
Allanson, 2006; 2008; Moreddu, 2011). Furthermore, some attempts are made to evaluate 
impacts of possible future reforms of EU agricultural policy on individual farm incomes at the 
national level in an ex-ante way, but without taking any behavioural effects into account (e.g. 
Severini and Tantari , 2013). 
Yet, despite the undoubted usefulness and importance of ex-post analyses, they are of limited 
use when it comes to the evaluation of “distributional impacts of policies or policy designs 
that do not currently exist, but that might exist in the future” (Bourguignon and Ferreira, 2003 
p. 123). For such an exercise, counterfactual situations have to be constructed. In the best 
case, incentive effects of individuals are taken into consideration since they “respond to 
policy changes by changing their own actions” and thus, “counterfactual[s] must rely on some 
representation of […] behaviour” (ibidem, p. 124). 
Simulation models account for behavioural effects, but the measurement of inequality is 
highly sensitive to the aggregation of individual data and the traditional approach of applying 
few representative groups within a simulation model turned out to be inadequate due to 
unobservable changes in inner-group inequality (Bourguignon et al., 2005; Savard, 2005). The 
share of total inequality that is accounted for by measuring inequality between groups is 
expected to increase with the number of subgroups a population is divided into, other factors 
being equal (Shorrocks and Wan, 2005). Still, as Elbers et al. (2005) empirically find, even a 
relatively high number of subgroups may coincide with a high within-group inequality 
component.2 
In other scientific areas, e.g. poverty analysis or tax reform analysis, it is quite common to 
assess impacts of macroeconomic shocks on income distributions on a national scale by the 
application of behavioural ex-ante models and referring to the level of individual incomes. To 
this end, methods were developed to commonly analyse impacts of macroeconomic shocks on 
an aggregate and individual level by combining outputs of macro models with individual data; 
mostly large population or household surveys. Different approaches are extensively reviewed 
in section 2.3.3 of this study. 
Similar tools for the measurement of impacts of sectoral or macroeconomic policies on the 
individual farm income level are less frequent for the agricultural sector. An example is a tool 
presented in Keeney and Beckman (2009), Keeney (2009), and Hertel et al. (2007), which 
combine a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model with a large-scale farm household 
survey. However, the link to the micro level is established through identical changes for all 
farm households in labour allocation, consumption and production and thus heterogeneity 
mainly is introduced by farm specific differences in initial income sources. Other attempts are 
made to combine macro or sectoral models with micro models, which incorporate the 
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behaviour of individual farms; however, such research is often restricted to the analysis of 
specific types of farms. Some model chains, however, do include a high number of individual 
farms (e.g. Louhichi and Valin, 2012) and might be extendable to represent the whole sector. 
Furthermore, in principle, the LEI model funnel presented by van Tongeren (2000) and 
Woltjers et al. (2011) would enable the analysis of macroeconomic impacts on individual 
farm incomes via the Financial-Economic Simulation model (FES), which is an FADN3-
based, non-behavioural accounting model on the single farm level. However, the analysis of 
redistributive effects4 among individual farms on a supra-regional level has not been 
conducted so far, to the best knowledge of the author with any of these models. Income 
effects rather are reported in more aggregated form for specific farm types or regions. 
Further tools worth mentioning are models, which depict farms at regional or farm type level, 
e.g. the CAPRI model (Britz and Witzke, 2012). These kinds of models are suitable to assess 
income changes at a certain level of disaggregation but not on the single farm level. 
Yet, even though ex-ante studies which explicitly aim at the estimation of redistributive 
effects of agricultural policy are rare, in general, ex-ante policy impact analysis in the 
agricultural sector has a long tradition. The combination of models to mutually assess effects 
at different levels of aggregation, taking behavioural effects into account, is very common 
(see section 2.3.2 for a review of different linking approaches). 
Against this background, the main objective of this work is to develop a tool that is able to 
consistently assess impacts of agricultural policy on individual farm incomes, thereby 
building up on existing modelling approaches and thus, taking behavioural effects into 
account for the ex-ante analysis of redistributive effects of agricultural policy. Subsequently, 
different liberalization scenarios are defined and a detailed analysis of redistributive effects is 
carried out for the western German agricultural sector by the application of methodologies 
borrowed from the field of tax progressivity analysis. In doing so, several contributions to the 
understanding of modelling inequality effects are made, methodologically as well as 
empirically. 
The modelling system consists of three layers. At the sectoral and the meso-level two 
previously developed large scale models are applied. The European Simulation Model (ESIM, 
Grethe, 2012) is an agricultural sector model with a strong focus on the CAP. It depicts the 
world agricultural sector – though in different degrees of disaggregation – and quantifies 
effects of agricultural policy at the European level. However, it is unable to estimate intra-
sectoral income changes at the farm level. The Farm Modelling Information System 
(FARMIS, Osterburg et al., 2001; Bertelsmeier, 2005; Offermann et al., 2005) is a more 
disaggregate model that depicts the German agricultural sector in great detail. It applies 628 
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homogenous farm groups and is used in the modelling chain to estimate impacts on the intra-
sectoral distribution of income at the meso-level. The two models at the sectoral and meso-
level are consistently linked via an iterative solution process. 
The ESIM model depicts the German agricultural sector through representative individuals 
(Kirman, 1992) for supply and demand, not differentiating between the different actors within 
the sector. Thus, ESIM is clearly exposed to the critics regarding the representative 
individuals approach, especially in terms of aggregation biases. Due to its more disaggregated 
structure, the FARMIS model is able to incorporate individual behaviour in more detail. 
Particularly, biophysical constraints and individual differences e.g. in terms of factor 
endowments can be accounted for. Nevertheless, due to the application of farm groups rather 
than single farms, results also are supposed to be biased by aggregation, however, to a far 
lesser extent than in ESIM. Thus, due to the consistent combination of the two models the 
aggregation bias in ESIM probably will be relaxed. The determination of the impact of the 
joint application of the models on the results is one sub-goal of this study. To this end, 
differences in the reaction of both stand-alone models to the same price changes will be 
discussed in chapter 4.2 before mutual results are presented. 
After convergence is achieved between ESIM and FARMIS, the mutual results are 
subsequently further processed in a micro model which estimates impacts at the individual 
farm level. The micro model has been developed for this study, is static in nature, and relies 
on the results of the meso-model. Comparability between corporate and family farms cannot 
be ensured when using family farm income (FFI) as an indicator for income. Thus, due to the 
dominance of corporate farms in eastern Germany, results regarding the measurement of 
inequality are presented for western Germany only. 
The methodology for the measurement of inequality in this study is traditionally developed 
and applied in the field of tax analysis. Based on the comparison and decomposition of Gini 
coefficients, detailed redistributive impacts of changes in agricultural policy are presented. 
Inter alia, different measures of agricultural policy (DPs vs. market price support) are assessed 
regarding their redistributive impacts and different concepts of inequality (relative vs. 
absolute) are applied. 
Due to an application of data at different aggregation levels (farm groups vs. individual farms) 
the magnitude of the aggregation bias regarding inequality parameters due to data grouping is 
assessed. Furthermore, to assess the relevance of links between market income and 
agricultural support, a static analysis is conducted and compared to the model based analysis. 
In addition, analyses for different concepts of income (i.e. family farm income vs. total farm 
household income) are compared regarding their redistributive outcomes. Results are 
discussed with reference to existing insights from the scientific literature. 
Furthermore, a detailed analysis of inequality effects with regard to farm types and regions is 
presented. To this end, the overall farm population is subdivided into farm type and regional 
groups, respectively. Subsequently, the Gini inequality index is decomposed with regard to 
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these groups. Thereby, effects can be distinguished with respect to within-group inequality, 
between-groups inequality, and an overlapping term. The latter is conceptually closely related 
to stratification characteristics of the overall farm population and to the best knowledge of the 
author, the methodology is applied for the first time in agricultural sector impact analysis. 
The present study consists of seven chapters. Following this introduction, in Chapter 2 the 
theoretical background for this study is provided and relevant literature for the combination of 
models depicting different levels of aggregation is reviewed. In Chapter 3 the modelling 
chain which is established and applied afterwards in this work is described in detail. Scenario 
descriptions and sectoral results are provided in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 is dedicated to 
introducing the methodology which is applied for the measurement of inequality and 
redistribution. Furthermore, literature which is concerned with the distributional effects of 
agricultural policy in the agricultural sector is reviewed and subsequently, redistributive 
effects are presented for different liberalization scenarios in western Germany. In Chapter 6 a 
subgroup decomposition of inequality effects is presented. In Chapter 7 the work is 
summarized and concluded. 
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2 Heterogeneity and Simulation Model Coupling – Theoretical 
Considerations and State of the Art 
The endeavour of the following lines is to give a meaning to the term ‘simulation model’. 
Thereafter, potential problems of utilizing aggregated data in simulation models are discussed. 
One possible way to overcome these problems and to simultaneously assess impacts at the 
macro and micro level is the combination of different stand-alone models. A subsequent 
literature review is presented on the coupling of models for the purposes of agricultural sector 
analysis and the measurement of inequality impacts. 
 
 Simulation modelling 2.1
Empirical models are suited for the evaluation of political reforms in complex environments. 
Models are able to reduce complexity by abstracting to a certain degree from reality and by 
focusing on the problem area under consideration. 
If a policy reform is already implemented, ex-post analyses can generate valuable insights on 
the outcomes of that reform. However, if information on the possible outcomes of a reform is 
desired as basis for decision-making before a reform is implemented, ex-ante analysis is 
required. Since in economics the outcome of policy reforms can hardly be tested in a 
laboratory, a simulation of the likely outcomes can serve as a substitute to provide the desired 
information. Thus, conducting ex-ante analyses means answering ‘what if’ questions by 
generating a counterfactual situation that can be compared to the status quo or to other 
simulated scenarios. Consequently, to generate a counterfactual situation as realistic as 
possible, the behaviour of actors under consideration needs to be taken into account and 
incentive effects should be incorporated (Peichl, 2009; Bourguignon and Ferreira, 2003). 
To conclude, simulation models generally are tools for the execution of ex-ante analyses and 
at best, take behavioural effects into account. However, the latter is not an inevitable 
condition since certain questions may require information on first-round effects. Furthermore, 
no model can account for all behavioural effects. From this perception, a static model may 
simply be seen as a variation of a behavioural model that assumes constant behaviour. 
The impacts of a policy reform may have various dimensions. In the absence of the ‘world 
model’ (van Tongeren et al., 2001), specific policy simulation tools exist in various fields of 
research, are concerned with different problems, and are conducted at different levels of 
aggregation. To concretize the very broad definition of simulation models given above, in the 
following, different types of models, which are frequently applied for ex-ante policy 
evaluations in the agricultural sector, are introduced. Subsequently, micro-simulation models, 
which are typically applied for the analysis of redistributive effects, are introduced. Only 
model types which are relevant for the work at hand and those that are closely related are 
discussed since manifold approaches of simulation models exist and the field is very 
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fragmented. Thus, several other modelling approaches which by definition also are simulation 
models are not explicitly mentioned in this overview. 
One model type, which is, among applications in many other research fields, regularly utilised 
for economic ex-ante analyses of agricultural policies, is the CGE model. CGE models rely on 
general equilibrium theory. They depict all sectors and agents (households, firms and 
government) of an economy and their interrelations, though mostly on a high level of 
aggregation. The reactions of agents are specified by underlying functional forms and 
exogenously implemented behavioural parameters. Furthermore, optimizing behaviour of 
agents is assumed. The objective of the models is to evaluate the impacts of changes in 
exogenous parameters on endogenous variables, for example on prices and quantities. For this 
purpose the models are calibrated to a consistent dataset which was observed at one point in 
time. This procedure ensures that observed data are replicated when the model is solved for 
the base period. For the generation of counterfactual scenarios, one or more exogenous 
parameters are changed and the system is forced to find a new equilibrium with newly 
calculated endogenous variables (Hertel et al., 2007; Peichl, 2009). 
Other frequently applied models are partial equilibrium (PE) models. Similar to CGE models, 
in PE models behaviour is determined by functional forms and behavioural parameters. Also, 
optimizing behaviour of agents is assumed and the models are calibrated to observed base 
year data. However, in contrast to general equilibrium models, partial models only depict one 
sector of the economy. For the agricultural sector of an industrialized country, the underlying 
assumption is that the sector is so small that no feedback effects exist to other sectors of the 
economy. Thus, macroeconomic indicators and other variables like the rate of technical 
progress are introduced exogenously. The advantage of partial equilibrium modes of the 
agricultural sector is that interrelations between demand and supply of agricultural products 
can be depicted in greater detail (van Tongeren et al., 2001). 
The third model type is well established at the farm level and is based on programming 
approaches. Models in this category are also partial models since only the agricultural sector 
is considered. Mostly, only the supply side is modelled or the programming model is 
combined with a demand component to endogenously account for price effects in agriculture, 
as well (see e.g. CAPRI, Britz and Witzke, 2012). The basic concept of programming models 
relies on the depiction of several farm groups which are represented by an objective function 
that is optimized under several constraints. This approach, in general, allows for a more 
disaggregated and detailed depiction of agricultural production compared to equilibrium 
models. 
For the analysis of policy induced redistributive effects, micro-simulation models frequently 
are applied. Micro-simulation models are “microanalytic partial models focusing on one side 
(usually the household side) of markets” (Peichl, 2009, p. 305) and “allow simulating the 
effects of a policy on a sample of economic agents […] at the individual level” (Bourguignon 
and Spadaro, 2006, p. 77). When applied for the analysis of redistributive effects they mostly 
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are based on large population or household surveys. Bourguignon et al. (2008b) differentiate 
between models with micro accounting and models with behavioural micro simulation. The 
first group of models are static models and do not allow for the adjustment of consumption or 
production when prices are changed and thus, only first-round effects are taken into 
consideration. The latter models take behavioural effects into account to a certain degree and 
often rely on econometric approaches. 
A subcategory of micro-simulation models which frequently is applied in the analysis of the 
agricultural sector is subsumed under the term ‘agent based models’ (ABM). ABMs aim to 
model behaviour of individual farms (agents) and their interaction with each other. The ABM 
approach usually relies on income maximizing behaviour of the agents and builds on 
mathematical programming techniques. It allows for the integration of detailed economic 
factors (like e.g. transaction costs) or of non-economic factors that have impacts on individual 
behaviour (Kremmydas, 2012). Most of the ABMs depicting the agricultural sector are 
applied on a regional scale, though exemptions are available: The SWISSland model (Mack et 
al., 2011) e.g. depicts the whole Swiss agricultural sector. However, ABMs have rarely been 
applied for the analysis of redistributive effects in the agricultural sector, so far. 
In general, models operating at a high level of aggregation typically depict the economy in a 
less detailed manner. However, variables may change their nature at different levels of 
aggregation, i.e. being exogenous at the individual level but endogenous at the macro level 
(Laborte et al, 2007). The trade-off between generality and scope on the one side and detailed-
ness on the other can be observed in many modelling exercises (e.g. Gohin and Moschini, 
2006). In the following sections, biases that trace back to the aggregation of data are discussed 
in more detail before the coupling of different stand-alone models is discussed as one 
possibility to overcome this trade-off. 
 Heterogeneity and aggregation 2.2
Depending on the type of aggregation, different types of biases may occur. Potential biases of 
empirical models due to the utilization of aggregated data will be discussed briefly in the next 
section. Subsequently, the specific problems of data aggregation with regard to the analysis of 
distributional effects will be presented. 
 
2.2.1 Aggregation biases in simulation modelling 
Depending on the type of model and the particular aggregation of the underlying data, 
different types of errors presumably occur in modelling exercises. One can distinguish 
between individual aggregation, special aggregation, product or sectoral aggregation, and 
temporal aggregation of data. 
When data over individuals are aggregated, the heterogeneity of the base population needs to 
be taken into account to draw reliable inferences on aggregate reactions on parameter changes 
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e.g. in the political environment of a sector (e.g. Stoker, 1993). Heterogeneity of farms might 
stem from various sources, such as different returns to scale, environmental constraints, or 
management abilities, which can be subsumed under the term production technology. Usually, 
equilibrium models apply behavioural parameters which are econometrically estimated or rely 
on expert knowledge to determine the intensity of reactions of their implemented agents. Even 
if these parameters take heterogeneity fully into account, they cannot account for a likely 
changing composition of individual farms which presumably leads to changing marginal 
reactions of the aggregate. Furthermore, policies designed to have different impacts on certain 
types of farms (e.g. the currently discussed capping of direct payments for the post-2013 
phase of the Common Agricultural Policy of the EU) can hardly be depicted in models which 
work with highly aggregated data. Thus, a highly aggregated model might lead to 
considerably differing results compared to a model operating at a disaggregated level. A 
similar argument counts for the depiction of bio-physical or environmental constraints which 
might be binding for some individual farms but not for others. 
Spatial aggregation errors are virtually all a special sub-type of individual aggregation errors 
as individual characteristics related to a regional component are taken into account. Different 
adjustment reactions might be caused in different regions due to region-specific constraints in 
production (e.g. environmental requirements) or regionally designed policy measures (e.g. the 
regional model of direct payments in Europe). Different regions might face different prices 
(e.g. due to transportation costs). An aggregation over regions excludes this and may therefor 
lead to biased results. 
Other biases might occur in models due to aggregation over different products or sectors. 
When combining different products or factors to a common aggregate one implicitly treats 
them as perfect substitutes, which certainly leads to stronger biases the more heterogeneous 
the products are. 
Narayanan et al. (2010) describe the disadvantages of using sectoral aggregated data for trade 
policy analysis in CGE models. They argue that product specific tariffs and policies cannot 
properly be depicted in models with highly commodity-wise aggregated data as many 
products are not explicitly identified. Further, they find aggregation biases due to “false 
competition”. This term refers to a situation where “two countries that do not compete in a 
third market at the disaggregated level (e.g. one exports engine blocks and one auto 
transmissions), may appear as competitors at an aggregate (auto parts) level” (Narayanan et 
al., 2010, p. 755). 
Data aggregation over time has not been widely discussed explicitly in relation with 
simulation modelling. Nevertheless, it is clearly of interest when dealing with seasonable 
labour or harvesting periods for example. Furthermore, time and adjustment processes are 
crucial parameters in the analysis of policy reforms (van Tongeren, 2000) since short run 
effects may be oppositional to long run effects. 
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Clearly, in more disaggregated models lower aggregation biases are expected ceteris paribus. 
Building models in a more disaggregate way, however, often comes at the cost of restricting 
the scope of the area depicted in the model. 
Findings on the importance of aggregation biases in empirical work, however, are ambiguous. 
Shumway and Davis (2001) for example review nine studies5 focusing either on individual or 
commodity-wise aggregation and find that the majority report small inferential errors due to 
aggregation. The authors also found, however, that including distributional information about 
individuals generally reduces the existing error of aggregation over individuals. Wu and 
Adams (2002) argue that the prediction accuracy of aggregate models is not necessarily 
problematic, especially if over-predictions for some individuals are compensated by under-
predictions for others. However, other studies like e.g. Charteris and Winchester (2010), 
Narayanan et al. (2010) or Bektasoglu et al. (2012) find serious problems due to sectoral 
aggregation and large impacts on simulation results. 
 
2.2.2 Data aggregation and measurement of inequality6 
In general the measurement of inequality is highly sensitive to the aggregation of data since 
heterogeneity is exactly the parameter under consideration. The impact of the information loss 
due to aggregation becomes most obvious in the extreme case when there is only one 
aggregate group used for simulation (e.g. with the representative individual approach). 
Without any information on the distribution of a certain variable – let’s assume income – an 
inequality measurement is impossible. 
Consider a population being divided into k mutually exclusive groups and Itotal representing an 
additively decomposable7 income inequality index of the form: 
(1)     =	 	
	 + 	 
where Iwithin is a (weighted) sum of income inequality inside the k groups and Ibetween the 
inequality between subpopulation means (Deutsch and Silber, 1999). In the extreme case of 
just one representative group, all the desired information would be hidden in Iwithin whereas 
only Ibetween would be measurable, but without any meaning in this case. Obviously, inequality 
inside of aggregated groups is not observable and thus, the loss on information generates a 
downward bias in the measurement of overall inequality by only incorporating grouped 
income data, even with a higher number of groups. 
                                                 
5
 It shall be mentioned that these studies are concerned with testing for inferential errors due to aggregation, but 
not explicitly are related to any kind of simulation modelling. 
6
 Parts of this section are identical with parts of chapter 1 in Deppermann et al. (2013). 
7
 The term ‘additively decomposable’ refers to the property of an inequality index, to be subgroup decomposable 
into exactly two terms: the between-groups inequality component which is gained by replacing all individual 
incomes by subgroup means and the within-group component, which is a weighted average of inequality within 
subgroups. As will be seen later on, the Gini coefficient e.g. is not additively decomposable in this sense 
(Deutsch and Silber, 1999). 
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However, since for a long time many official statistics only provided classified income data, 
some methodologies were developed to deal with the occurring bias and to approximate the 
real overall inequality. Two approaches can be distinguished which are sometimes commonly 
applied. One is based on the calculation of upper and lower bounds of the distribution. The 
lower bound is derived by assuming that all members of a group have the same (average) 
income – which basically means setting Iwithin to zero – and the upper bound is derived by the 
calculation of maximum possible inequality inside the single groups. Ogwang (2006) gives a 
recent survey on existing approaches. Nevertheless, some minimum descriptive information 
about the single groups is required. In general, knowledge of the income bounds (the 
minimum and maximum income inside one group) or other adequate information is necessary 
for the computation of the maximum possible inside group inequality. 
A second way to deal with grouped income data is through the application of a functional 
form that satisfies the properties of a Lorenz curve (Ogwang, 2006). However, at least some 
observed points of the Lorenz curve are required for a meaningful utilization of this method. 
These minimum requirements are met in most classified income data, because the groups are 
non-overlapping and static, but usually not when grouped data are used in policy simulations.8 
Since mostly analysts are interested in (average) income effects of subpopulations defined by 
diverse attributes other than income (e.g. gender, area, etc.) income bounds of the subgroups 
are overlapping. Furthermore, bounds can only be observed in the moment of calibration, 
when the groups are generated on the basis of individual data. After conducting scenario 
simulations with the model, only average values are observable for groups. 
Even if the goal is not the identification of the exact effects on overall inequality but rather the 
effectiveness of a certain policy (e.g. does inequality decrease at all?), it is not a priori 
unambiguous that measurement of sole between-groups inequality detects the direction of the 
change of overall inequality. To identify the change of total inequality ∆ =	∆	
	 +
∆ it has to be ensured, that the change of the unobserved within-component is not 
overcompensating the change of the between-component. Savard (2005), Bourguignon et al. 
(2005) and Ahuja et al. (1997) empirically show the importance of within group inequality. It 
also becomes clear that the occasionally used approach to exogenously define inequality 
within groups and apply the distribution with a new average income after the simulation is not 
sufficient to capture unambiguously the effects of overall inequality changes, because there is 
no reason why income distribution should be unaffected by different scenario assumptions. 
Nevertheless, for an approximation of the effects on the absolute level of poverty this 
approach may be judicious (e.g. Pereira da Silva et al., 2003).  
Clearly, with an increasing level of disaggregation (i.e. an increasing number of groups) and 
an increasing homogeneity of the individuals grouped together, an increasing part of the 
necessary information is expected to shift from the unobservable into the observable part of 
inequality (Shorrocks and Wan, 2005). A sufficient level of disaggregation, however, is a 
                                                 
8
 Unless subgroups consist of only one individual, of course. 
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priori not ascertainable. Elbers et al. (2005), for instance, empirically find that even a 
relatively high number of subgroups may coincide with a high within-group inequality 
component. Thus, the first, best level of disaggregation for inequality analysis is the 
individual level. 
To avoid the occurrence of all kinds of aggregation biases, more disaggregated and detailed 
models are required. These kinds of models, on the other hand, often fail to adequately take 
into account interactions at the macro level. To overcome the trade-off between detailedness 
and generality, different stand-alone models can be coupled. In the following section, the 
current state of research on coupling different simulation models is introduced.  
 
 State of the art of model coupling for agricultural sectoral policy 2.3
impact analysis and the assessment of income redistribution 
This chapter starts with a look at the motivation to couple stand-alone models, which is 
mentioned in the literature. Subsequently, an overview of different attempts of model linkages 
is given. Due to the manifold usage of simulation models in policy analysis the focus is laid 
on two specific strands of literature, which are related to the present work and may be 
understood as a pragmatic way of summarizing relevant literature. 
One strand of literature refers to the combination of stand-alone simulation models that focus 
on the agricultural sector (including side effects for example on the environment or land use 
effects) and is presented in section 2.3.2. There are only a few attempts which aim at an ex-
ante analysis of redistributive effects of agricultural policy and even fewer which apply a 
modelling chain for that purpose. Nevertheless, some model chains estimate reactions of 
individual farms on sectoral policy changes. Generally, simulation model based analysis of 
macroeconomic impacts on income distribution has been done in numerous ways, however, 
mostly with regard to household income or poverty issues on the consumption side. These 
studies are surveyed in section 2.3.3.  
For the sake of completeness it shall be mentioned that redistributive effects of agricultural 
policy have been analysed in manifold ways, but the bulk of the studies are ex-post studies. A 
few ex-ante analyses have been carried out, yet, by the application of static models. The 
respective literature will be reviewed extensively in section 5.2. 
 
2.3.1 Motivation 
Looking into the literature, authors give several reasons why they combine different models. 
Helming and Banse (2008, p. 371) state that a “chain of models gives results that are more 
realistic and consistent with the economic behaviour at the different levels of aggregation” 
and that “linking models also allows to conduct economic analysis which covers various 
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degrees of regional and commodity coverage”. For Offermann (2008, p. 361) the “increased 
coverage” and the “improved consistency of scenarios” are also major advantages of linking 
models. Britz (2008, p. 363) mentions the “combined analysis of economic and environmental 
consequences of policy”. Helming et al. (2006) and Kuhlman et al. (2006) argue that different 
models possibly create diverging results for the same variable and that linking different 
models can counteract this issue, while creating more consistent results with economic 
behaviour at different aggregation levels. Böhringer and Rutherford (2006, p. 1) recognise 
that with an increasing level of aggregation “models may also violate fundamental physical 
restrictions”. 
Summing up, two main arguments are at the centre of linking models: besides the increased 
consistency and plausibility of the analyses due to better depiction of behavioural effects at 
different aggregation levels, the increased number of observable variables to evaluate a policy 
simultaneously from several different perspectives (e.g. market effects and environmental 
effects) is mentioned.9   
Both of these objectives are also central to the present work. Models are coupled to broaden 
the scope of the analysis and observe effects of policy changes on income distribution, which 
requires the combined measurement of price effects at an aggregate level and income effects 
on the individual farm level. Second, the accuracy of supply reactions to policy changes under 
consideration shall be increased by the combination of different models. 
 
2.3.2 Linking simulation models for policy impact assessment purposes in the 
agricultural sector 
Different simulation models are coupled in different ways by using data from other models or 
providing data for other models (Britz, 2008). In the literature, coupling attempts are 
commonly distinguished by their degree of model integration (e.g. Banse and Grethe, 2008b). 
Britz (2008, p. 363f) divides linking approaches into three classes: ‘model chain without 
calibration’, ‘one-way calibration’ and ‘sequential calibration’. In this chapter, his 
classification is used to give an overview about current attempts of coupling models. The last 
category, however, is referred to as ‘iterative linking’ instead of ‘sequential calibration’. 
Not considered are cases where exogenous variables like population or GDP growth estimates 
are simply implemented in stand-alone models. This approach is very common and virtually 
no simulation model would be able to run without such exogenous information. The focus of 
this review relies on approaches using different models to conjointly answer a specific 
research question by conjointly calculating a policy scenario and comparing it to a common 
                                                 
9
 This distinction might seem artificial, as in many cases a more detailed depiction increases the number of 
variables as well as the consistency of the analysis. Nevertheless, the distinction adds valuable theoretical 
insights to understand, why models are coupled and what kind of advantages and challenges coupling leads to. 
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reference scenario. This clearly distinguishes relevant model linkages from implicit linkages 
that utilize results of other models to create a reference scenario itself. 
The first category (‘model chain without calibration’) is the oldest way of linking models. For 
this approach one model is used to generate data, which subsequently is used to shock another 
model. This approach results in an informal coupling since inconsistencies commonly arise in 
the conjoint outputs due to differences in underlying data, functional forms and assumptions 
of the stand-alone models. Nevertheless, so called soft linkages are less vulnerable in terms of 
model evolution compared to more integrated forms of model coupling since different models 
usually are run by different persons or institutions (Britz, 2008). Soft linkages often are 
applied to combine more than two models with each other. 
One such modelling system is presented by van Tongeren (2000). In his article he presents the 
“LEI Modelling Funnel” which consists of models representing five different levels of 
aggregation, starting with a global CGE model and ending up at the farm process level 
represented by technical models. In between, models are applied representing the EU, the 
Netherlands and the farm level. These models are coupled in a top-down manner where 
results from a higher aggregation level are used as exogenous information in the models at the 
next aggregation level. The main focus of the model funnel is CAP analysis. Since the 
informal way of model coupling (without any calibration or iteration) is applied, the funnel is 
characterized as “loosely coupled”. Van Tongeren (2000) opposes the disadvantage of 
possible inconsistencies in results to the advantage of preciseness, which can be achieved 
through personal communication and as a consequence of making underlying assumptions 
explicit due to the discussion of specific results. An update of the model funnel is presented 
by Woltjer et al. (2011). However, the main coupling methodology still relies on soft linkages 
between the models. 
In principle, the model funnel would enable the analysis of macroeconomic impacts on 
individual farm incomes via the Financial-Economic Simulation model (FES; see Woltjers et 
al., 2011), which is an FADN data based, non-behavioural accounting model on the single 
farm level. Price and policy changes are exogenously implemented and mapped to the single 
farms while taking replacement investments into consideration. However, the analysis of 
redistributive effects among individual farms on a supra-regional level has not been 
conducted so far, to the best knowledge of the author. 
A similar coupling approach is applied by Manegold et al. (1998), Bertelsmeier et al. (2003) 
and Offermann et al. (2012) which present the “vTI Modeling Funnel” and its precursors. 
They use different models at different aggregation levels to analyse agricultural policy 
impacts from the global to the farm group level in Germany. Like van Tongeren (2000) they 
couple different stand-alone models in an informal way, so that the single models still are 
independent from each other. Bertelsmeier et al. (2003) state that due to the exchange of 
information and the coordination of important model assumptions, a mutual monitoring of 
results is achieved. This approach is also applied in Nowicki et al. (2009) for the common 
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analysis of agricultural policy with a general and a partial equilibrium model. A comparative 
overview about model funnels is given by Brockmeier and Urban (2008). 
Breen et al. (2005) take commodity and input price information from the partial model 
FAPRI-Ireland and feed them into optimization models of single farms to measure the effect 
of decoupling of direct payments at the farm level for cattle, tillage and dairy farms in the 
Irish agricultural sector. Production decisions at the farm level are modelled by linear 
programming models for each relevant FADN farm relying on the assumption of net margin 
maximization. 
In the second category (one-way calibration) models are coupled in such a way that one 
model generates results, which in turn are used for the calibration of a second model. This 
procedure usually is applied in a bottom-up manner and shall ensure that a certain part of the 
higher aggregated model behaves in the same way like the disaggregated model does. 
An example for this category is the work of Britz and Hertel (2011) who combine a partial 
equilibrium programming supply model of the agricultural sector with a global general 
equilibrium model to analyse environmental impacts of biofuel policies. Based on sensitivity 
experiments the highly disaggregated supply model is used to generate a set of compensated 
own- and cross-price supply elasticities for crop groups to represent aggregate EU supply 
reactions. The standard production functions in the CGE model are replaced by more flexible 
functions which then are calibrated so that the generated elasticities are replicated. In this 
way, supply behaviour of the two different models is ensured to be consistent. 
A similar approach is described in Pérez Domínguez et al. (2009). They develop the 
EXPAMOD meta-model to econometrically parameterize a market model using simulated 
price reactions of bio-economic farm level models. Supply response of the farm level models 
is extrapolated depending on prices, farm- and environmental characteristics. Regional supply 
modules of a market model are then calibrated to these estimates. 
Louhichi and Valin (2012) combine a CGE model and a programming model of agricultural 
supply of the French arable sector to estimate impacts of biofuel policies at the farm level. In 
the programming model behaviour of all individual arable farms of the French FADN sample 
is modelled. In a first step, elasticities generated by the farm level model are implemented in 
the CGE model. Subsequently, price changes are calculated by the CGE model for different 
scenarios and the farm level model is shocked with the new prices. Income effects are 
presented on a regional basis. Since only arable farms are modelled, redistributive effects of 
the whole agricultural sector cannot be estimated. 
A less formalized approach is applied by Banse and Grethe (2008b) combining a CGE model 
with a partial agricultural sector model for the analysis of different CAP liberalization 
scenarios. In principle their approach is a simple mapping down of results that are 
endogenously calculated in the CGE model and exogenously implemented in the partial 
model (very much similar to the “without calibration” approach). However, additionally a 
detailed comparison of supply response of the two different models for the same scenario is 
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carried out and in case of major deviations the CGE model is recalibrated to reproduce the 
generally more plausible results of the partial model. 
The third category of model coupling (‘iterative linking’) aims at full consistency of the 
combined models. This is mostly achieved by an iterative procedure where results of one 
model are mutually used as input in another model. Jansson et al. (2009) use this approach to 
couple a CGE model with a PE model of the agricultural sector. The purpose of their exercise 
is to exploit the models specific strengths – a detailed depiction of the agricultural sector in 
the partial and the representation of the whole economy in the general model – and at the 
same time avoid conflicting results. The full link of the models is achieved by iteratively 
running the models. Thereby price changes are calculated by the CGE model and 
implemented in the PE model and the sectoral response of the PE model is mimicked via 
shifting the functions in the CGE model until convergence is reached. 
Helming et al. (2006) couple a CGE and partial model, where the latter is a mathematical 
programming model for the Dutch agricultural sector. In an iterative procedure real product 
price changes and changes of sectoral productivity are generated by the CGE model and used 
as exogenous inputs in the programming model. Furthermore, the non-linear cost terms of the 
programming model are calibrated to CGE results. The programming model in turn generates 
changes of agricultural production which are exogenously implemented in the CGE model. 
This procedure is continued until convergence among the models is achieved. Kuhlman et al. 
(2006) apply the same model chain and identify that the strongest differences between model 
results (in the first iteration) can be observed for products where quantitative policy 
restrictions are in place. This is due to the fact that the CGE model does not take such bounds 
into account and tends to overestimate changes in production. A similar procedure for the 
combination of a CGE with a programming supply model is presented in Böhringer and 
Rutherford (2005) for the energy sector. 
A global aggregate agricultural market model is consistently combined with non-linear 
regional programming models representing the core of the CAPRI model (Britz and Witzke, 
2012). CAPRI itself is a PE model for the agricultural sector aiming at the analysis of 
agricultural policy changes. The linkage of the market and the supply modules is carried out 
via a sequential calibration procedure, whereby the market models supply functions are 
iteratively calibrated to the results of the programming models which in turn are driven by the 
prices provided by the market models (Britz, 2008). Gocht et al. (2013) use the CAPRI model 
to calculate effects of different scenarios of direct payment harmonization for regional farm 
types in Europe. They report income changes on member state and farm type level. 
Grant et al. (2007) present another iterative coupling example. However, their partial model is 
not represented as a quadratic programming problem, but is a mixed-complementary 
formulation subsector model representing the dairy sector for trade analysis at the tariff line. 
With price changes generated by the higher aggregated CGE model and aggregate price 
response in the dairy sector generated by the partial model convergence is achieved “after just 
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a few iterations” according to the authors (Grant et al., 2007, p. 274). Comparing model chain 
results with stand-alone results of the CGE model, they conclude that aggregate welfare 
changes are quite robust, but that output response and trade flow reactions to dairy market 
liberalization tend to be underestimated by their CGE model. 
An iterative linkage between a CGE and an integrated assessment model measuring policy 
impacts on bio-physical processes is presented in papers of van Meijl et al. (2006) and Prins et 
al. (2011). Here, sectoral production growth rates, land use and productivity changes are 
provided by the CGE model and implemented in the bio-physical model which in turn 
delivers yields, land supply and feed efficiency rates to the CGE model. Due to this procedure 
a harmonization of land use in both models is achieved. 
Deppermann et al. (2012) link an energy system model and an agricultural sector model to 
assess the outcomes of EU greenhouse gas emission mitigation policies. In their stand-alone 
versions, biomass supply is exogenous to the energy system model and biomass demand for 
energy production purposes is exogenous to the agricultural sector model. Through an 
iterative combination of the models, demand and supply of energy crops are endogenized. 
An attempt at measuring impacts on the single farm taking market price effects into account is 
presented in Valdivia et al. (2012). Their approach doesn’t exactly fit into one of the 
categories used before as they basically extend a farm level supply model (the Tradeoff 
Analysis Model, TOA) by a single demand module, which they refer to as model coupling. 
The TOA model consists of bio-physical process models and economic decision models 
representing a statistically representative sample of farms in a specific region. Based on the 
individual farm results an aggregate regional crop supply curve is estimated. This regional 
crop supply curve is augmented by a demand module, which enables the model system to also 
endogenously take price changes at the regional level into account. In a final step the new 
equilibrium price is implemented in the disaggregated module again. Valdivia et al. 
demonstrate their approach with a case study for the Kenyan region Machakos. The modelling 
system enables an ex-ante analysis of outcomes of policy reforms in terms of poverty or 
inequality based on single farms in the agricultural sector. However, the analysis is restricted 
to a regional scale, where the occurrence of price changes is assumed because of poorly 
integrated markets, and to the depiction of a few crops only. 
Another approach for the consistent assessment of impacts at the sectoral and individual farm 
level is presented by Helming and Schrijver (2008). In their work they combine a partial 
equilibrium model for the European agricultural sector with a programming model for the 
Dutch agricultural sector and a bio-economic model for individual dairy farms. The two 
aggregate models are treated as a one-model system and are iteratively linked to the bio-
economic dairy farm model. Prices of agricultural commodities and factors are calculated at 
the more aggregate level and passed to the bio-economic model, which in turn delivers area 
specific results on yield changes, animal density and unit costs per type of dairy cow to the 
more aggregate models. 
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2.3.3 Linking simulation models for policy impact assessment purposes on poverty and 
income distribution 
Tools for the ex-ante analysis of redistributive impacts of macroeconomic or sectoral policies 
in the agricultural sector taking effects at the single farm level into account are rarely 
presented in the literature. Even though some approaches exist which account for impacts at 
the individual farm level, most of them only depict a share of farms like e.g. dairy farms 
(Helming and Schrijver, 2008) or arable farms (Louhichi and Valin, 2012). Only a few tools 
with a sector-wide coverage of individual farms are presented and seldom applied for the 
analysis of redistributive effects in the agricultural sector. Noticeable exemptions can be 
found in Keeney and Beckman (2009), Keeney (2009), and Hertel et al. (2007) which all 
apply the same model chain in their studies (see below). Many more studies are concerned 
with impacts of macroeconomic shocks on poverty and income distribution among the overall 
population. 
The measurement of inequality effects based on the traditional approach by the application of 
a few representative household groups (RHG) within a macro model turned out to be 
inadequate due to the unobservable changes in inner-group inequality (Savard, 2005; 
Bourguignon et al., 2005, see also section 2.2.2). Thus, methods were developed to commonly 
assess impacts of macroeconomic shocks on an aggregate and individual level by combining 
outputs of macro models with individual data, mostly large population or household surveys. 
In general, any kind of macro model can be applied for this kind of analyses. However, in 
most of the cases macro models are of the CGE type (Bourguignon et al., 2010). 
Apart from the traditional RHG approach, one can distinguish three different approaches of 
macro-micro-economic modelling for the analysis of distributional effects (based on Mussard 
and Savard, 2010)10: the top-down approach, the iterative approach and the integrated 
approach. Similar to the approaches of model coupling for policy impact analysis in the 
agricultural sector, approaches are distinguished by their degree of model integration. 
Nevertheless, categories are differently defined since other, more integrated approaches exist 
in the literature of ex-ante modelling of distributional effects. 
Following the top-down approach macroeconomic shocks are implemented in the macro 
model and solution variables are used as external inputs at the individual micro-level. This 
procedure implies that no feedback effects are accounted for in this kind of analysis. 
Bourguignon et al. (2008b) further differentiate the top-down approach into two sub-
branches: the top-down approach with micro accounting and the top-down approach with 
behavioural micro simulations. In the former individuals do not adjust their consumption or 
production (quantities) to changing prices, which means that only first-round effects are taken 
                                                 
10
 For other possible classifications see e.g. Bourguignon et al. (2008a) or Agénor et al. (2004). 
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into account. The latter approach involves a microeconomic model that additionally accounts 
for behavioural responses. 
Depending on the richness of information available in the applied survey data, the micro 
accounting procedure might vary in specificity. For the simplest alternative, individual data 
on total consumption or total income are required and the relative consumption or income 
changes provided by the macro model for the respective representative household group are 
used to scale all incomes of corresponding individuals (or households). This simple 
procedure, however, still does not account for any heterogeneity inside the groups. If the 
survey contains more disaggregated data on income composition (factor types or transfer 
sources) or even commodity specific information on individual consumption, this information 
can be used to account for more heterogeneity. The respective macro model results can be 
matched to different types of factors or transfers and individual real incomes can be adjusted 
by the calculation of an cost-of-living index for each individual (Lofgren et al., 2003). 
According to Bourguignon et al. (2008b) the advantage of the micro accounting method is the 
straightforward implementation giving consideration to the largest impacts of the 
macroeconomic shock on individuals. They conclude that first round effects approximate total 
welfare effects accurately in the short to medium run and if price changes are small and 
markets competitive. 
Such a micro accounting approach is chosen by Keeney and Beckman (2009), Keeney (2009), 
and Hertel et al. (2007) to assess distributional impacts of WTO reforms or changes in 
agricultural policy in the U.S. agricultural sector. To this end, in their papers they apply a 
CGE model (GTAP) which is refined to distinguish between market clearing wages and 
capital rents for agriculture and non-agriculture. The model implies one representative 
household for each region. After the CGE model is shocked results are combined with a large-
scale farm household survey to estimate welfare changes of individual farm households. 
Keeney and Beckman (2009) assume that individual households in the U.S. behave in 
accordance with the representative household that depicts the U.S. in the CGE model. Labour 
allocation (on- versus off-farm), production and consumption response as well as price 
changes are identical for all households. Thus, heterogeneity is introduced by farm specific 
differences in initial income sources. Income changes are deflated by a consumer price index 
and first-round approximations of welfare changes are calculated for each household. 
Distributional effects are identified on the basis of decile groups. 
Keeney (2009) and Hertel et al. (2007) apply the same CGE model and farm household 
survey, however, only superficially explain how they link CGE results to disaggregated farm 
households. Keeney (2009, p. 1290) draws on ”factor markets linking the macro- and micro-
components of a policy simulation” and Hertel et al. (2007, p. 300) refer to “the general 
equilibrium changes in product and factor prices are combined with disaggregated household 
data to evaluate the welfare impact on different groups of farm households”. To the best 
knowledge of the author, these three studies are the only ones which are explicitly aimed at an 
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ex-ante measurement of distributional effects in the agricultural sector. The following studies 
refer to impact assessments of macroeconomic shocks on poverty and income distribution 
among the overall population. 
Ravallion and Lokshin (2008) also apply the top down approach with micro accounting to 
assess welfare impacts of different trade policy reforms for cereals in Morocco. For their 
analysis they commonly use a CGE model and a household sample consisting of 5,117 single 
households. The CGE model is applied in a first step to simulate price changes for different 
trade policy scenarios. In a second step, these price changes are used to calculate welfare 
gains for individual households in monetary terms. As prices and wages are not included in 
the household survey data, price changes are weighted by their corresponding expenditure and 
revenue shares (including earnings and household production activities) and the first order 
approximations of welfare changes per household are gained by the difference between 
revenue and expenditure changes. Subsequently, indices of vertical and horizontal inequality 
are calculated for the baseline and the counterfactual scenarios, respectively, to assess 
inequality impacts. 
Another application of the top down approach with micro accounting is provided by Bussolo 
et al. (2008). They estimate impacts of different trade reform scenarios on poverty in Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia and Mexico. Again, macroeconomic effects on commodity and factor prices 
are calculated by a CGE model and then mapped down to the different household surveys to 
adjust real household incomes and to generate new counterfactual situations without allowing 
individual households to adjust their quantities. CGE-simulated changes in average real 
wages, in average real capital/land rents (differentiated by agriculture and non-agricultural) 
and in prices of food and non-food commodities are mapped to the endowments and 
consumption patterns of the individual households. Household income from pensions, public 
transfers, remittances and auto-consumption is assumed to be constant. Changes in household 
incomes are deflated with a newly calculated cost-of-living index. Finally, poverty measures 
are calculated based on the counterfactual individual household incomes. 
Ferreira et al. (2008) provide an example for the top-down approach with behavioural micro-
simulations. They assess distributional impacts of a currency crisis for Brazil. To analyse the 
effects of such a macroeconomic shock they econometrically estimate a model “based on a set 
of investment savings and liquidity preference money supply (IS-LM) equations […] using 
time-series national accounts and aggregated household survey data from Brazil for 1981-
2000” (Ferreira et al., 2008, p. 120). Levels of employment and unemployment, wage levels 
and consumer price levels are generated by the macro model (distinct for different household 
groups and sectors) and used to recalibrate parameters in the micro-simulation model. The 
latter is a reduced-form model of household income determination and able to simulate 
individual responses to the mean changes calculated by the macro model, however, without 
giving any feedback to the macro level. 
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The iterative approach is applied by Bourguignon and Savard (2008) for the purpose of 
assessing trade reforms for the Philippines in terms of distributional effects. They combine a 
CGE model with a micro-simulation household model that accounts for household income 
structure, expenditure behaviour and labour supply decisions. In an iterative resolution 
process, they feed price changes calculated at the macro level into the micro-simulation model 
and pass back total consumption and labour supply figures from the micro to the macro level. 
They compare the modelling system with and without the implementation of feedback effects 
and find important differences in case of the existence of rigidities in the labour market. 
Further applications of the iterative approach are presented in e.g. Essama-Nssah et al. (2007) 
and Mussard and Savard (2010). 
Cockburn et al. (2010) present two applications of the integrated approach for Nepal and the 
Philippines. In contrast to the iterative approach where two different models are connected via 
the exchange of solution variables, in the integrated approach each household from a 
representative household survey is depicted individually in a CGE framework. In principle, 
this approach can be seen as a continuation of the representative household approach. The 
number of household groups is expanded until it equals the number of households in the 
survey, i.e. each household group contains only one individual household. This approach 
usually requires a considerable effort to reconcile the data used by the CGE model with the 
household survey (Cockburn et al., 2010). For their analyses Cockburn et al. (2010) integrate 
3,388 individual households for Nepal and 24,797 households for the Philippines in a CGE 
model. Mussard and Savard (2010) state that modelling of complex behaviour (like regime 
switching decisions) is difficult within the integrated approach and is therefore, often avoided. 
 
2.3.4 Synthesis 
In the preceding sections, literature regarding simulation model based policy impact analysis 
for the agricultural sector and regarding the simulation model based impact assessment on 
income distribution has been reviewed. These two branches of literature are hardly 
overlapping. Nevertheless, first attempts are made to ex-ante estimate policy induced 
distributional impacts for the agricultural sector. An example is the macro-micro framework 
presented by Keeney and Beckman (2009), Keeney (2009), and Hertel et al. (2007). These 
authors combine a highly aggregated CGE model with a large farm household data survey by 
mapping quantity and price changes, but without the possibility for farms to adapt production 
patterns. Further approaches exist, in principle applicable for the consistent measurement of 
sectoral impacts and at the same time income changes at the individual farm level. An 
example is the LEI modelling funnel, among others consisting of macro and sectoral level 
models on the one side and farm level models on the other. A few other model chains in 
principle also are able to estimate income changes at the individual farm level, however, they 
often only depict specific farm types. Furthermore, static ex-ante approaches of measuring 
income effects at the individual farm level do exist (refer to section 5.2), though, to the best 
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knowledge of the author, none of them have been linked to a sectoral or macroeconomic 
model to assess redistributive effects of agricultural policy at the national level. Moreover, 
several agricultural sector models correspond to the farm level, but they apply rather to 
regional farms or farm types (like the CAPRI model for example) instead of individual farms. 
In contrast, manifold approaches of consistently assessing impacts of macroeconomic policies 
at the macro and micro level exist in the field of tax incidence or poverty analysis. Due to the 
high number of publications not all studies could be considered here, however, selected 
publications are reviewed, covering all relevant methodological branches. Virtually all studies 
measuring impacts on income distribution refer to household income or consumption rather 
than to enterprise profits. Keeney and Beckman (2009), Keeney (2009), and Hertel et al. 
(2007) account for changes in farm production, however, under the assumption that all 
individual farms behave in the same way according to macro results. 
For an analysis of policy induced redistributive effects in the agricultural sector, impacts have 
to be assessed consistently at the sectoral and at the farm level since some variables (e.g. 
prices) are exogenous at the farm level and others (e.g. individual income) are not observable 
at the sectoral level. Furthermore, due to the combination of differently aggregated models the 
trade-off between generality and detailedness is likely to be relaxed. 
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3 Modelling Chain11 
In this chapter, a modelling system for the agricultural sector is presented, consistently taking 
effects of the sectoral and individual farm level into account. For this purpose, different 
components observed in the field of agricultural policy analysis and the field of impact 
assessment on income distribution are combined. Two behavioural large-scale agricultural 
sector models are combined in an iterative procedure (cf. section 2.3.2). As a third model, a 
micro accounting model is connected to the others in a top-down manner (cf. section 2.3.3). 
Farm groups can adjust their production relying on information from the sectoral model 
before results are further disaggregated by a static model, which introduces more 
heterogeneity in the analysis.  
After a broad overview about the whole modelling chain, the single models and linking 
approaches are explained in more detail. 
 
 Description of the overall modelling chain 3.1
The modelling system consists of three different single models depicting three different levels 
of aggregation to consistently measure changes in individual incomes among western German 
farms resulting from agricultural policy reforms. A schematic overview of the modelling 
chain is presented in Figure 3.1. The model with the highest level of aggregation is an 
agricultural sector model depicting European agricultural markets in detail and the 
agricultural sector of the rest of the world in a more aggregate manner. It is a partial model in 
the sense that it explicitly models the agricultural sector and takes all other sectors as 
exogenously given. Thus, the core macroeconomic variables such as inflation rates and GDP 
growth rates are exogenous to the model. At the meso-level, a model which depicts the supply 
side of the German agricultural sector in great detail is applied to measure impacts of 
agricultural policy changes on 628 heterogeneous farm groups. Both simulation models are 
two already pre-existing large scale models, ESIM (Grethe, 2012) at the sectoral level and 
FARMIS (Osterburg et al., 2001; Bertelsmeier, 2005; Offermann et al., 2005) at the farm 
group level. They both have been used in numerous studies, alternatively as stand-alone 
versions (e.g. Banse and Grethe, 2008a; Bertelsmeier, 2003) or in combination with other 
models (e.g. Banse and Grethe, 2008b; Offermann et al., 2012). Yet, both models so far 
haven’t been coupled in a consistent (iterative) way with other models. This iterative 
approach is undertaken for the study at hand to link the two models at the first stage of the 
overall modelling system.12 Effects of agricultural policy at the European level are quantified 
by ESIM and a resulting vector of price and yield changes is exogenously implemented into 
FARMIS. Based on the new set of parameters, FARMIS calculates new supply quantities for 
                                                 
11
 This chapter served as a basis for the paper Deppermann et al. (2013) and in parts is equivalent to it. 
12
 Deppermann et al. 2010 present a common interface of the two models. However, the paper is part of this 
dissertation project. 
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the German agricultural sector and a respective vector of supply changes is exogenously 
implemented in ESIM. This procedure is continued until both models converge in the analysis 
of a joint scenario. The models and the linking procedure are described in more detail in 
Section 3.2 below. 
After convergence between ESIM and FARMIS is achieved, farm group results are passed in 
a top-down manner to the newly developed micro model to assess individual farm incomes 
for the year 2020, the final year of the simulation period. The micro model is an accounting 
model in the sense of Bourguignon et al. (2008b) (see section 2.3.3), which further 
disaggregates the results of the farm groups commonly calculated by ESIM and FARMIS. 
The micro model serves as an add-on for the FARMIS model, since it relies on its structure. It 
is based on the German farm accountancy data network (FADN). More information on the 
micro-accounting model is provided in section 3.3 below. 
With this modelling system, different ex-ante evaluations of policy scenarios are conducted. 
Based on simulation results for the year 2020, income distribution indices are calculated. 
Results for the year 2020 are utilized in an ex-post manner for the calculation of different 
inequality indices to evaluate the state of income inequality in the agricultural sector and the 
degree of progressivity of different reform packages. To this end, inequality indices of 
different policy scenarios are compared to a reference scenario, the so-called baseline. Since 
the methodology of measuring inequality effects is independent from the modelling system, it 
is discussed in chapter 5, before the empirical discussion of the redistributive effects. 
All models are coded in the The General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) programming 
language, which facilitates an automatized coupling of the models. Furthermore, the 
calculation of inequality indices is also done in GAMS. The ESIM-FARMIS link (the box in 
the upper part of Figure 3.1) is managed by a steering file (see Annex A), which was 
developed to run the system without manually exchanging results between the single 
elements. Further technical information on the coding is provided in section 3.4 below. 
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Figure 3.1: Methodological framework for an ex-ante measurement of redistributive effects 
of agricultural policies on farm incomes 
Source: Adapted from Mussard and Savard (2010). 
 
 From the sectoral to the meso-level: an iterative approach 3.2
Before a more formal explanation of the ESIM-FARMIS coupling procedure is presented, the 
single models themselves are introduced in the following sections. 
 
Loop until
| ∆ Pi - ∆ Pi-1|< 0.01
∆ AREA (crops)
∆ Q (livestock)
(Germany)
LEGEND:
∆: % change 2020 to baseyear
P: Price vector
Q: Supply vector
AREA: Area vector
YIELD: Yield vector
i: Iteration step
∆ P (EU27)
∆ Yield
(Germany)
Agricultural Sector Model
ESIM
(EU27 member states in a global 
context)
Agricultural Supply Model
FARMIS
(628 farm groups representing the
German agricultural sector)
Farm Group Results (2020)
Micro-accounting Model
Analysis of redistributive effects
Single Farm Income
(Baseline, 2020)
Single Farm Income
(Scenarios, 2020)
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3.2.1 The single models 
Both models are ex-ante models, however, with different theoretical foundations. The ESIM 
model represents agricultural demand and supply of the agricultural sector based on isoelastic 
functions. FARMIS is a programming model that depicts German agricultural production and 
is based on the income maximization assumption for several farm groups. 
 The agricultural sector model ESIM 3.2.1.1
ESIM is a partial equilibrium model of the agricultural sector (Grethe, 2012). It is a 
comparative static net trade model, which depicts the agricultural sector of the EU-27 on 
member state level. Furthermore, Croatia, Turkey, the Western Balkans and the USA are 
modelled as single areas and all other countries are subsumed in an aggregate named “rest of 
the world” (RoW). The first pillar of the CAP of the European Union is depicted in great 
detail, implying ad valorem and specific tariffs, tariff rate quotas, production quotas, export 
subsidies, coupled and decoupled direct payments, and set-aside regulations. Outside the   
EU-27 agricultural policies are not taken into consideration since the focus of the model is on 
the analysis of CAP reforms. All behavioural functions are isoelastic except for sugar supply 
and altogether 15 crops, 6 animal products, 21 processed products, pasture and voluntary set-
aside are covered by the model. ESIM abstracts from regional price differences inside the  
EU-27 and assumes a point market mechanism for all tradable products. Prices for non-
tradable products (raw milk, fresh milk, potatoes, fodder, silage maize and pasture) are 
determined by a market clearing mechanism at the member state level (Grethe, 2012). 
Human demand functions are given for all farm and processed products except for raw milk, 
pasture, fodder, silage maize, set-aside, and rapeseed. Raw milk is split up into its components 
– fat and protein – which are further processed into several dairy products for human 
consumption or for direct use as animal feed. Further processing demand is defined for 
oilseeds, and inputs for biofuel production. The biofuel module depicts the production of 
bioethanol and biodiesel. Inputs for ethanol are wheat, corn, and sugar. Biodiesel is produced 
from rape oil, sunflower oil, soy oil and palm oil. Input ratios are endogenously determined 
by a CES function. Byproducts of biofuel production are accounted for and are used as 
additional feeding stuff in the livestock sector (Grethe, 2012; Banse and Grethe, 2008a). In 
the following a more detailed description of standard13 crop and livestock production is given 
because these are the two components which are approximated to FARMIS results for 
Germany in the final model chain and thus, have to be modified in ESIM. The following 
explanations are based on Grethe (2012). 
For EU-27 member states supply of crops is determined by a yield function and an area 
allocation function which are multiplicatively combined: 
                                                 
13
 In ESIM some products are depicted by different supply equations. These products, however, mainly belong to 
the group of processed products which are not modified in the course of model coupling and thus, are not 
presented in this short overview of the basic model characteristics. A very detailed description can be found in 
Grethe (2012). 
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(2) , = , ∗ ,	. 
Yield per hectare (3) is a function of the endogenous own (producer) price of the respective 
crop, changes in factor costs, which are represented by exogenously implemented cost indices 
and an exogenous trend parameter. Five categories of factor costs (intermediates, capital, 
labour, energy, and fertilizer) are taken into account for the yield function. The trend 
parameter reflects an exogenous trend in yield changes, caused for example by technical 
progress in plant breeding. Furthermore, an intercept parameter is calculated for the 
calibration of the model, i.e. to meet a certain combination of price and yield per hectare 
observed in reality for the base year of the simulation period. 
The yield function is specified as: 
(3) , =	 !". $%, ∗ ,&'()),)* ∗ ∏ ,. -./%/,0
&.'.0)),1)),)*
0 ∗ %2. 34, 
where 
cc   = Index of countries 
cr  = Index of crops 
fcc  = Index of factor cost components 
YIELD  = Yield per hectare 
yield.int  = Intercept of the yield function 
PP   = Producer price in country 
f.costs  = Factor cost index 
elastyd  = Own price elasticity of yield 
elast.y.fc  = Elasticity of yield with respect to factor costs 
tp.gr  = Trend parameter. 
 
Area allocation is a function of own- and cross- (incentive) prices, the land price and other 
factor costs (4). Incentive prices in ESIM consist of the producer price for the specific product 
and the price-equivalent of direct payments that is assumed to have an impact on production 
decisions (i.e. 100% for coupled and 20% for decoupled payments). This approach takes into 
account that in reality farmers are only able to receive decoupled payments in combination 
with eligible land.14 Product and land prices are endogenously calculated in ESIM, while all 
                                                 
14
 The reader may find it more logical to introduce the DPs on top of the land price instead of the producer price 
as payments are linked to land in reality. However, elasticities of area demand with respect to incentive prices 
are set proportionally to elasticities of area demand with respect to land prices, taking the share of land costs in 
total costs into account. Thus, impacts on area demand are similar, no matter where the subsidy is introduced. 
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other factor costs are exogenously determined. The obligatory intercept again is used for 
model calibration purposes for the base year of the model. 
(4) , = 
54 5. $%, ∗6,&&7)),)*,)*

∗ 89&.7)),)* ∗ 	6,. -./%/
0 ,0
&..0)),1)),)*
 
where 
cc   = Index of countries 
cr  = Index of crops 
fcc  = Index of factor cost components 
AREA = Area used for production 
area.int = Intercept of the area allocation function 
PI   = Incentive price 
LANDPRICE  = Hectare price for land 
f.costs = Factor cost index 
elastsp = Elasticity of area allocation with respect to own- and cross-prices 
elast.lp  = Elasticity of area allocation with respect to the land price 
elast.a.fc  = Elasticity of area allocation with respect to factor costs. 
 
Supply of animal products in ESIM is a function of endogenous own- and cross- (incentive) 
prices of animal products, an endogenous index representing feed costs for respective animal 
products, exogenously determined factor costs, and an exogenous technical progress shifter 
representing for example progress in breeding. 
(5) ,; = 
/<2. $%,; ∗ 	6,;&&7)),=>,=>
;
∗ ?9,;&.;.0)),=> ∗6	,. -./%/,0
&.;.0)),1)),=>
0
∗ %2. 34,; 
where 
cc  = Index of countries 
lv  = Index of animal products 
fcc  = Index of factor cost components 
sup.int = Intercept of the supply function 
PI = Incentive price 
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FCI  = Feed cost index representing changes in average feed costs 
f.costs = Factor cost index 
tp.gr  = Trend parameter 
elastsp  = Elasticity of animal product supply with respect to own- and cross-prices 
elast.lv.f = Elasticity of animal product supply with respect to the feed cost index 
elast.lv.fc  = Elasticity of animal product supply with respect to factor costs. 
 
 The programming model FARMIS 3.2.1.2
FARMIS is a comparative-static process-analytical programming model for the German 
agricultural sector (Osterburg et al., 2001; Bertelsmeier, 2005; Offermann et al., 2005). The 
model version applied for the study at hand incorporates 628 homogenous farm groups, 
generated by the aggregation of individual farms and stratified by region, type and size. 
Sectoral production covers 27 crop and 15 livestock activities. The German farm accountancy 
data network (FADN)15 is used as the main data source for model specification, covering 
about 11,000 individual farms. Farm group specific technical coefficients are either directly 
taken from the data network or calculated under additional consideration of management 
manuals. The application of farm-specific weighting factors ensures a consistent 
representation of the sectors’ overall production and income indicators (for a detailed 
description of the calculation of aggregation factors see Osterburg et al., 2001). 
The core model is based on the assumption of income maximization and each farm group is 
represented by an objective function subject to several constraints, which determines 
production patterns and factor allocation. In mathematical terms the objective function of the 
model is represented by (6) (Bertelsmeier, 2005; Sanders, 2007)16. 
                                                 
15
 It shall be noted that in the FADN, very small farms with less than 16 European Size Units are excluded for 
the years of our model base period. Thus, the share of rented land in the farms covered by the model is slightly 
higher than that for all farms since very small farms usually operate with a higher share of own land. 
16
 For a more consolidated representation of the general functionality of the model, the original equation 
(Bertelsmeier, 2005, p. 79) is presented here in a modified version, abstracting from different levels of intensity 
of agricultural production and also leaving out a more detailed depiction of different subsidy and premium 
payments. 
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where 
n = Index of farm groups 
i = Index of production activities 
j = Index of output products 
l = Index of land type 
u = Index of labour 
v = Index of fertilisers 
Z = Objective function 
Y = Sales of agricultural products in tons 
X = Level of activities in ha or livestock housing units (LHU) 
PX = Level of activities eligible for direct payments in ha or LHU 
U = Level of labour input/requirements in 1,000 hours 
V = Level of fertiliser input/requirements in tons 
LAND = Level of rented utilised agricultural area in ha 
QUOT = Rented milk quota in tons 
p  = Prices for agricultural products in € 
c  = Net of activity-specific costs and subsidies €/ha or LHU 
dp  = Activity-specific direct payments in €/ha or LHU 
rnu  = Labour costs in €/agricultural working unit 
rnv  = Expenditures for fertilisers in €/ton 
rnl  = Rental costs for UAA in €/ha 
κ  = Parameter associated with the linear PMP term 
ω = Parameter associated with the non-linear PMP term. 
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The first term of the objective function depicts the revenues from selling agricultural 
production. The second term covers the specifically referable per unit costs and subsidies of 
production times the activity level. The third term reflects the amount of direct payments 
accessible by the farm group. The fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh term comprise labour costs, 
expenditure for fertilisers, rental costs for milk quota, and rental costs for agricultural land, 
respectively. Terms number eight and nine are the “so-called hidden costs”, which are “used 
to reproduce the activity levels of the base year” (Sanders, 2007, p. 77). These two terms 
correspond to the application of a positive mathematical programming (PMP) procedure for 
model calibration and are constructed to meet externally given point elasticities in the 
calibration point. For this analysis an average of three subsequent years (2006-2008) is used 
as a model base in order to reduce the impact of the typical yearly fluctuations in the 
agricultural sector on model results. A more detailed description of the objective function and 
the model calibration procedure of FARMIS can be found in Bertelsmeier (2003) and Sanders 
(2007). 
Model constraints refer to “the areas of feeding (energy and nutrient requirements, calibrated 
feed rations), intermediate use of young stock, fertiliser use (organic and mineral), labour 
(seasonally differentiated), crop rotations, and political instruments (e.g., set-aside, quotas)” 
(Offermann et al., 2005, p. 2). 
For the conduction of an (ex-ante) scenario, assumptions on the continuation of agricultural 
policy, changes in general farm structure, and rates of technical progress have to be 
implemented exogenously. Furthermore, all prices except for specific agricultural production 
factors (milk quota, land, and young livestock) are exogenous to the model (Offermann et al., 
2005). 
 
3.2.2 A formal approach of model linking 
In this section a formal approach of model linking is presented to sketch the basic ideas of the 
exercise before the development of the interface between ESIM and FARMIS is discussed in 
more detail in section 3.2.4. The approach relies on the formal explanation of coupling a CGE 
with a PE model, presented in Jansson et al. (2009, p. 17ff), however, adapted for purposes of 
this study. 
In this study an iterative coupling between two partial models is achieved at the first stage of 
the model chain (cf. Figure 3.1). The model at the top (ESIM) is a PE model for the world 
agricultural sector and shall be represented by yt indicating the vector of variables for each 
year of the simulation period t and by αt indicating the respective vector of parameters of the 
model. With f connoting a vector of functions of the same length as yt, an optimal solution of 
ESIM as a stand-alone version is represented by f(yt;αt) = 0. The more disaggregated model 
FARMIS covers the German agricultural sector and is represented by vt indicating the vector 
of variables and βt the vector of parameters for the year t. An optimal solution is characterised 
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by C`,ab,, cd = max;h`,i C`,ab,, cd		∀$	 denoting that all individual farm groups n 
are maximizing their objective function Z in the year t. 
For their base year (t = base) both models are calibrated to observed data. This is done by 
endogenizing sub-vectors of αbase and βbase and in turn fixing variables ybase and vbase to the 
observed values.17 This procedure ensures that observed base year values are met by the 
model. For all t ≠ base α and β are completely exogenous parameters and variables are 
endogenous. Since all results presented later on in this study refer to the year 2020, time 
indices are omitted henceforth, and all parameters and variables are defined to correspond to 
2020 unless differently stated. 
The two models shall be linked by the mutual exchange of solution vectors until convergence 
on the exchanged variables is achieved. For that purpose, ESIM provides results for yields 
and prices and FARMIS provides results on area allocation and animal product supply for the 
German agricultural sector. The transmission of prices and yields from the higher to the lower 
aggregated model is straightforward, since they are endogenous to the former and exogenous 
to the latter. The mapping procedure can be described by the vector valued function j: Y
 
→ 
B, with Y denoting a set of all possible solutions of ESIM and B the set of all possible 
parameters of FARMIS. 
The aggregation function that transmits disaggregated FARMIS results into more aggregate 
ESIM categories is named h. Since FARMIS covers the supply side of the German 
agricultural sector and ESIM depicts supply and demand worldwide, the vector of all 
variables y shall be split up into two sub-vectors yEXC (EXC referring to results that shall be 
exchanged) and yREST where the former includes all ESIM variables which correspond to 
aggregated FARMIS results and the latter to all other variables y = (yEXC,yREST). Then we can 
write h: V → YEXC, with V indicating the set of all possible solutions of the FARMIS model. 
The final goal of the modelling chain is to get the same optimal solution for both models yEXC 
= h(v) with regard to the same vector of prices and yields β = j(y). 
Since area allocation and supply for animal products in Germany are variables in both models, 
respective functions in ESIM have to be approximated to FARMIS results while all others 
shall behave like before. Let fEXC be a sub-vector of f for all functions that have to be shifted to 
mimic FARMIS results and fREST a sub-vector of all other functions with f = (fEXC,fREST). 
Furthermore, let αEXC be a sub-vector of all parameters that have to be changed in order to 
shift the functions fEXC and αREST a sub-vector of all other parameters with α = (αEXC, αREST). To 
approximate yEXC according to FARMIS results h(v), αEXC is modified to klEXC such that fEXC 
(yEXC = h(v), klEXC, αREST) = 0. A formal expression for the shifting operation that transmits 
yEXC = h(v), yREST and αREST into klEXC shall be denoted klEXC = Ф(yEXC = h(v), yREST; αREST). 
Setting klEXC = αEXC would create the original ESIM model. A simple method to approximate 
                                                 
17
 For the moment, it is abstracted from additional precalculations which are required for the PMP calibration 
procedure in FARMIS. The philosophy of model calibration in principle is the same: parameters are calculated 
based on observed data which from the next period on will be variables. 
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FARMIS results could be to replace fEXC by a vector of constants reflecting FARMIS results. 
This would entail klEXC = Ф(h(v), yREST; αREST) = h(v) and setting fEXC to klEXC - yEXC = 0. 
However, this solution not necessarily leads to convergence. Different options to approximate 
yEXC to h(v) are discussed in section 3.2.3. 
Based on the former definitions, the iterative linking of the two models includes the following 
steps:  
Step 1: Set i := 0; Solve f(yi;α) = 0 
Step 2: Compute β = (yi) 
Step 3: Solve C`ab	 , cd = max;h`m C`ab	 , cd		∀$ 
Step 4: Compute klEXCi = Ф(h(vi), yRESTi; αREST) 
Step 5: Set i := i + 1; Solve f(yi;	klEXCi-1,αREST) = 0 
Step 6: IF (yi - yi-1) < tolerance, THEN terminate, ELSE go to step 2. 
After a first stand-alone run of the ESIM model (step 1), prices and yields are implemented 
into FARMIS (step 2), which is solved subsequently (step 3). In step 4 shifters for ESIM are 
calculated. Taking the shifters into account ESIM is solved (step 5). If ESIM results between 
the last two iterations differ less than a predetermined tolerance value, the procedure stops, 
otherwise it starts again with step 2. 
After the iteration process is terminated (i.e. convergence is achieved), the parameter vectors 
δ and β are endogenised in the modelling system. An optimal solution to the modelling system 
is denoted by: 
f(y=(yEXC,yREST); klEXC, αREST) = 0 
Ф(yEXC,yREST; αREST) = klEXC 
yEXC = h(v) 
C`nb, co = max;h` C`nb, co		∀$	and 
β = j(y). 
The single models rely on different conceptual frameworks and also use different data bases 
for their base year calibration. Thus, variations among the models’ base year data are likely to 
occur for their common solution space, which comprises the equilibrium quantities and prices 
of the German agricultural sector. One way to take these differences into account is to avoid 
the exchange of absolute results and rather apply change rates of solution variables between 
the calibrated base year and the year 2020. In other words, the relative difference of quantities 
and prices which exists in the base year between the two models is kept constant for the 
simulation period. Thus, h(v2020) aggregates FARMIS results in 2020 expressed as a share in 
FARMIS base year values which are then multiplied by ESIM base year values to gain 
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absolute ESIM values for 2020. The same applies for j, which maps price and yield changes 
instead of absolute values. 
3.2.3 Sequential calibration 
After discussing the general approach of coupling ESIM and FARMIS, the next step is a 
detailed presentation of the way results are exchanged among the models. Regarding the top-
down part of the linkage, ESIM results are implemented into FARMIS as parameters. This 
requires a simple mapping procedure of prices and yields (still, there are some possible 
variations of this approach which will be discussed at the end of this section). The bottom-up 
part of the linkage (i.e. Ф(h(v),yREST;αREST) ) is less straightforward and offers several 
different approaches. Jansson et al. (2009, p. 20f) discuss advantages and problems of 
different methods of a sequential calibration procedure. Their preferred general approach 
described for an iterative coupling of a CGE and a PE model is applied in this study, as well. 
In the following lines their work is outlined and adapted to the study at hand. 
As already shown in the preceding section, one simple possibility for implementing FARMIS 
results into ESIM would be dropping fEXC and fixing yEXC to h(v). But, this approach is not 
free from shortcomings. 
Figure 3.2 sketches a partial one-commodity market for Germany with S representing the 
sectoral supply curve provided by the FARMIS model and D depicting the demand curve of 
the ESIM model. Assuming for the moment that both models only depict this single 
commodity, convergence would be reached in the crossing point of supply and demand. The 
initial endogenous supply curve of ESIM is not explicitly presented in the graph, but it is very 
likely that the first stand-alone run of ESIM (see step 1, Section 3.2.2) creates a price which is 
different from the convergence-price. Thus, let the iteration procedure start with the arbitrary 
initial ESIM-price p0 (point A in the graph). With p0 FARMIS would calculate a respective 
quantity of supply q1. Now, the original ESIM supply curve is replaced by a constant supply 
curve in accordance with FARMIS results, which is depicted by the dotted vertical line at q1. 
Solving ESIM with the new (constant) supply would generate price p1. In the next step 
FARMIS would respond with a supply at q2. Following this procedure further on, it is 
noticeable from the graph that the point of convergence will never be reached, even though it 
uniquely exists. Convergence will only occur “if the slope of the supply schedule is greater 
than the (negative of the) slope of the demand schedule” (Jansson et al., 2009, p. 20). This, 
however, cannot easily be ensured for all single commodity markets in the modelling system. 
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Figure 3.2: Iteration process with diversion. 
 Source: Adapted from Jansson et al. (2009). 
 
Instead of fixing supply quantities in ESIM, a recalibration of the original ESIM supply 
curves is a better option to provide convergence. This approach is sketched in Figure 3.3 by 
means of linear demand and supply functions; however, the general idea also works with the 
non-linear functions applied in ESIM (cf. Section 3.2.1.1). 
The sectoral supply curve provided by FARMIS is denoted by SF and the ESIM demand curve 
by D. The original ESIM supply curve is named SESIM0 and the stand-alone equilibrium of 
ESIM is indicated by point A. Like in the first approach the price is implemented into the 
FARMIS model, which subsequently calculates the respective supply quantity. In the next 
step the ESIM quantity is not fixed, but the original18 supply curve of ESIM is recalibrated to 
the new price-quantity combination (p0,q1), indicated by SESIM1. The resulting ESIM-
endogenous equilibrium accrues at point C. The procedure restarts until the ESIM-
endogenous equilibrium equals the equilibrium of the model chain. In comparison to the first 
approach of fixing ESIM supply, this approach is more robust and leads more likely to 
conversion. Furthermore, even if the first approach was leading to convergence, the second 
approach would be more efficient in terms of solution time since fewer steps are needed to 
find the equilibrium of the modelling system.19 
 
                                                 
18
 However, in the full ESIM model with several commodities and several cross relations among these products, 
the original supply function is modified (the cross relations to other commodities are cut) to facilitate a better 
approximation of the FAMRIS supply reactions. 
19
 The recalibration approach was used for most commodities in ESIM. However, for a few commodities 
(especially for livestock products) supply was simply fixed to FARMIS results for the sake of convenience. This 
is efficient since prices for these products are determined by the world market/European market and thus, only a 
few iterations are necessary to reach convergence anyhow. 
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Figure 3.3: Iteration process with linear approximation. 
 Source: Adapted from Jansson et al. (2009). 
 
Referring to specific ESIM equations for area allocation (4) and animal product supply (5) 
presented in section 3.2.1.1, area.int and sup.int respectively are the parameters to be 
recalibrated. With additionally cutting the cross relations to other commodities and also factor 
costs, equations for recalibration are: 
(7) 54 5. $%"qrs",	 	= ℎnLo		/	n"qrs",&&7"vwx",)*o	yJ 
where X indicates the level of activities in hectare calculated by FARMIS (cf. equation (6)), 
h(·) denotes the aggregation function from FARMIS results to ESIM categories (cf. section 
3.2.2), the index “GER” denotes that only German supply is affected and index i represents 
the iteration step. The function for recalibration of the animal product supply curves in ESIM 
appears similarly: 
(8) /<2. $%"qrs",;	 = ℎnL;o		/	n"qrs",;&&7"vwx",=>o	yJ 
with X indicating levels of livestock housing units instead of hectare. 
However, since even the recalibration method does not guarantee convergence in any case, an 
additional mechanism is applied to further increase the robustness of the iteration procedure. 
This mechanism corresponds to the top-down part of the linkage and Jansson et al. (2009, p. 
21) refer to it as “partial adjustment”. Prices which are transmitted to FARMIS are not simply 
replaced by the latest ESIM prices as suggested in the graphs above, but by an average of the 
last and second to last iteration. This further increases probability of convergence, however, it 
cannot be guaranteed in any case. 
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3.2.4 Development of an ESIM-FARMIS interface20 
After the basic idea of coupling was presented in the chapters above, it is described more 
specifically which steps were undertaken to link ESIM and FARMIS in the following. 
At first, consistent product interfaces were defined. In some cases the product aggregation 
level is different in ESIM and FARMIS and decisions were made about adequately mapping 
solution variables between both models. The detailed mapping is presented in Table B.1 in 
Annex B. Unlike for other commodities of agricultural production, prices for animal feed in 
FARMIS are not delivered by ESIM since they are endogenously determined in FARMIS, 
which is necessary in order to define the ratio between feed that is produced on farm and feed 
that is additionally purchased. Feed production in FARMIS, however, is related to animal 
production and required area for fodder production as determined by FARMIS is 
implemented into ESIM to consistently depict the price effects on other commodities in the 
next iteration step. Some by-products of the biofuel industry can be used as feeding stuff. For 
these products prices are handed over from ESIM to FARMIS since biofuel production is not 
depicted in FARMIS. 
For a first scenario, policy assumptions as well as a wide range of parameters exogenous to 
both models were harmonized, including technological progress, GDP growth, inflation rates 
and changes of exogenous factor costs. Furthermore, FARMIS depicts the production of 
energy maize which is not explicitly covered in ESIM. Since demand for energy maize is 
assumed to increase significantly until 2020, the respective area is exogenously removed in 
ESIM to account for price effects on cross products. This is already done in the first stand-
alone version of ESIM to facilitate a comparison of model reactions to the same vector of 
price and yield changes. This comparison is presented in section 4.2 and emerging differences 
among the models are discussed there. 
 From the meso to the micro-level: a top-down approach with micro 3.3
accounting21 
After ESIM and FARMIS converged in the first step of the modelling chain, detailed results 
regarding production patterns, factor demand and income sources for 628 farm groups are 
obtained representing the whole German agricultural sector. This information is necessary to 
further be disaggregated for an analysis of inequality effects. For this reason a micro-
simulation model is developed and integrated into the modelling system (see Figure 3.1). In 
the following chapters the choice of the methodology will be discussed first and the income 
variables under consideration are explained before the model is introduced in detail. 
                                                 
20
 In this section, some parts are identical with Deppermann et al. (2010). 
21
 This chapter served as a basis for the paper Deppermann et al. (2013) and in parts is equivalent to it. 
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3.3.1 Pre-information 
FARMIS applies farm groups instead of individual farms due to better manageability and an 
increased robustness of the model. Potential data errors in individual cases in particular could 
result in higher solution instability. Furthermore, the application of individual data would lead 
to high variations among the calculated input-output coefficients between farms (Osterburg et 
al. 2001). Thus, the aggregation bias which occurs from aggregation over individuals is 
accepted in favour of stability and manageability of the model. This certainly is a justifiable 
choice, especially when taking into account that over- and under predictions of individual 
production patterns tend to cancel each other out in the aggregate level (Wu and Adams, 
2002). Furthermore, the time needed to set up the model with an updated database (which 
would likely be longer with the implementation of individual farms) has to be taken into 
account. Yet, for the measurement of inequality, which so far has not been a traditional field 
of analysis for the FARMIS model, this choice is rather unfortunate because a certain part of 
inequality will be hidden inside the groups and thus, will not be observable (cf. section 2.2.2). 
For this study it was decided that the two large scale models at the top of the modelling chain 
shall be kept exercisable as stand-alone models. This has the advantage that updated versions 
of the single models can easily be implemented in the modelling chain. This rather practical 
choice relates to the “institutional challenge” of “sustainable maintenance of linked model 
systems”, which is a matter of “sufficient financial and/or human resources” (Offermann, 
2008, p. 361). Hence, to make use of synergy effects in model development it was decided to 
run the FARMIS model based on farm groups and develop an add-on model that allows a 
further disaggregation of the grouped results instead of directly accounting for reactions of 
individual farms (like it was done e.g. in Louhichi and Valin (2012) for arable farms). The 
micro-simulation model itself can easily be switched to an updated model database. 
The indicator applied for the measurement of income inequality among farms in the German 
agricultural sector is family farm income (FFI). FFI provides information on the return to 
land, labour, and capital resources owned by the farm family, as well as the remuneration of 
entrepreneurial risk.22 Henceforth the terms income and FFI will be used synonymously. Later 
on, results are presented for FFI both without and with taking additional non-farm income 
(which is not incorporated in the modelling system) into account. Whenever the latter is the 
case it is clearly stated. 
In the base period of the analysis, data for 628 homogenous farm groups are generated based 
on information from the German FADN set covering about 11,000 farms. Due to the 
dominance of corporate farms in eastern Germany all successional analyses related to the 
measurement of inequality in this study are restricted to 467 western German farm groups 
                                                 
22
 FFI is not equal to the objective function value Z of equation (6) since for instance hidden costs of the PMP-
terms do not appear in FFI and in the objective function family workers are paid by their assumed opportunity 
costs of time. 
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representing 8034 individual farms, because no comparability between different farm 
structures could be ensured when using FFI as an indicator. 
For the base period, both individual and grouped data can be observed and thus, the 
information on inequality which is lost due to data grouping and working with average values 
instead of micro data can be calculated. For the current base data of the modelling system, a 
comparison of the relative Gini coefficient reveals some differences in inequality for the base 
period: the relative Gini coefficient of single farm income data is 0.55 and the relative Gini 
coefficient of farm group income data is 0.40. 
 
3.3.2 The micro-simulation model 
The objective of the micro-simulation model is the disaggregation of farm group results of the 
last year of the simulation period. Individual FFI data are generated by tracing back farm 
group results to the individual farms which were used for the generation of farm groups in the 
base year. The basic idea of the model is to calculate base year values of the shares each 
single production activity contributes to individual farm gross margin and resource 
requirements, and then adapt these proportionally according to the changes of respective farm 
group activity levels, gross margins and factor prices between the base year and 2020. 
Figure 3.4 sketches the mode of operation of the micro-simulation model. The first step (steps 
are indicated by Roman numerals in dashed circles) refers to the generation of farm groups 
based on individual FADN data in the base period for utilization in the FARMIS model. For 
the study at hand, the micro-model takes 467 farm groups into account, which are generated 
by aggregation of 8034 western German farms that are included in the FADN data for the 
base year. Grouping implies the calculation of average production quantities, factor costs, 
gross margins and income values as well as the generation of aggregation factors to represent 
the respective proportion of the basic population for each farm group. These values are 
subsequently applied in the FARMIS model to run simulations. 
Gross margins for single production activities refer to market revenues less attributable 
production costs for a specific activity and are not directly apparent in FADN data23. Since 
this information is crucial for running simulations with FARMIS, several assumptions and 
additional calculations are made to generate activity specific gross margins, when defining the 
farm group programming model (for details see Offermann at al., 2005 and Osterburg et al., 
2001). 
In step two, base year income of individual farms is broken down into several components 
which reflect the shares that single production activities contribute to the individual farm 
income. For that purpose activity levels from FADN data are combined with respective 
average gross margins which were calculated for FARMIS groups in step one. Furthermore, 
                                                 
23
 For example, variable input costs are not directly attributed to production activities in the German FADN. 
40 
 
individual costs for hired labour, capital, and rented land are as well separately calculated by 
utilizing average group prices and individual input quantities. 
Since not all commodities, income sources, and costs indicated in the German FADN are also 
allocated to activities and included in FARMIS (e.g., forestry and agri-tourism are not 
explicitly covered in the model), a part of the original FFI is not changed by the model and is 
assumed to be fixed. In step two the ‘variable part’ of the income (the part depicted in the 
FARMIS model, i.e. the core agricultural production activities) is calculated for all individual 
farms by summing up all income components of the single production activities and all 
(negative) factor costs. 
Step three indicates a simulation run of the ESIM-FARMIS modelling chain. In this process, 
farm group results for the year 2020 are generated. The generated changes of activity levels 
between the base year and the year 2020 are applied to individual base year levels in step 
four. That is, all individual farms covered by a specific farm group have the same percentage 
changes in production for all commodities. The same approach is used for capital costs. The 
quantity of rented land is calculated according to new farm specific crop activity levels less 
the farm owned share of land. 
Labour requirements are calculated regarding new production quantities. With new 
production patterns in 2020 an individual farm may have excess capacity of family workers. 
In such a case it is assumed that the farm sells work to other farms at market conditions. 
However, work can only be ‘traded’ within one farm group to ensure consistency between 
group income and aggregated income of individual farms. Thus, in the case that the whole 
group as an aggregate has excess capacity of family workers, these workers are assumed to 
work off-farm.24 
Then, adjusted activity levels and resource requirements are multiplied by respective gross 
margins and factor prices calculated by the modelling system for the year 2020. Adding up 
the single gross margins and cost components generates the variable part of each individual 
farm income for 2020. 
In step five, the difference of the variable part of the income in the base year and the variable 
part of the income in 2020 (which can be positive or negative) is added to the original base 
year FADN values of farm income. That way, also the fixed part of the income is considered. 
In a last step the generated individual data are aggregated and compared to original group 
results. In most cases group results are perfectly met. In case of small divergences, individual 
incomes are scaled to meet group results. 
                                                 
24
 Off-farm work is not included in FFI. However, the amount of income earned off the farm makes a difference 
when total household income is analysed instead of FFI (section 5.3.2). Thus, sensitivity of income levels of 
additional off-farm workers on distributional parameters was tested. To this end, a version where additional off-
farm workers earn 80% of employed on-farm workers was compared to a version where additional off-farm 
workers are unemployed and have no income. However, the impact of this assumption on the final results is only 
marginal. 
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NB: N – Number of income units; GM – Gross Margin; FP – Factor Price; FFI – Family Farm Income. 
 Figure 3.4: Micro-simulation model in connection with FARMIS. 
 Source: own compilation. 
 
The micro-model is of the micro accounting type in the sense of Bourguignon et al. (2008b) 
since the model is static which means there is no behaviour depicted in the model itself (see 
section 2.3.3). A similar approach for the generation of farm incomes at the micro level is 
used in the FES model (Woltjer et al., 2011) which applies exogenous price changes to static 
single farms. 
The model takes adaptions of production patterns into consideration, though, only as 
exogenous information. In principle, it would be possible to account for behaviour of single 
farms (compare, for example the approach of Louhichi and Valin (2012) for arable farms). 
Nevertheless, due to the reasons presented in section 3.3.1 behaviour of single farms was not 
taken into consideration. 
The same proportional reaction of all farms in one group to new price incentives is certainly a 
strong assumption. Still, heterogeneity among production patterns of farms in the same group 
is taken into consideration because different commodities might face different price changes. 
Furthermore, taking into account that an average group represents 17.2 FADN farms and that 
stratification was undertaken according to type, region, and size, an assumed similar 
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behaviour of individual farms belonging to the same group seems acceptable. It can be argued 
that behavioural adaption processes are to a great extent already covered by the FARMIS 
model, which also makes the missing feedback effect less relevant. The application of 467 
behavioural farm groups also distinguishes the modelling chain from a similar methodology 
presented in Keeney and Beckman (2009), Keeney (2009), and Hertel et al. (2007), which, in 
a nutshell, map quantities and prices resulting from only one regional household of a CGE 
model to a disaggregated farm household survey. 
One caveat, however, which appears in almost all analyses of distributional effects on the 
national or comparable level remains. The overall farm population of western Germany 
consist of more than 160,000 farms. This in turn means that 8,024 FADN farms still account 
for only a fraction of all farms and have to be weighted by an aggregation factor to represent 
their respective proportion of the overall population. Thus, an implicit assumption is that one 
single farm depicted in the modelling system (or in the FADN data) on average represents 
more than 20 farms of the overall population. This assumption is common to virtually all 
analyses of distributional effects since only observed units can be modelled and complete 
population surveys on the national level practically do not exist. 
Summing up, the model is applied to account for heterogeneity of farms inside a group to 
allow for measuring changes in inside-group inequality. Results are disaggregated in a static, 
top-down manner, after the ESIM-FARMIS model chain is solved. In principle, the approach 
is comparable to other standard micro accounting approaches utilizing representative groups, 
however, this analysis refers to 467 representative farm groups from a behavioural model, 
which in comparison is an outstanding high number. As Lofgren et al. (2003, p. 334) argue, 
the distinction between the micro-simulation approach of modelling a single unit and the 
representative agent approach of applying only grouped data is not always sharp. This 
especially becomes evident, when it is taken into account that single units from large data 
surveys are assumed to be representative for a share of the overall population. 
 Technical implementation of model communication 3.4
All parts of the overall modelling system are coded in the GAMS programming language. 
This facilitates an automated coupling of the two large scale models ESIM and FARMIS and 
a successional run of the disaggregation and inequality components. 
The ESIM-FARMIS coupling is managed by a steering file, presented in Appendix A. In 
principle, it implements the steps defined in Section 3.2.2 until convergence among the model 
results is ensured. To keep the structure of the models autonomous, so that they readily can be 
removed by an updated model version, it is necessary to run them independently from each 
other. Furthermore, the models have to be run several times with redefining parameters after 
each solve of a single model. Thus, models have to be started at execution time of the GAMS 
system since they are not readily available at compilation time, yet. 
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The basic idea to do so is to run GAMS from within the main GAMS program. This is 
achieved by the ‘execute’ command which in general allows the implementation of external 
programs during execution time of GAMS (McCarl et al., 2012). This command is 
complemented by the use of ‘execute_unload’ and ‘execute_load’ to store results in a gdx-file 
and load them at execution time, respectively. The latter two commands are used to hand over 
results after each single-model run to the main GAMS program, convert them into commodity 
categories of the second model, and subsequently hand them over to a subservient GAMS 
program for running the adapted second model. 
To save computation time, the ESIM model is split up into a component which runs the model 
until the year 2019 and a second component which runs the model only for 2020. This is 
possible due to the comparative static nature of the model. The first component is only run 
once at the beginning of the iteration process and intermediate results are saved for a 
subsequent utilization in the (adapted) 2020 component.25 
4 Scenario description and sectoral results 
In the empirical part of this study, different scenarios are analysed with the above described 
modelling system. These scenarios are introduced in this section. Subsequently, sectoral 
results of the first part of the modelling system (only ESIM-FARMIS) are presented. 
Inequality effects are presented afterwards in chapter 5 and 6. 
 Scenario description26 4.1
Scenarios are conducted for the year 2020 with the model base period being an average of the 
years 2006-200827. Three different liberalization scenarios are compared with a reference 
scenario (the baseline) regarding their market outputs and later on regarding their income 
distribution. In the baseline, the 2003 Reform and the Health Check of the CAP are fully 
implemented except for the abolishment of milk quotas. Milk quotas are assumed to increase 
until 2015 according to the Agenda 2000 decision, including the additional 2% quota increase 
in 2008 and the fat adjustment in 2009/10. It is assumed that a (first generation) biofuel share 
of 8% in total EU transport fuel consumption will be reached by 2020. Furthermore, the sugar 
market reform decided upon in 2005 is implemented and set-aside obligations are removed in 
2008. The baseline adopts constant levels of tariffs, export subsidies, tariff rate quotas (except 
for sugar), and the current system of intervention prices. For the international environment, 
ESIM is calibrated to FAPRI world market price projections (FAPRI, 2011) and no changes 
in external trade policies of the EU are assumed until 2020. 
                                                 
25
 Actually, it is only necessary to solve the model for the base year and 2020. However, for technical reasons it 
is easier to run the model until 2019 and store intermediate results for subsequent utilization. 
26
 This section is almost identical to Deppermann et al. (2013) and Deppermann et al. (2014). 
27
 The FARMIS model applies 2006-2008 data for its base period and the baseline calibration of the modelling 
system for 2020 refers also to prices of 2006-2008. However, the ESIM base period refers to 2006-2007 data, 
which may lead to slight inconsistencies. 
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To account for the effects of liberalizing agricultural policy on production and income in the 
agricultural sector, the baseline results in 2020 are compared with results of other scenarios in 
2020. The single scenario results reflect impacts of different, exogenously defined policy 
changes to the baseline scenario.  
The strongest liberalization scenario assumes a liberalization of all first pillar agricultural 
policies (i.e., the abolishment of all intervention prices, tariffs, quotas, subsidies, and direct 
payments). Therefore, in 2020 the EU price level equals the world market price for tradable 
products. In another scenario isolated effects of a separate abolishment of first pillar direct 
payments (DP) are analysed (henceforth, No_DP scenario) and in another scenario all price 
policies are abolished (henceforth, No_Pricepol scenario), but direct payments are still paid to 
farmers to single out the effects of different policy instruments. Furthermore, a scenario with 
a cut of 50% of DPs is carried out (50_DP scenario) to analyse whether results are in 
accordance with the full abolishment of DPs, since for a 100% cut the FARMIS model clearly 
generates results which would be dampened in reality by structural change which is not 
depicted in the model. 
 Sectoral results28 4.2
In the following sections sectoral results of the described scenarios are discussed in detail. 
Thus, only results of the ESIM-FARMIS modelling chain are presented without application of 
the micro model. At first the baseline scenario, which serves as a reference later on, is 
described. Subsequently market impacts of the policy scenarios are presented. 
To evaluate the importance of the iterative coupling procedure differences in the reaction of 
both stand-alone models to the same price changes will be discussed. This gives also an 
indication for the occurrence of aggregation biases. 
 
4.2.1 Integrated Baseline 
The overall trend of world market prices in US-dollar in the baseline is based on projections 
published by FAPRI for 2020 (FAPRI, 2011). The development of world market prices 
between the base year (2006-2008) and 2020 is characterized by a slight increase of real crop 
prices and a stronger increase of the real price index of animal products (see Figure 4.1). 
While the crop price index increases by roughly 3.5% until 2020, animal product prices rise 
on average by 7% in the same time period. Consequently, the real price index of all farms 
shows an intermediate increase of about 5%. 
                                                 
28
 Some parts of this chapter are identical to the paper Deppermann et al. (2010). 
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Figure 4.1: Real world market price indices for agricultural products. 
 Source: Own calculations. 
The development of the European agricultural sector is determined by developments of the 
world agricultural market; however, it is additionally affected by European agricultural policy 
and other macroeconomic variables. In the baseline, a continuous appreciation of one percent 
per year of the Euro against the US-Dollar is assumed (FAPRI, 2011)29. This is the main 
reason for the decrease of agricultural prices in Europe, as presented in Figure 4.2. In 
accordance with the world market prices (US-Dollar based), the European price index for 
crops (Euro based) shows the greatest decrease. The price index of animal products declines 
slightly and the overall farm price index is intermediate. Additional to the exchange rate 
effect, the crop price index is affected by the sugar market reform which is implemented 
between the base year and 2010 and which substantially reduces the European price for sugar. 
In spite of declining Euro-prices in the agricultural sector, supply of crops and livestock 
products increases until 2020. This is caused by exogenously implemented supply shifters 
which reflect yield increases in the agricultural sector and which are linear extrapolations of 
yield data of the FAO database from 1992 until 2007 (FAO, n.d.). 
 
                                                 
29
 In the original data (FAPRI, 2011) the development of the exchange rates is more volatile. For the sake of 
convenience the yearly development is averaged out, since the model runs more stable and our interest is only in 
comparative static results of the baseline and its counterfactuals in the year 2020, which are not affected by the 
time path a parameter follows. 
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Figure 4.2: Development of EU-27 Indices of Agricultural Prices and 
Production (Base year – 2020). 
Source: Own calculations. 
In Table 4.1 price changes and responding quantity/supply changes for single products of the 
German agricultural sector are displayed. Columns 1-3 refer to the baseline development of 
ESIM and FARMIS as stand-alone models (before the iteration process), whereby ESIM 
prices are used to generate FARMIS results. Thus, it can be assessed how the two different 
models react on the same vector of price changes. 
Crop prices develop in line with the overall European price index with only the wheat price 
slightly increasing. This is caused by the fact that the EU switches from a net export position 
in the base year to a net import position in 2020 and a threshold price is applied in the EU, 
which lies slightly above the world market price. The only commodity shown among the 
animal products with a decreasing price is pork. Yet, pork has a high value share among the 
animal products and poultry prices30 also decline, which explains the decreasing price index 
of animal products in Figure 4.2 despite rising beef and milk prices. 
Price drops and an increasing amount of energy maize production which is exogenously 
implemented in the models lead to a substantial decline in utilized agricultural area for all 
other crops in 2020 compared to the base year in both models. In the stand-alone version of 
FARMIS this effect is slightly stronger for most products than in ESIM. In general reactions 
of the models go into the same direction and are of similar scope. Yet, there are two main 
exemptions from that: beef and set-aside.  
                                                 
30
 Poultry is not presented in the table because only a part of the poultry production is considered in FARMIS. 
Namely, only poultry farming on farms with area is depicted and in western Germany production on corporate 
farms is excluded. In the base year, poultry production in FARMIS accounts for 42% of the production depicted 
in ESIM. 
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Differences in model reactions regarding beef production have to be discussed in combination 
with the milk market. Milk supply increases by 4% in both models, which is the effect of a 
slight expansion of the EU milk quota until 2020. The limited production of milk together 
with an output increase per dairy cow cause a decline in beef production in FARMIS, since 
with higher milk output per animal less milk cows are needed to fulfil the milk quota and calf 
production is reduced. In ESIM, this link is missing. Milk and beef are modelled as 
complementary goods, i.e. connected by a positive cross-price elasticity. Given this and a 
binding milk production quota, ESIM results tend to be erroneous. In the case at hand, the 
stable milk price doesn’t affect beef production and the latter increases due to the projected 
price increase. 
Set-aside land reported in Table 4.1 refers solely to voluntary set-aside, in the base year as 
well as in 2020. Obligatory set-aside is abolished already in 2008. The different reactions 
among the models regarding set-aside mainly go back to different modelling concepts. In 
ESIM the quantity of set-aside land depends on its “own-price”, which in fact is the amount of 
direct payments linked to one hectare of eligible land, and to prices of arable crops. However, 
cross-price elasticities to arable crops are very small and with decreasing real values of direct 
payments (since nominal direct payments are assumed to be constant until 2020) the quantity 
decreases slightly, as well. In FARMIS the quantity of production depends on gross margins. 
With only slightly falling values of direct payments per hectare and at the same time heavily 
decreasing prices of other crops, set-aside becomes more favourable and thus, its quantity 
increases. 
These two major differences and the minor deviations are dealt with by the iterative 
procedure, resulting in a convergence of model results after four iterations. Results are 
presented in columns four and six of Table 4.1. For the majority of products, Germany is a 
small country inside the European Union. This means that (EU determined) prices do not 
react much to relatively small changes in German supply. For these products, FARMIS 
determined quantity changes do not generate any relevant price feedback and after one 
iteration step convergence is already reached. 
The model linkage is rather relevant for non-tradable goods or such goods where in Germany 
a big part of total EU supply is produced. An example for the latter is rye: an 8% area 
reduction in 2020 due to FARMIS results goes together with a decrease in prices of two 
percentage points. Furthermore, German beef production accounts for roughly 15% of total 
European production in the base year and thus, a decrease of eleven percentage points causes 
a two percentage point increase in beef prices compared to the ESIM stand-alone baseline. 
Potatoes and raw milk are the only two goods that are modelled as non-tradable in ESIM and 
at the same time are more relevant for the model linkage. While in the case of potatoes a 
strong price effect occurs due to the less pronounced area reduction in FARMIS, there are no 
effects in milk supply. This is due to EU milk quota restrictions. Here, the iteration process 
becomes relevant in case of a non-binding quota. 
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In the final baseline, overall utilized agricultural area declines for most crops with the 
exception of wheat. Also voluntary set-aside is extended; however, the absolute area is rather 
small (roughly 2% of total arable land in the base year). Not depicted in the table is the 
exogenously driven increase of energy maize which accounts for about 7.5% of German 
agricultural area. Effects are clearly stronger in FARMIS, which is more price sensitive than 
ESIM. In case of beef supply, biophysical restrictions are crucial for the decline in quantity. 
Milk and sugar supply is determined by the quota. 
Table 4.1: Price and area/quantity changes (in %) in the baseline (2020 compared to base 
year) for Germany before and after Iteration. 
 
 
Products 
Before iteration After iteration 
 Change 
in price 
Change in 
area/supply 
in ESIM 
Change in 
area/supply 
in FARMIS 
Change in price Change in 
area/supply 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
% 
comp. to 
base 
year 
% comp. to 
base year 
% comp. to 
base year 
% 
comp. 
to base 
year 
% points 
differ-
ence 
with (1) 
% 
comp. 
to base 
year 
% 
points 
differ-
ence 
with (2) 
Area changes (crops)               
Wheat 2 -1 3 2 0 2 3 
Barley -6 -6 -7 -5 1 -7 1 
Corn -3 -1 -3 -2 1 -3 2 
Rapeseed -22 -21 -35 -21 1 -35 14 
Rye -9 -6 -15 -7 2 -14 8 
Sugar  -22 -19 -17 -22 0 -16 -3 
Other Grains a -10 -7 -18 -9 1 -17 -10 
Potatoes -20 -16 -7 -30 10 -14 -2 
Fodder b - 0 3 - - 3 3 
Silage Maize - - 8 - 4 - - -4 4 
Grass - 0 0 - - 0 0 
Volunt. Set-aside - - 1 29 - - 27 30 
Supply changes 
(animal products)               
Pork -2 1 8 -2 0 8 7 
Beef 7 4 -7 9 2 -7 11 
Milk 1 4 4 2 1 4 0 
a
 Other grains: triticale and oats. b Fodder: other fodder except silage maize and grass. 
Source: Own calculations. 
4.2.2 Liberalization Scenarios 
In this chapter the four different liberalization scenarios (see section 4.1) are presented and 
compared to the reference scenario. At first results are presented at the European level.  
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Figure 4.3 shows that the scenarios with a 50% and a 100% cut of DPs have similar results, 
whereby the effects of the full cut are clearly stronger. Results at the European level are 
largely determined by ESIM since FARMIS solely provides results for Germany, which in the 
European context have only a minor impact as seen already in the discussion of baseline 
results. 
When DPs are cut, farm supply is decreasing because production incentives are reduced. This 
effect is stronger for crops since the bulk of DPs is coupled to land. Yet, for animal products 
some coupled DPs are still left (e.g. Article 68 payments) and additionally higher feedstock 
prices reduce the supply quantity in the scenario results, but to a lesser extent. Lower supply 
quantities subsequently result in higher prices. 
It is visible from Figure 4.3 that the abolishment of price policies has much stronger effects on 
market development than the abolishment of DPs. This, however, is only true for the ESIM 
model. Diverging results regarding cuts in DPs among the models can be observed in the 
following tables and will be discussed in the remainder of this section in more detail. 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Scenario Results Relative to Baseline – EU-27 Indices of Agricultural Prices and 
Supply Quantities (2020). 
Source: Own calculations. 
The abolishment of price policies causes a different type of shock than a cut in direct 
payments does. The latter reduces the incentive to produce, which leads to increased market 
prices. The abolishment of price policies like tariffs or intervention prices directly causes 
lower domestic market prices, which reduce the incentive to produce (Figure 4.3).31 
                                                 
31
 Since quota restrictions are implemented together with border protection measures, the quantity effects are not 
a priori assessable. 
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In the Full_Lib scenario supply indices decrease more than in the No_Pricepol scenario 
reflecting lower production incentives due to additional cuts in DPs, which results in a higher 
average price level compared to the No_Pricepol scenario. 
Results for the German level are presented in Table 4.2 to Table 4.5. Again, the first three 
columns refer to the model results when they are used as stand-alone versions without 
iteration procedure and the remaining columns show results of the two models commonly 
applied and differences to the stand-alone version results. Scenario results are presented in 
relation to baseline results to provide ceteris paribus conditions and single out the effects of 
policy reforms. 
Table 4.2 presents results for the German agricultural sector under the scenario No_DP, which 
entails a full abolition of DPs. Results of the stand-alone version of ESIM show only a slight 
decline in utilized area for most of the crops, whereas area changes in FARMIS are 
significant. FARMIS reacts much more sensibly to cuts in decoupled DPs than ESIM does. 
The explanation is inherent to the models. In ESIM it is assumed that decoupled payments 
have an effect on production which is equivalent to an increase in prices by 20% of their 
value. Thus, only 20% of the DPs are incorporated in the model and an abolishment of DPs 
causes a comparatively low shock. Furthermore, structural change – in terms of an increase in 
average farm size as well as in terms of adoption of new production technologies – is 
incorporated in the supply elasticities that are utilized in ESIM. Hence, effects of strong 
income shocks in the agricultural sector are more moderate since it is assumed that the sector 
adapts not solely within given production structures but also by changing structures.  
In FARMIS the land market is modelled on a regional level. DPs are assumed to fully 
capitalize in the land market. Hence, a reduction of DPs only affects production when gross 
margins without DPs become negative and subsequently production is reduced in respective 
regions. In many regions land rental prices are too low to absorb abolished DPs, which then 
leads to a strong decline in utilized area as shown in Table 4.2. In reality effects probably 
would be dampened by structural changes in the farming sector; however, in the current 
version the programming approach applied in FARMIS takes structural changes into account 
only exogenously between the base year and the final year of the simulation period. This 
means that the same rate of structural change occurs in each scenario, independently from 
sectoral market developments. Thus, in contrast to ESIM no structural changes occur between 
baseline results and scenario results. According to that, FARMIS results should be interpreted 
against the background that with strong reductions in average income, significant structural 
change such as an increase in farm size and farmers leaving the sector can be expected which 
is not depicted in current model specifications. 
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Table 4.2: Price and Area/Quantity Changes (in %) in the No_DP Scenario (2020 compared 
to Baseline in 2020) for Germany before and after Iteration. 
 
 
Products 
Before iteration After iteration 
 Change 
in price 
Change in 
area/supply 
in ESIM 
Change in 
area/supply 
in FARMIS 
Change in price Change in 
area/supply 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 % % % % % points 
differ-
ence 
with (1) 
% % 
points 
differ-
ence 
with (2) 
Area changes (crops)        
Wheat -0.6 -0.3 -14.6 2 2.6 -12 11.7 
Barley 0 -0.6 -19 1.7 1.7 -17.7 17.1 
Corn 0 -0.1 -9.7 0 0 -10.1 10 
Rapeseed 0.2 -1.5 -38 1.1 0.9 -35.4 33.9 
Rye 1.3 -1.6 -23 8.7 7.4 -16.3 14.7 
Sugar  0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0 0 
Other Grainsa 0.6 -1 -24.1 3.1 3.7 -22 21 
Potatoes -1.5 0.1 -1.6 2.7 4.2 -0.4 0.5 
Volunt. Set-aside - -40 -60 - - -60.7 20.7 
Fodderb - -1.3 -11 - - -11.1 9.8 
Silage Maize - -1.6 -1.8 - - -1.9 0.3 
Gras - -0.2 -14.2 - - -14 13.8 
Supply changes 
(animal products) 
       
Pork 0 0.1 -0.2 0.5 0.5 -0.5 0.6 
Beef 1 0.2 -3 0.7 0.3 -3.1 3.3 
Milk 0 0 0 0.2 0.2 0 0 
a
 Other grains: triticale and oats. b Fodder: other fodder except silage maize and grass. 
Source: Own calculations. 
ESIM results in the livestock sector might seem implausible at first glance. In Germany, beef 
quantities and price rise simultaneously after DPs are abolished. This, however, is a specific 
result for Germany since DPs are fully decoupled unlike in many other countries (e.g. France, 
Spain, and Austria) which kept a small share of DPs coupled, especially in the beef sector. 
The abolishment of coupled payments in these countries leads to a reduction of the incentive 
price for beef production, which in turn reduces supply and increases the market price for beef 
in Europe.32 Since no coupled DPs are left in the baseline in Germany in 2020, German 
farmers do not suffer from abolished DPs for beef but are profiting from an increase in market 
prices. In ESIM this own price effect even overcompensates the increasing feedstock costs 
                                                 
32
 In ESIM a European point market is assumed. It is abstracted from the possibility of different regional prices 
that might occur due to transportation or other transaction costs. 
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which result from higher crop prices. Thus, at the aggregate European level beef supply is 
reduced but in the German sector it is slightly extended. In FARMIS the slightly increasing 
beef price is not sufficient to overcompensate for higher feedstock prices, hence, beef supply 
decreases. 
After the iteration process, a significant reduction in utilized area compared to the stand-alone 
ESIM results (see Table 4.2, column 7) leads to rather small price changes (column 5). This 
again reflects that Germany is a small country within Europe (and the world) in terms of 
agricultural production for most commodities. For non-tradable goods (potatoes) and for 
crops where a substantial share of world supply is produced in Germany (rye) stronger price 
effects occur and the FARMIS results are dampened. 
In Table 4.3 results of a 50% DP cut scenario are presented. Effects are less pronounced for 
this scenario compared to the full abolishment. The FARMIS stand-alone version still 
generates significantly stronger effects than the ESIM stand-alone version. However, area 
declines less than half the amount of the scenario with full abolishment of the DPs. The 
relation between the share of DPs that are cut and the decline of area under production is non-
linear because the production decision is only affected when gross margins become negative. 
The still strong area effects in FARMIS are mainly caused by low rental prices which are 
observed in southern German regions in the baseline in 2020. Here, even a 50% cut of DPs 
cannot be absorbed by the land market, whereas in the north most regions still have positive 
land rents after the cut. In a more aggregate version of the model these effects would have 
been weaker since an average land price would provide more scope for an absorption of DP 
cuts, since the threshold of zero rental prices would hardly be passed. This is a good example 
to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the two single models: while ESIM tends to 
underestimate effects of DP cuts due to an aggregation error FARMIS tends to overestimate 
the effects in the scenario at hand due to a limited depiction of structural changes that likely 
would occur. 
When the models are commonly used in the iterative modelling chain, these weaknesses are 
not fundamentally solved. Since the FARMIS model replaces only the German supply in 
ESIM, price effects are still determined to a great extent by the other European countries 
which are not disaggregated. Furthermore, the effects for Germany are likely overrated since 
quantity effects generated by FARMIS hardly are dampened by the small price effects at the 
European level. 
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Table 4.3: Price and Area/Quantity Changes (in %) in the 50_DP Scenario (2020 compared to 
Baseline in 2020) for Germany before and after Iteration. 
 
 
Products 
Before iteration After iteration 
 Change 
in price 
Change in 
area/supply 
in ESIM 
Change in 
area/supply 
in FARMIS 
Change in price Change in 
area/supply 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 % % % % % points 
differ-
ence 
with (1) 
% % 
points 
differ-
ence 
with (2) 
Area changes (crops)        
Wheat -0.1 -0.1 -5.3 0.7 0.8 -3.8 3.7 
Barley 0.1 -0.5 -6.6 0.6 0.5 -5.9 5.4 
Corn 0 -0.1 -2.9 0 0 -3.2 3.1 
Rapeseed 0.1 -1.2 -11.4 0.4 0.3 -10.3 9.1 
Rye 0.7 -1 -7.2 2.3 1.6 -5 4 
Sugar  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other Grainsa 0.5 -0.7 -7.5 1.1 0.6 -6.7 6 
Potatoes -0.5 0 -0.8 0.6 1.1 0 0 
Volunt. Set-aside - -7 -18.4 - - -18.4 11.4 
Fodderb - -0.8 -7.6 - - -7.5 6.7 
Silage Maize - -0.9 -1 - - -0.9 0 
Gras - 0 -3.3 - - -3.1 3.1 
Supply changes 
(animal products) 
       
Pork 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.1 
Beef 0.6 0.1 -0.9 0.4 0.2 -0.9 1 
Milk 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
a
 Other grains: triticale and oats. b Fodder: other fodder except silage maize and grass. 
Source: Own calculations. 
Comparatively strong price changes occur in the No_Pricepol scenario (Table 4.4). For wheat 
and corn strong price cuts arise because of the abolishment of intervention prices which were 
relevant in the baseline in 2020. An even stronger reduction occurs for sugar due to the 
abolishment of the quota restrictions, the specific tariff, and the intervention price. In the case 
of beef and pork meat, high tariffs are reduced. Yet, a quality mark-up of roughly 25% of 
world market prices is assumed for these products in the No_Pricepol scenario to reflect the 
assumption that consumers care about the origin of livestock products and on average have a 
higher willingness to pay for domestically produced meat. Despite the mark-up, beef prices 
drop by 34.8% compared to the baseline in 2020. The pork meat price drops to a much lesser 
extent because under baseline assumptions the EU has an almost balanced net-trade (net-
exports account for about 1% of EU consumption) and prices are almost at world market level 
in the baseline (plus the mark-up). The abolishment of the European milk quota and the 
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simultaneous liberalization of dairy product markets (export subsidies and tariffs) lead to an 
18.8% lower milk price compared to the baseline. 
As has already been observed in baseline results, a biophysical link in FARMIS restricts beef 
production when a binding milk quota is in place. The reverse effect is now observable when 
the milk quota is abolished. While in ESIM beef supply is reduced by 29% due to strong price 
effects, FARMIS results only show a reduction of 1.8%. Due to a strong increase in milk 
supply additional beef meat is produced as a complementary product which compensates the 
price induced decline in beef production to a great extent. Pork production in ESIM is 
extended despite a reduced price. This effect occurs because the price drop is relatively small 
compared to other livestock products and the own-price effect is overcompensated by cross-
price effects. 
A similar case occurs for barley, rye, other grains, and rapeseed. Area in both models is 
extended despite reduced own-prices because of cross-price effects which are triggered by a 
strong decline in wheat, corn and sugar prices. The relatively small reduction of wheat and 
corn area in ESIM is also explained by cross-price effects.  
The area utilized for feeding-stuff production is reduced in ESIM due to decreasing livestock 
production. The less pronounced decline in livestock production in FARMIS and the increase 
in milk supply lead to an increasing demand for feeding-stuff and accordingly area is 
expanded. 
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 Table 4.4: Price and Area/Quantity Changes (in %) in the No_Pricepol Scenario (2020 
compared to Baseline in 2020) for Germany before and after Iteration 
 
 
Products 
Before iteration After iteration 
 Change 
in price 
Change in 
area/supply 
in ESIM 
Change in 
area/supply 
in FARMIS 
Change in price Change in 
area/supply 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 % % % % % points 
differ-
ence 
with (1) 
% % 
points 
differ-
ence 
with (2) 
Area changes (crops)        
Wheat -19 -5.3 -16.1 -18.6 0.4 -15.4 10.1 
Barley -3.8 4.3 2.9 -3.4 0.4 3.5 0.8 
Corn -19 -3 -18.2 -19 0 -18.2 15.2 
Rapeseed 0.9 9.3 15.1 0.9 0 15.1 5.8 
Rye -3.8 4.4 4 -3.4 0.4 4.3 0.1 
Sugar  -33.6 -19.8 -24.1 -33.3 0.3 -23.6 3.8 
Other Grainsa -2.8 4.7 5.5 -3 0.2 5.3 0.6 
Potatoes -5 0.1 -1 -3.7 1.3 -0.2 0.3 
Volunt. Set-aside - 1.7 21.2 - - 21.5 19.8 
Fodderb - -9.4 4.9 - - 3 12.4 
Silage Maize - -12 4.7 - - 3.6 15.6 
Gras - -1.6 0 - - 0 1.6 
Supply changes 
(animal products) 
       
Pork -4.3 0.5 -2 -3.9 0.4 -2.2 2.7 
Beef -34.8 -29 -1.8 -35.4 0.6 -2.6 26.4 
Milk -18.8 3.3 11.3 -21.1 2.3 9.8 6.5 
a
 Other grains: triticale and oats. b Fodder: other fodder except silage maize and grass. 
Source: Own calculations. 
In the Full_Lib scenario a full market liberalization of EU agricultural policies is simulated, 
i.e. the abolishment of all price policies and all direct payments at once. ESIM results only 
marginally change compared to the No_Pricepol scenario33. FARMIS results conversely 
indicate that area for almost all crops declines heavily due to an additional abolishment of 
DPs. After the abolishment of price policies, average gross margins in FARMIS already are 
reduced so that an additional cut in DPs causes negative gross margins in many regions. Even 
with these enormous declines in production, world market prices are hardly affected by 
implementing FARMIS results into ESIM. 
                                                 
33
 The only exception is voluntary setaside which doesn’t generate any income anymore when DPs are abolished. 
However, due to isoelastic functional forms production values cannot become zero. 
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Table 4.5: Price and Area/Quantity Changes (in %) in the Full_Lib Scenario (2020 compared 
to Baseline in 2020) for Germany before and after Iteration. 
 
 
Products 
Before iteration After iteration 
 Change 
in price 
Change in 
area/supply 
in ESIM 
Change in 
area/supply 
in FARMIS 
Change in price Change in 
area/supply 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 % % % % % points 
differ-
ence 
with (1) 
% % 
points 
differ-
ence 
with (2) 
Area changes (crops)        
Wheat -19.6 -5.3 -35 -17.8 1.8 -33.2 27.9 
Barley -3.9 3.5 -21.4 -1.7 2.2 -19.1 22.6 
Corn -19.2 -2.9 -30.5 -18.7 0.5 -30.4 27.5 
Rapeseed 1 7.7 -34.4 2.3 1.3 -30.8 38.5 
Rye -2.8 2.6 -25.2 2.2 5 -20.3 22.9 
Sugar  -33.7 -23 -38 -33 0.7 -36.9 13.9 
Other Grainsa -2.7 3.5 -25 -1.9 0.8 -23.9 27.4 
Potatoes -6.6 0.4 -3.2 -0.6 6 -0.6 1 
Volunt. Set-aside - -39.6 -55.5 - - -55.2 15.6 
Fodderb - -12 -13 - - -13.4 1.4 
Silage Maize - -14.7 0.4 - - -0.5 14.2 
Gras - -2.1 -15.7 - - -16.3 14.2 
Supply changes 
(animal products) 
       
Pork -4.3 0.6 -2.2 -3.5 0.8 -2.8 3.4 
Beef -34.5 -29 -6.8 -35 0.5 -7.6 21.4 
Milk -18.6 2.8 8.1 -20 1.4 7.1 4.3 
a
 Other grains: triticale and oats. b Fodder: other fodder except silage maize and grass. 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
4.2.3 Discussion 
In the baseline, for most commodities reactions of the models go in the same direction and are 
of similar scope. Under scenario conditions, however, quite a few differences can be observed 
between the stand-alone versions of the two models. 
In the No_Pricepol scenario reactions for field crops are broadly in line among the models. 
However, FARMIS seems to be more sensitive regarding price changes than ESIM. Larger 
disparities occur in the livestock sector, mainly caused by different impacts of the milk quota 
abolishment. 
Differences in scenarios with DP cuts are much more pronounced. This goes back to different 
theoretical concepts with regard to the modelling of direct payments and the implementation 
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of structural change. ESIM to a certain degree considers (historically observed) structural 
change since it implicitly is included in its behavioural parameters. Furthermore, only 20% of 
the value of decoupled DPs is assumed to have an effect which is equivalent to a change in 
market prices. Contrarily, structural change in FARMIS is implemented exogenously. With 
strong reductions in average income, an increase in average farm size would be expected in 
reality; however, this dampening effect on supply reactions does not arise in the current model 
specification. Additionally, DPs are fully accounted for. When land markets are not able to 
absorb DP cuts via a reduction in rental prices, production becomes unprofitable in certain 
regions. The regional differentiation of land markets gives a more detailed picture compared 
to a model with a single region. In the 50_DP scenario, production declines in some regions 
even though the average land price of all regions would be high enough to absorb the cut in 
DPs almost entirely. ESIM only implicitly takes regional differences into account at the 
aggregate level via its elasticity approach. However, this approach implies that all farms have 
constant marginal reactions on a cut in DPs, no matter of the depth of the cut. Considering all 
these points, it can be concluded that impacts of DP cuts tend to be underestimated in ESIM 
and overestimated in FARMIS. 
The different model reactions are dealt with in an iterative procedure. However, even 
significant declines in supply in FARMIS do not cause strong price feedback in ESIM. Prices 
are similar for many products before and after the iteration. This is due to the fact that prices 
in ESIM are determined at the world or European level rather than at the German level. 
Germany is a small country for most of the agricultural products. Only in cases where a 
considerable share of world production is produced in Germany or where commodities are 
non-tradable, are price reactions more pronounced. Thus, the iteration procedure is relevant 
only for few commodities depicted in the models. Another picture would emerge, when more 
countries depicted in ESIM would simultaneously be substituted by programming models of 
the FARMIS type. In such a case supply changes would be more pronounced at the aggregate 
level and prices would react accordingly. 
From the discussion above it becomes clear that even though considerable differences among 
the models occur, they only partially can be traced back to the different levels of model 
aggregation. Nevertheless, due to the disaggregated structure, FARMIS clearly accounts for 
more heterogeneity of the sector, which also is reflected in aggregate results. For example, 
effects in the 50_DP scenario would be much lower if FARMIS was run on a higher level of 
aggregation. Another example is the bio-physical link between milk and beef production in 
FARMIS. Farmers that already fulfil their milk deliveries under quota restrictions need less 
dairy cows, which has an effect on calf and consequently beef production at the aggregate 
level.  
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5 Redistributive effects of agricultural policy 
After the modelling system has been introduced above and it has been explained how ex-ante 
data are generated, in a second step these data are further analysed to draw conclusions 
regarding distributional effects of the different reforms of agricultural policy in the 
agricultural sector of western Germany. 
 Measuring inequality and redistributive effects – methodological 5.1
aspects 
In this chapter, methodological aspects of the measurement of inequality and the measurement 
of redistributive effects are discussed. First, it shall be clarified how inequality is measured 
and what in general is meant by an index of inequality. There is a broad consensus in the 
literature what kind of basic properties such an index is desired to satisfy. These properties are 
presented in the next section. Thereafter, it is explained how impacts on inequality can be 
assessed. 
Since in the empirical analysis (presented below in section 5.3) several farms have negative 
incomes, the reaction of indices on the appearance of negative values in the income 
distribution is discussed. Negative incomes surely would be an inconceivable concept in the 
case of wage earners; however, for farmers negative incomes reflect losses, which at least 
temporarily are not unusual in the agricultural sector. 
5.1.1 Definition and properties of inequality indices 
Foster (1985, p. 12) gives a general definition of measures of inequality: 
“In the most general sense, a measure of inequality is a functional relationship I 
between a set D of social states and a set R of comparison points ordered by a binary 
relation ≥ . The measure extracts from a given social state d in D aspects that are 
relevant to inequality and assigns an element I(d) in R to reflect these aspects. The 
relation ≥ then indicates the inequality level of the state relative to other social states.” 
This very broad definition of an inequality measure I is commonly refined by several basic 
properties for the measurement of income inequality (see among others Foster, 1985; 
Chakravarty, 1999 and 2001; Bosmans and Cowell, 2010)34. Following these authors, the 
income of an individual i is a real number xi. The income distribution for n individuals 
arranged in ascending order is denoted by x = (x1,…,xn) in the Euclidean n-space Rn. The set 
of all possible income distributions is ∪|  = L. The dimension of an income distribution x 
is denoted by n(x) and µ(x) is the mean income. The expression 1n characterizes a vector of 
dimension n with all components being equal to 1. An inequality measure is a real valued 
continuous function I:XR. I(x) is increasing with higher income inequality and shall be 
                                                 
34
 There exists a broad consensus about these general properties of inequality measures in the literature. For 
further sources refer to the references given in Chakravarty (1999). 
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defined for n ≥ 2 only. I(x) = 0 in case of an equal distribution. The following properties are 
defined (Bosmans and Cowell, 2010; Chakravarty, 2001)35: 
Pigout-Dalton Transfer Principle (PD): 
For all x ∈ X and any positive real number δ, it counts that I(x1,…,xi,…,xj,…,xn) > 
I(x1,…,xi + δ,…,xj – δ,…,xn) if xi < xi+ δ < xj – δ < xj. 
PD ensures that a rank preserving progressive (regressive) transfer has a decreasing 
(increasing) effect on the inequality index. 
Symmetry: For all x ∈ X, I(x) = I(x’) if x’ is obtained from x by rearrangement of 
components. 
Symmetry ensures that the degree of inequality does not change when individuals switch their 
rankings. 
 Population Principle: For every x ∈ X, I(x,x) = I(x). 
The population principle ensures that an inequality index is the same for a given distribution 
and any of its replications. 
A fourth criterion is differentiated for absolute and relative measures of inequality.36 A 
relative index of inequality should satisfy: 
 Homogeneity: For every x ∈ X and δ being any scalar > 0, I(x) = I(δx). 
Absolute measures of inequality should satisfy: 
Translation invariance: For every x ∈ X and any real number δ, I(x) = I(x + δ1n). 
Homogeneity ensures that proportional changes in all incomes do not change inequality. 
Translation Invariance implies that equal absolute changes in all incomes do not cause 
changes in the index of inequality. A more detailed discussion of relative and absolute 
concepts of inequality is presented in the next section. 
The presented basic properties are in general satisfied by most of the well-known and 
frequently used indices of inequality. Examples of relative indices are the family of 
generalized entropy measures (including Theils’ indices), the Atkinson index, and the Gini 
index. Examples for absolute indices are the variance, the Kolm index, and the absolute Gini 
index (all these measures are discussed in more detail in Chakravarty, 1999). It is worth 
noting, however, that not all statistical measures of inequality satisfy all the mentioned 
principles; e.g. the interquartile ratio does not satisfy the PD property (Deaton, 1997). 
Each of the different indices of inequality measurement has its own specific features and the 
“choice of a particular index will be guided by the specific objective one has in mind” 
                                                 
35
 The names of the properties differ among different authors. The formal expressions are taken from Bosmans 
and Cowell (2010) and Chakravarty (2001) in case of Homogeneity. 
36
 For sake of completeness it shall be mentioned that also “intermediate” measures exist. For a detailed 
introduction refer to the relevant literature, e.g. Bossert and Pfingsten (1985) and Pfingsten (1986). 
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(Chakravarty, 2001, p. 87). For the study at hand the relative and the absolute Gini coefficient 
have been chosen to measure the distributional impacts of policy reforms in the agricultural 
sector. The rank-based formulation of the Gini coefficients is a particularly important feature 
since it allows the measurement of re-ranking effects. Furthermore, at least the relative Gini 
coefficient is a well-known and widely used measure with a straightforward geometric 
interpretation. However, Gini indices cannot be decomposed into only two components – the 
sum of inequality among subgroup means and a weighted sum of within group inequality – if 
subgroup income ranges overlap (Mookherjee and Shorrocks, 1982). This may make the 
interpretation of a decomposed Gini coefficient less straightforward, but will also in turn 
facilitate further insights in the composition of inequality. A detailed discussion of subgroup 
decomposability is presented in chapter 6. A further characteristic that is worth mentioning is 
that both the absolute and the relative Gini indices are most sensitive to transfers around the 
middle of a distribution (Chakravarty, 2001). 
The relative Gini index G can (in discrete form) be specified as:37 
 
(9) 1 12
1
2
n n
i j
i j
x x
G
n µ
= =
−
=
∑∑
  
 
where xi is the income of individual i (i = 1,2,3,…,n) and µ represents the average income. 
The relative Gini coefficient is conceptually closely related to the relative Lorenz curve. The 
latter relates the share in overall income of the p% poorest people to the share they represent 
in the overall population. An arbitrary relative Lorenz curve is presented in Figure 5.1, where 
population is ordered from the poorest to the richest at the abscissa. The area between the 45°-
line (i.e. the line of equality) and the Lorenz curve divided by the triangle under the 45°-line 
represents the relative Gini coefficient. 
 
 
                                                 
37
 See Pyatt (1976) and Stuart and Ord (1994). 
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 Figure 5.1: Relative Lorenz curve. 
  Source: Adapted from Jenkins (1991). 
 
The absolute Gini index AG is equal to the relative one multiplied by mean income of the 
sample (Chakravarty, 1999) and thus, can be specified as: 
(10)    2
1 1
1
2
n n
i j
i j
AG G x x
n
µ
= =
= = −∑∑ . 
An arbitrary absolute Lorenz curve is presented in Figure 5.2, again with the ordering of the 
population from the poorest to the richest. Since the concept of absolute Lorenz curves is 
hardly applied in the economic literature, it shall be briefly introduced in the following lines, 
which are taken from Jenkins, 1991, p. 4: 
 “An Absolute Lorenz curve […] graphs p[%] times average income among the 
poorest p[%] minus [p% times] the population average income, against cumulative 
population share, p[%]. If there is complete equality, the curve coincides with the 
horizontal axis […], and with inequality the curve hangs below the axis like a tear-
drop […]. In the extreme case where one person has all the income, the Absolute 
Lorenz curve is straight-edged and  -shaped, with the length of the vertical section 
equal to mean income. […] The closer the Absolute Lorenz curve is to the horizontal, 
the more equal the distribution.” 
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 Figure 5.2: Absolute Lorenz curve. 
  Source: Adapted from Jenkins (1991). 
 
Furthermore, the concept of concentration indices (e.g. Kakwani, 1980; Jenkins, 1988) shall 
be introduced in the following since it is extensively used in the next chapters. Starting point 
shall be the relative concentration curve because a relative concentration index can be derived 
from a concentration curve in a similar way as the Gini index can be derived from a Lorenz 
curve. 
Figure 5.3 presents an artificial concentration curve. The concept is closely related to the 
concept of Lorenz curves; however, instead of ranking income units in ascending order with 
respect to the variable under consideration, income units are kept in the ordering of another 
distribution. For example, a concentration curve of taxes with respect to the ordering of 
before-tax income graphs the share in overall taxes which have to be paid by the p% poorest 
income receivers (according to before-tax income) against the share they represent in the 
overall population. If a tax function takes other attributes except before-tax income into 
account it may happen that some people with a lower rank in the before-tax ordering have to 
pay more taxes than people with a higher before-tax income and a higher rank. This would 
lead to a kinked curve as presented in Figure 5.3. In general, relative concentration curves are 
not restricted to lie below the 45°-line. They also can be flipped to the other side above the 
45°-line. In this case the respective concentration index would take a negative value which 
would indicate that income units in the lower tail of the distribution (e.g. with lower before-
tax incomes) have a larger share of the variable under consideration (e.g. bear a higher tax 
burden). The Lorenz curve is a special case of a concentration curve when the orderings of the 
two variables are identical. 
Following Vernizzi et al. (2010), the relative concentration index can be specified as: 
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,  
where µy is the mean of a variable y (e.g. taxes), rx(yi) represents the rank of individual i in the 
X-ordering and ψ{z} is an indicator function such that ψ{z}=1 if z>0, ψ{z}=0 if z=0 and 
ψ{z}=-1 if z<0. Absolute concentration indices are equal to relative ones multiplied by mean 
incomes of the variable under consideration, i.e. µy. 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Relative concentration curve of variable y ranked with respect to variable x. 
 Source: Own compilation on the basis of Pyatt et al. (1980). 
 
5.1.2 Measuring redistributive effects 
After having explained how inequality is measured, in this section the measurement of 
redistributive effects is presented. As Lambert (2001, p. 39) points out, “redistribution is a 
term in the English language commonly understood to refer to the new distribution of a given 
total.” Yet, how can we talk about redistributive effects in a case where mean income is not 
comparable? According to Lambert (2001), this is possible because we implicitly compare the 
new situation with another one in which income would have been changed in a distribution 
neutral way. The latter is used as a natural benchmark to evaluate distributional effects. 
In the following paragraphs, two different but related methodologies for the measurement of 
redistributive effects are introduced. The first one originally stems from the field of tax 
analysis. It has been applied for the analysis of redistributive effects of agricultural policy (see 
e.g. Allanson, 2006) and is also used in the work at hand. It distinguishes between vertical and 
re-ranking effects. The second methodology is also commonly utilized for the analysis of 
policy induced impacts on income distributions and is based on the decomposition of the Gini 
coefficient by income sources. 
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 Vertical redistribution, re-ranking and progressivity 38 5.1.2.1
In section 5.1.1 it was discussed how income distributions can be expressed by single indices. 
As already mentioned by Foster (1985) in the introductory quotation, to evaluate the degree of 
inequality of a specific distribution, it has to be compared to a reference distribution. In the 
study at hand different liberalization scenarios are compared with the income distribution of a 
reference scenario to evaluate reforms of agricultural policy in terms of (re-)distributional 
effects among farm incomes. Since the modeling system does not account for farm exits 
triggered by liberalization, negative impacts on mean farm income can be expected for the 
scenarios introduced in chapter 4.1. 
Kakwani (1986) develops the following measure of redistribution that is based on a 
comparison of relative Gini coefficients and decomposes the total effect into a vertical and a 
re-ranking component, which Allanson (2006) applies to agricultural policy:  
(12) ( ) ( )x y x y y yR G G G C C G V H= − = − + − = +  
where R represents the overall effect of redistribution as the difference of the Gini index in the 
base situation (Gx) and the Gini index in the new situation (Gy), Cy is the concentration index 
of income in the new situation with respect to base rankings, and V and H are indices of 
vertical redistribution and re-ranking, respectively. Generally, the concept of vertical equity 
represents the idea that a monetary burden on individuals should increase with their capacity 
to bear that burden. A positive (negative) sign for V indicates that in case of income losses, in 
this work due to a reduction of government support, the burden is progressively (regressively) 
allocated among the total farm population. Nevertheless, V does not measure the “pure” 
degree of deviation from a proportional burden share but it also depends on the share of the 
average burden in average base income. The “pure” degree of deviation rather is indicated by 
the comparison of the concentration index of the burden CB and the initial Gini coefficient Gx, 
which is presented by the Kakwani (1977) measure of progressivity: 
(13)     P = CB - Gx. 
P measures the extent to which the burden is distributed more unequally or equally than 
income in the base situation (Aronson et al., 1994). 
The connection between V and P is given as follows (Kakwani, 1986): 
(14)     (1 )
P sV
s
⋅
=
−
 
where s represents the share of the average burden in average base income of the whole farm 
population.39 
                                                 
38
 Parts of this section are identical with Deppermann et al. (2011, 2013) and Deppermann et al. (2014). 
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Yet, the degree of deviation from a proportional share of the burden does not entirely explain 
the new state of distribution (Atkinson, 1980; Plotnick, 1981). The index of vertical 
redistribution equals the overall effect of redistribution only if no re-ranking of farms occurs. 
In our analysis this would be the case if farms were arranged in ascending order of income in 
the baseline situation and still held the same rank after liberalizing the agricultural sector. 
Otherwise the index of vertical equity overestimates the redistribution effect by not including 
rank reversal effects. To illustrate the impacts of re-ranking on inequality, let us assume an 
extreme case in which, due to an imaginary policy, all individuals of a population have to 
switch their income: The highest income is replaced with the lowest, the second highest 
income with the second lowest, and so on. This policy would be highly progressive since the 
highest income-earners would have to bear the greatest burden and the lowest income-earners 
would obtain the most, but there would be no change in the overall distribution of income 
(refer to the symmetry property of the Gini index, presented in section 5.1.1). To account for 
re-ranking, the index H (which is also known as the Atkinson-Plotnik-index of re-ranking) is 
applied in equation (12). It can be interpreted as an indicator of arbitrariness or discrimination 
of the examined income redistribution system. Atkinson (1980) refers to the effect as 
“mobility” induced by an income policy, which might be of interest in its own right. If re-
ranking occurs, it always has a negative impact on the overall redistribution index (Lambert, 
2001). A graphical presentation of the decomposition of the overall redistributive effect in a 
vertical and a re-ranking component is provided in Figure 5.4. The redistributive effect R is 
represented by the area between the continuous Lorenz curve which represents the initial 
income distribution and the dotted Lorenz curve, which present the final state of income 
distribution. In this artificial case, a burden (e.g. a tax) would be inequality reducing. The 
vertical effect V refers to the area between the initial (continuous) Lorenz curve and the 
kinked concentration curve. Since some re-ranking occurs in this fictive situation, the vertical 
effect would overstate the reduction of inequality. Thus, after (re-)ranking income units in 
ascending order of the new distribution the dotted Loren curve would appear and the 
(negative) re-ranking index H refers to the area between the kinked concentration curve and 
the dotted Lorenz curve.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
39
 The reduction of income caused by liberalization is treated like a tax. In case one wants to measure the effects 
of cash benefits, the formula should be V = (Gx-CB)*(s/(1+s)). 
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Figure 5.4: Overall redistribution, vertical effects and re-ranking. 
 Source: Own compilation. 
 
The described approach has so far been based on the relative Gini coefficient. One property of 
relative measures of inequality is that proportional changes in all incomes do not change 
inequality (refer to the homogeneity property of relative inequality indices in section 5.1.1). 
However, it depends on subjective evaluation what kind of changes keep inequality 
unaffected (Chakravarty, 1990). According to different normative views on inequality 
equivalence, different concepts of inequality measures exist. In addition to the relative 
measure the absolute Gini index is applied in this work to broaden the view on inequality 
effects. The two concepts are closely related since the absolute Gini index is obtained by 
multiplying the relative one by the mean income of the sample, yet they react differently to 
income changes. Absolute measures of inequality are invariant to equal absolute changes in 
all incomes (refer to the translation invariance property of absolute inequality measures 
introduced in section 5.1.1).  
In his seminal paper, Kolm (1976, p. 417) labels relative measures “rightist” and absolute 
ones “leftist” in a context of wage and salary negotiations. His view is based on the 
observation that social forces that traditionally could - in a political sense - be classified as 
leftists (e.g. trade unions) rather favor absolute equal increases of salaries than proportional 
ones. He explicitly states that the term “must not be taken too literally” and that it is based on 
a situation with “an equal increase in all incomes rather than an equal decrease” (ibid., p. 
419). In our analysis we deal with decreasing income (on average) and thus, the terms might 
be misleading, since “leftists” probably prefer a proportional burden for everybody to an 
equal absolute cut in income. 
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Following Kolm (1976) and Pfingsten (1986), relative and absolute measures represent two 
extreme cases of inequality concepts because many people value an absolute equal levy as 
inequality extending and a proportional one as inequality reducing.40 
Generally, the described method of decomposing the overall redistribution effect can be 
applied to the absolute Gini index as well (Allanson, 2008): 
(15)  ( ) ( )x y x x y y x x y y y y y yAR AG AG G G G C C G AV AHµ µ µ µ µ µ= − = − = − + − = +         
where A indicates the absolute versions of the respective measures and µx and µy represent the 
average income of the base and new situation, respectively. In the absolute version, the 
(relative) concentration index of burden (CB) indicates whether a burden is progressively or 
regressively distributed. It shows how the shares of the total burden are distributed, keeping 
the ranks in sequence of the base situation. Thus, a negative (positive) CB indicates that small 
initial incomes have to bear a greater (smaller) part of the burden than higher incomes.41 
Comparing CB with the relative index of progressivity (P) makes it clear that in absolute 
terms, a burden might be indicated as progressive (positive CB) while in relative terms it is 
denoted as regressive in the case that CB < Gx, since P = CB – Gx. These potential 
discrepancies might also be found with regard to the overall effect of distribution. In the 
following it is clarified how the relative and absolute indices in the analysis at hand can be 
interpreted against this background. 
Starting from an arbitrary distribution with positive average income and not all incomes being 
equal, five possible cases can occur with the implementation of a tax or levy (see Figure 5.5). 
The horizontal line indicates a constant total amount of levies that all individuals have to bear 
together. When moving along the line, only the distribution of the burden among individuals 
is changed, i.e., inequality in the new situation continuously is reduced by moving from the 
left to the right, keeping average levies constant. Section a in Figure 5.5 represents a situation 
in which both the relative and the absolute index of overall redistribution have a negative 
sign. Thus, the new situation is less equal compared to the initial one. In section c, both 
indices assess the new situation as more equal (with both showing positive values). However, 
in section b we find contradicting results with the relative index indicating increasing 
inequality and the absolute index indicating decreasing inequality. Here, there is decreasing 
absolute income spreads in the after-burden situation (absolute Gini coefficient), which are 
not large enough to not be overcompensated by the reduced mean in case of the relative Gini 
coefficient (as G = AG/µ). Furthermore, with an equiproportionate reduction of all incomes, 
the effect of redistribution in relative terms is zero, but the redistribution effect in absolute 
terms is positive because absolute income spreads are reduced. With the implementation of a 
                                                 
40
 Therefore they suggest some “centrist” (Kolm, 1976, p. 434) or “intermediate” (Pfingsten, 1986, p. 386) 
concepts of inequality, which, however, are also based on normative views on inequality. 
41
 However, CB does not measure the degree of progressivity in absolute terms. It simply indicates the relative 
distribution of the respective burden. An equal absolute change of the burden for all individuals would cause a 
change in CB which, in absolute terms, should be a neutral modification. 
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uniform levy, the absolute index of redistribution indicates no change to the prior situation 
and the relative index shows less equal distribution as average income is reduced. 
 
Figure 5.5: Relation of the reactions of relative and absolute redistributive indices in the 
context of an average income reduction. 
Source: Own compilation. 
 
To evaluate a liberalization of agricultural policy as positive in terms of redistributive effects, 
it is obvious that the new situation should be more equal than the previous situation. Based on 
the above discussion, the argumentation is that the overall redistributive effect of any reform 
package must be at least positive in absolute terms and preferably be positive in relative terms 
as well. 
 Distributional effects of income components 5.1.2.2
Other studies measuring inequality effects in the agricultural sector have decomposed the Gini 
coefficient by income sources (e.g. El Benni and Finger, 2012; Keeney, 2000). This 
methodology allows for the identification of impacts on overall inequality caused by marginal 
changes in average incomes from one specific source (e.g. direct payments). In opposition to 
the methodology presented in section 5.1.2.1, the source decomposition of the Gini coefficient 
“does not serve to provide an explicit characterisation of the redistributive properties of farm 
income support measures” (Allanson, 2006, p. 118). Nevertheless, the methodology shall 
shortly be introduced in the following to provide a better understanding of results of other 
studies presented in chapter 5.2. Additionally, some similarities and relations of the two 
methodologies shall be revealed. Typically, the relative version of the Gini coefficient is 
decomposed by income sources in the current literature and thus, the presentation of the 
methodology is limited to this case in the following. 
The income source decomposition usually starts from a covariance-based formulation of the 
relative Gini coefficient as presented in Lerman and Yitzhaki (1984), which is numerically 
equivalent to the already introduced formulation in (9): 
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(16)   2 [ ]cov X, F(X)G
µ
=  
where F(X) is the cumulative distribution function of the random variable X representing total 
income. With decomposing total income into different income sources such that X = x1 + x2 + 
… + xk and F(Xk) representing the cumulative distribution function of income source k 
equation (16) can be extended to (Lerman and Yitzhaki, 1985): 
(17)   
1
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= × ×∑ . 
Following Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985), the term Rk is named Gini correlation between 
income source k and total income, Gk depicts the relative Gini coefficient of income source k 
and Sk represents the share of income from source k in total income. 
Multiplying Rk and Gk yields the concentration index Ck which measures the distribution of 
income source k when income units are ranked according to their total income: 
(19)   
1 1
cov [ ] 2 cov [ ]
cov [ ]
K K
k k k
k k k
k k k k k
x , F(X) x , F(X )C R G
x , F(X ) µ
= =
= × = ×∑ ∑ . 
The concentration index Ck sometimes also is referred to as ‘Pseudo-Gini coefficient’. It is 0 
if all income units get an absolute equal amount of income from source k, negative if income 
units in the lower tail of a distribution have a larger share of income from source k, and 
positive if income units in the upper tail of a distribution get the larger share of source k (El 
Benni and Finger, 2012). 
Following Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985), El Benni and Finger (2012) and Keeney (2000) 
calculate the impact a marginal change in the mean income of source k would have on the 
overall Gini coefficient under the assumption that the internal concentration index remains 
undisturbed: 
(20)   ( )1k k kS C GGη  = −  . 
From equation (20) it can be observed that the effect of a marginal increase of income from 
one specific source k depends on the share of income from source k in total income Sk, the 
concentration index Ck, and the relative Gini coefficient of total income G. As already 
specified in section 5.1.1, the concentration index Ck measures the distribution of income 
source k when income units are ranked according to their total income. Thus, Ck for example 
measures the distribution of direct payments across the farm population when farms are 
ranked with respect to total income. This, however, measures exactly the same as the 
concentration index of burden CB (introduced in section 5.1.2.1) measures in a scenario where 
direct payments are abolished. 
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Thus, the results gained from a source decomposition of the Gini coefficient can also be 
calculated based on the indices introduced in section 5.1.2.1, but vice versa re-ranking and 
vertical effects are not attainable from the indices introduced in this chapter. 
 
5.1.3 Measuring inequality and negative income  
Many authors have recognized difficulties in interpretation of relative indices of inequality 
when negative values are allowed for in the distribution under consideration. This is observed 
especially in case of the relative Gini coefficient (among many others Chen et al., 1982; 
Ahearn et al.,1985; Boisvert and Ranney, 1990; Stich, 1996). 
When negative incomes42 appear in the distribution the relative Gini is no longer bound by the 
maximum value of one. Chen et al. (1982, p. 475) conclude from this “… that the [relative] 
Gini coefficient may overestimate the inequality of income distribution when negative 
incomes are included”. Ahearn et al. (1985) e.g. take this into account and try to circumvent 
the problem by recoding all negative incomes to zero while recognizing that this will 
underestimate the level of inequality.  
Chen et al. (1982) suggest an adjusted relative Gini coefficient which accounts for negative 
incomes as long as average income of the distribution is positive. They also present a 
graphical interpretation of their approach (Figure 5.6). Using their terms, the conventional 
relative Gini can be expressed as (A+B) / (B+C), whereas without negative values A = 0. To 
account for negative values, they suggest rewriting the Gini in the adjusted form: (A+B) / 
(A+B+C), since the “…conventional Gini goes wrong because it treats the indefinite size of 
(A + B + C) as a definite size of ½” (Chen et al., 1982, p. 477). Thus, the adjusted Gini is 
bound by the maximum value of one, even with the appearance of negative incomes. In other 
words, Chen et al. implicitly scale the maximum degree of inequality, which for the 
conventional relative Gini is equal to the denominator B+C and which implies that one 
member of the population owns all available income and all others have zero.43. 
 
                                                 
42
 This discussion of course applies for any other variable as well. However, since income is the variable under 
consideration in this work it is used as the term of choice here.  
43
 Precisely speaking, the area between the line of total equality (the 45° line) and the Lorenz curve of the 
distribution “one owing all and all others nothing” approximates B+C with a large number of income units.  
71 
 
 
Figure 5.6: The relative Lorenz curve and negative incomes. 
 Source: Chen et al. (1982, p. 476). 
 
This approach is criticised by van der Ven (2001, p. 11): “Chen et al. (1982) explicitly avoid 
the conceptual issues associated with the definition of perfect inequality … which complicates 
any interpretation of the coefficient that they advocate”. Due to this shortcoming “comparison 
between two distributions are complicated … by the use of different scaling factors” (p. 11). 
Another explicit criticism of the application of the relative Gini with negative values is, that 
transformations of the distribution under consideration might cause counterintuitive reactions. 
In a seldom recognized paper, Stich (1996, p. 299) defines the “Greatest Gets More axiom” 
(GGM), which, as he demonstrates, doesn’t hold generally for the relative Gini coefficient. 
GGM: I(x) < I(x1,…,xn-1,xn + k) for every k > 0. 
The GGM axiom states that an inequality index I rises in the case that the richest individual 
gets more income and all others keep their incomes. The underlying mechanism for the 
inability of the relative Gini coefficient to fulfil the GMM axiom when negative values arise 
in the distribution can be explained by splitting up the simple transformation process (i.e. the 
richest individual gets more income) into two steps. First, assume a mean increasing but 
inequality preserving change. For the relative Gini i.e. all incomes are proportionally scaled 
by the same factor (refer to the homogeneity property). This in turn implies that negative 
incomes become more negative. In the second step, assume that the additional income now is 
collected (also the additional negative income) and given to the richest person. This step 
implies that all persons with positive incomes except the richest lose money and all persons 
with negative incomes gain by reducing their debts. With a high share of negative incomes, 
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their gains and the losses of the positive incomes expect for the richest are weighted more 
than the gain of the richest person and overall inequality is announced to decrease. Stich 
(1996) explains the mechanism with the reaction of the Lorenz curve. Referring to Figure 5.6, 
an increase of the highest income would increase area B but at the same time downsize area 
A. 
Stich (1996) concludes that relative measures of inequality should be avoided when negative 
incomes appear in the income distribution. He proposes the utilization of absolute or in certain 
cases intermediate measures of inequality. 
However, absolute measures have a different normative basis than relative measures and thus, 
they cannot be considered as good substitutes in all cases. Also, the above proposed solutions 
(replacing negative values by zero; adjusting the reference base of inequality) have their 
shortcomings and hamper interpretation. Due to these difficulties the relative Gini and 
underlying data are not adjusted in the analysis at hand, even though a considerable amount of 
negative incomes appear in the distributions under consideration, as will be seen later on. The 
need to further utilize the relative Gini coefficient for the calculation of other indices would 
especially complicate their interpretation. The absolute Gini coefficient however, is used 
additionally. 
Furthermore, many authors apply the conventional relative Gini coefficient even with 
negative values. Amiel et al. (1996, p. 65) argue that the relative Gini is a “pratical 
alternative” when negative values appear in the distribution since many other scale invariant 
measures are undefined in such a case. Allanson (2006) even develops a methodology to 
compare relative Gini coefficients of distributions with negative and positive average 
incomes. 
To become more familiar with the implications of negative values on the calculation of 
relative Gini coefficients, a small artificial empirical experiment is provided in the following 
lines. This proceeding of course cannot generate any general conclusions nor is it meant to do 
so. However, it might help the reader to better reflect the shortcomings of the relative Gini as 
discussed above. 
In an artificial situation, consider an income vector of three persons {15,10,5}. This initial 
situation is constantly changed by reducing the income of each person by one Euro (Table 
5.1). 
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Table 5.1: Constant absolute differences with 
reduced mean incomes.  
 
 Source: own calculations. Figure 5.7: Impact of mean income 
reductions on the relative Gini coefficient. 
 Source: own calculations. 
 
From Table 5.1 and Figure 5.7 it can be seen that the relative Gini, assumed that absolute 
distances between income units do not change, increases exponentially with decreasing mean 
income. In a more general sense this becomes clear by recalling that average distances among 
individuals appear in the numerator of the relative Gini and mean income in the denominator:  
(9) 1 12
1
2
n n
i j
i j
x x
G
n µ
= =
−
=
∑∑
. 
This reaction takes place also when negative incomes are excluded (until distribution F). 
However, the appearance of negative incomes tends to make this effect more pronounced 
because the spread between numerator and denominator in this case may increase without 
having a ‘natural bound’. Absolute average distances can be kept constant and at the same 
time mean income can become close to zero44 and vice versa, with the allowance for negative 
incomes absolute average distances can increase without a ‘natural bound’ while keeping 
mean income constant. If this happens with an already comparatively low mean income, 
changes in absolute distances may seem disproportionally strong in relative terms.  
Furthermore, it should be kept in mind that the relative Gini does not necessarily violate the 
GGM axiom as soon as one negative value in the income distribution appears: The term 2n(n-
1)µ is equal to the maximum possible sum of absolute distances that can occur between 
individual incomes when only non-negative incomes are allowed, i.e. in a situation when one 
                                                 
44
 Of course mean income can become negative as well, which would result in a negative value for the relative 
Gini. However, it is abstracted from this possibility here since the discussion of negative Ginis is beyond the 
scope of this work and not relevant in the empirical analysis. 
0
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Income 
1 
Income 
2 
Income 
3 
relative 
Gini 
A 15 10 5 0.2222 
B 14 9 4 0.2469 
C 13 8 3 0.2778 
D 12 7 2 0.3175 
E 11 6 1 0.3704 
F 10 5 0 0.4444 
G 9 4 -1 0.5556 
H 8 3 -2 0.7407 
I 7 2 -3 1.1111 
J 6 1 -4 2.2222 
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person owns everything and all others own nothing. Observing that an increase of the highest 
income by an additional unit increases the distances among all units  
1 1
n n
i ji j x x= = −∑ ∑  (i.e. 
the numerator of the relative Gini) by the same absolute amount as it increases the term 2n(n-
1)µ (i.e. the denominator of the relative Gini for a large n)45, it can be concluded that for large 
populations only relative Ginis close to one or greater than one will not fulfill the GGM 
axiom. Thus, counterintuitive reactions not automatically appear when negative incomes 
exist; rather the ratio 
1 1
n n
i ji j x x= = −∑ ∑  to (2n
2
µ) is crucial. 
It can be stated that even though the relative Gini is technically correctly specified when 
negative incomes are considered, it can react in a way that might not be in line with normative 
expectations and thus, may lead to misinterpretations. This should be kept in mind when 
relative inequality is discussed later in the empirical part of this work. Additionally, Lorenz 
curves are presented to illustrate the impact of negative values. If Lorenz curves do not 
intersect, no counterintuitive reactions can be expected. Yet, disproportionally strong 
reactions are of course still possible. 
 Literature review 5.2
After the discussion of methodological aspects for the measurement of inequality and 
redistribution, empirical results shall be presented. Before redistributive effects of the 
calculated scenarios are discussed in detail for the western German agricultural sector, a 
literature review of studies concerned with the measurement of income distribution and the 
redistributive effects of agricultural policy is provided below. 
As already stated in the introduction, most of the studies assessing redistributive effects of 
agricultural policy on farm incomes are ex-post studies and static in nature.46 Many studies 
only refer to separate measures of agricultural policy which are directly observable from the 
data without side calculations. However, other authors apply sophisticated methodologies for 
the quantification of support, which is not directly observable, like border protection e.g. 
Within the literature regarding the measurement of redistributive effects of agricultural policy, 
one methodology is dominating. Several authors apply the source decomposition of the 
relative Gini coefficient, which was introduced in section 5.1.2.2. This method enables the 
assessment of impacts on overall inequality caused by marginal changes in income sources. 
Besides the application of a similar methodology, most of these studies have in common that 
they focus on agricultural support that is directly observable from official statistics, e.g. DPs 
of the CAP. More subtle support such as transfers from consumers to farmers often is 
neglected. Furthermore, most studies abstract from capitalization of support in production 
factors and assume that farmers are the ultimate beneficiaries of such payments. Furthermore, 
                                                 
45
 For a large population n it holds that 1/2n2µ ≈ 1/2n(n-1)µ. 
46
 The few exemptions are already discussed in section 2.3. 
75 
 
incentive effects in general are not taken into account. Some studies additionally analyse 
inequality effects of off-farm incomes. 
Keeney (2000) presents such a study for Ireland. She disaggregates family farm income into 
DPs and market income, where the latter includes all on-farm income sources but DPs. Based 
on the decomposition of the relative Gini coefficient she finds that DPs reduced relative 
income inequality in Ireland between 1992 and 1996 and states that an increased share of DPs 
has equalizing effects on farm income distribution. 
In a study for Switzerland, El Benni and Finger (2012) differentiate inequality effects by 
region, i.e. by valley, hill and mountain area. They observe changes in farm household income 
inequality in relative terms between 1990 and 2009 and decompose overall income into off-
farm income, DPs and a remainder market income. They find that off-farm income and DPs 
have equalizing effects on the distribution of household income and the opposite for market 
incomes. Furthermore, their results show that DPs have stronger marginal effects on 
inequality than off-farm incomes. 
Based on the same static methodology, Severini and Tantari (2013) analyse likely 
redistributive impacts of different possible reforms of first pillar DPs for Italy. In their study, 
farm net value added is the income indicator under consideration which is decomposed into 
income from DPs and market based income. For the status quo they find a high concentration 
of income which is reduced by DPs in relative terms. Their simulation of a shift from the 
historical to the regional DPs model reveals only a slight reduction of inequality compared to 
the baseline. 
Von Witzke and Noleppa (2007) decompose a relative Gini coefficient as well as a measure 
of absolute inequality of total farm profit into components for direct payments and market 
profit. The authors conclude that direct payments account for about one-third of overall 
inequality for family farms and for two-thirds of overall inequality for incorporated farms in 
Germany. However, from their numerical results it can be concluded that in relative terms 
DPs have an inequality reducing effect on family farms since the reported “pseudo factor 
Gini” is lower than the relative Gini coefficient for total income. The fact that the “pseudo 
factor Gini” has a positive value itself demonstrates that DPs have an inequality increasing 
effect in absolute terms. 
Several similar studies have been carried out for U.S farm households. Ahearn et al. (1985) 
analyse the effects of direct government payments on income of farm operator households in 
1984. They find equalizing effects of direct government payments and off-farm income at the 
margin in relative terms. Findeis and Reddy (1987) differentiate by regions and conclude that 
off-farm income has inequality reducing effects at the margin in relative terms in regions 
where full-time farming predominates. 
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Boisvert and Ranney (1990) apply the methodology to New York dairy farms. They consider 
net farm income, off-farm income and direct government payments and conclude that the last 
two have inequality reducing effects. El-Osta et al. (1995) include non-monetary47 and 
monetary income in their analysis. They find equalizing effects of government payments and 
off-farm incomes at the margin in relative terms. 
Mishra et al. (2009) investigate relative inequality effects of government payments on farm 
household incomes, differentiated for nine farming regions in the U.S. They conclude that a 
marginal increase in the off-farm and government payments components would reduce overall 
inequality; this is also true at the regional level for government payments and for most regions 
in the case of off-farm income. 
As an interim conclusion it can be stated that all considered studies which apply the Gini 
coefficient decomposition methodology find equalizing effects of DPs or other direct 
government support in relative terms, no matter for which country or period the study is 
carried out. If off-farm incomes are included in the analyses, this component is also found to 
be inequality reducing in most of the cases. However, regional differences appear in some 
analyses. The only study explicitly taking absolute inequality into account (von Witzke and 
Noleppa, 2007) suggests inequality increasing effects of direct payments. 
To account for different dimensions of inequality impacts, Allanson (2006, 2007, 2008) and 
Allanson and Rocchi (2008), through a series of papers, use the approach which was 
introduced in section 5.1.2.1 and which is based on a comparison of Gini indices of pre- and 
post-support income. They take overall agricultural (CAP) support into account. Support from 
market price measures is calculated on the basis of OECD producer support estimate data. 
Besides, DPs and other grants and subsidies are considered in the analyses. Furthermore, in 
contrast to the majority of the studies, they account for the fact that support only partly 
benefits the farmers and that a part of the payments will capitalize into prices of production 
factors not owned by the farm. The four studies are presented in the following in more detail. 
Allanson (2006) estimates changes of relative Gini coefficients for family farm incomes in the 
Scottish agricultural sector. In this paper, the overall redistribution effect of agricultural 
policy support is split up into a vertical dimension of inequality and a re-ranking effect. The 
analysis suggests that support is progressive in absolute terms, which has to be interpreted 
against the background of a negative average income of Scottish farms in the pre-support 
situation. However, an unequalizing overall effect of agricultural policy is found in relative 
terms, which is caused by re-ranking effects overtaking the equalizing vertical effects.  
In a paper explicitly taking classical horizontal inequity48 into account, Allanson (2007) finds 
the same result based on three different relative inequality measures. In absolute terms his 
                                                 
47
 Non-monetary income refers to the value of home produced and consumed goods and the rental value of 
dwelling (El- Osta et al., 1995). 
48
 The concept of classical horizontal inequity refers to the unequal treatment of equals. It is distinguished from 
other concepts of horizontal inequity like re-ranking. 
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results suggest a slight decrease in inequality due to agricultural support. However, negative 
horizontal inequity effects more or less outweigh equalizing vertical effects. Again, these 
rather confusing results (a more equal absolute index with a less equal relative index caused 
by income increasing support) appear with a negative average pre-support income which 
makes interpretation more difficult. 
Allanson (2008) presents an analysis in absolute terms for another time period than in his 
afore mentioned papers. Results show for five consecutive years an unequalizing effect of 
agricultural policy on the distribution of farm incomes in the Scottish agricultural sector. The 
unequal treatment of pre-transfer equals is identified to be the main reason for the increase in 
overall inequality, which otherwise would have been reduced. 
Allanson and Rocchi (2008) find similar results for overall inequality effects through a 
comparative analysis for Tuscany and Scotland. However, for Tuscany transfers are 
regressive in absolute terms rather than progressive as in the Scottish case. In their paper, an 
analysis for farm income is compared to an analysis for total household income which 
additionally takes off-farm income into account. In both areas – Tuscany and Scotland – 
inequality would decrease by additionally taking off-farm income into account when keeping 
ranks of the farm income distribution constant; however, since the ranks of the farms also 
change, pre-support income inequality effectively increases. When total household income is 
the indicator of choice vertical effects are less regressive/more progressive when agricultural 
support is introduced. 
OECD (2003) measures the degree of concentration of gross farm receipts, agricultural 
support and net operating income by estimating relative Gini coefficients and Lorenz curves 
based on farm quartiles. Support consists of DPs and market price support, which is 
calculated based on the OECD PSE database. Based on a comparison of these measures, the 
authors conclude that for most OECD countries under consideration, agricultural support has 
relatively small effects on distribution by farm size because the distribution of agricultural 
support is only marginally less unequal than the distribution of gross receipts. Thus, they 
conclude that the distribution of support is unequal because larger farms receive a greater 
share. Furthermore, it is found that on average market price support is more unequally 
distributed than DPs. 
Findings in a similar analysis by Moreddu (2011), who additionally focuses on differences 
among farm types and regions, are in line with these results. Using the assumption that 
farmers are final beneficiaries of support, it is found that market price support generally is 
distributed more unequally than direct payments. Yet, these differences are found to be small 
for Germany. It is concluded that overall support is unequally distributed but less than gross 
output which indicates inequality reducing effects in relative terms. Specifically for Germany, 
it is found that total support is as unequally distributed as gross agricultural output. 
Schmid et al. (2006) compare relative Gini coefficients of direct payments per farm holding 
for single EU-15 member states. They show that the degree of distribution of direct payments 
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is fundamentally different and closely related to the concentration of land inside the respective 
member states. In a more detailed analysis for Austria, they find that larger holdings receive 
the bulk of direct payments and that less favoured area payments have little equalizing effects. 
Von Witzke (1979) analyses the effects of prices and price policies on income distribution in 
the agricultural sector. Based on a theoretical model short- and long-run effects of price 
changes are empirically analysed for a sample of farms located in a specific German region. 
He finds that increasing prices lead to a lower concentration of agricultural income in the 
short-run (in relative terms). In the long-run, results depend on the assumption regarding the 
elasticity of scale. If the elasticity of scale is assumed to be positively correlated to farm 
income increasing prices lead to a higher concentration of agricultural income in the long-run. 
Brown (1990) applies a comparative static partial equilibrium model to identify long-run 
effects on producer welfare in the EU-10. In a first step, changes in producer welfare are 
calculated on a commodity basis for a full liberalization of the CAP. Subsequently, changes 
are disaggregated among representative farms. He finds that benefits of the CAP are 
regressively distributed.  
Another methodological approach with which to analyse policy induced income effects in the 
agricultural sector is the spatial micro-simulation approach applied by Hynes et al. (2009a, 
2009b). They statistically match different large scale datasets to generate a “synthetic 
population of Irish farms representing the Irish rural space” (Hynes et al., 2009a, p. 284). 
Hynes et al. (2009a) analyse with their spatial farm level micro-simulation model potential 
effects of a possible shift from the historical DP scheme to flat rate payments on the spatial 
distribution of family farm income in Ireland and provide their results in a GIS-based 
graphical form. Hynes et al. (2009b) use a similar approach to examine effects of carbon taxes 
in Ireland. Both analyses are static in nature even though ex-ante policy analysis is carried 
out. 
A related branch of literature aims at the estimation of EU agricultural policy effects on 
regional convergence. Hansen and Teuber (2011) take direct payments as well as market price 
support into account by applying OECD producer support estimate figures. They calculate 
regional agricultural support per labour force and per hectare. Based on the coefficient of 
variation they calculate changes in regional inequality of farmers revenues with and without 
CAP support over time for an area that consist of 26 NUTS-3 regions in Hesse, Germany. 
They find that inequality between farmers’ revenues increases across regions over time and 
that the CAP has only attenuating impacts on this trend. With a similar approach Anders et al. 
(2004) analyse the distribution of support in the same area and find increasing variations of 
total support, support per farm and support per hectare among individual regions over time. 
However, they state that per hectare support is negatively correlated with regional per capita 
income. For further relevant studies in this field refer to the introduction of Hansen and 
Teuber (2011). 
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In a completely different approach, Rocchi (2009) uses a SAM-based model to analyse 
income distribution changes from the single payment scheme of the CAP for Italy. This 
approach is able to distinguish between direct and indirect impacts of agricultural policy on 
income distribution among agricultural as well as non-agricultural households. However, the 
analysis is carried out at a highly aggregated level and does not take price effects into account. 
To conclude this section, it can be stated that the majority of the studies find explicitly or 
implicitly (e.g. “the distribution of support is unequal”) that agricultural support increases 
inequality in absolute terms. On the other hand, agricultural support is found to be inequality 
reducing in relative terms. Most of the studies do not take re-ranking or classical horizontal 
equity effects into account, however, their importance is shown by Allanson (2006, 2008). 
Virtually all of the studies which are assessing income effects at the farm level are static in 
nature49. Among them, only Allanson (2006, 2007, 2008) and Allanson and Rocchi (2008) 
account for the fact that farmers probably are not the final beneficiaries of the whole amount 
of support. 
  
                                                 
49
 It is not unambiguously clear to the author if the partial equilibrium model in Brown (1990) is a behavioural 
model. However, in his study production patterns at the farm level are static. 
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 Redistributive effects of CAP reforms on western German farm 5.3
incomes 
In the following section, redistributive effects of policy changes assumed in the different 
scenarios (as introduced in section 4.1) are presented. Thereby, results of different 
methodological approaches are compared to each other. To ease the understanding of the 
methodological differences behind the analyses compared, Figure 5.8 gives an overview about 
the different aggregation levels, types of income, and the different styles of data generation. 
The left part of the figure refers to data generated by the modeling system as described above 
and the right part refers to a static analysis which does not take incentive effects into account. 
The latter serves as a reference for comparison and will be described in detail later on. 
At first, aggregation biases are accounted for in inequality analysis due to the application of 
grouped data instead of individual data. To this end, inequality impacts calculated on the basis 
of 467 FARMIS groups are compared to results calculated on the basis of 8,024 individual 
FADN-farms. This comparison is undertaken for the income indicator FFI (second column of 
the left part of Figure 5.8) and for the income indicator ‘total household income’ which, in 
addition to family farm income, accounts for off-farm income sources (column 2 + column 3 
from the left part of Figure 5.8). Off-farm income sources are not covered by the modeling 
system and the observed data in the base year of the analysis is assumed to be constant in real 
terms over time for all scenarios. 
Second, an analysis for the indicator ‘FFI’ is compared to an analysis for the indicator ‘total 
household income’. Comparison is presented at the individual farm level. Relating to Figure 
5.8, results referring to the second column in the last row of the left part are compared to 
results calculated on basis of the sum of the second and third column (FFI + off-farm income) 
in the last row of the left part of the figure. 
Third, since virtually all analyses which try to assess redistributive effects of agricultural 
policy instruments are conducted in a static way, the importance of taking incentive effects 
into account is assessed. To do so, an analysis is carried out which compares statically derived 
income distributions with distributions generated by the modeling system. To ease the 
analyses of the underlying processes, this comparison is carried out on the basis of FFI values 
for 467 FARMIS groups (column 2, row 3, left hand side vs. column 2, row 3, right hand 
side).  
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Figure 5.8: Overview of methodological approaches of inequality measurement. 
 Source: own compilation. 
 
For all scenarios, baseline results with the assumed status quo of agricultural policy serve as a 
base situation where redistributive effects are referred to in all cases. This implies the 
weighting of all (marginal) income changes by baseline-rankings (Lerman and Yitzhaki, 
1995). 
5.3.1 Redistributive effects and aggregation error50 
In this chapter redistributive effects of different reform scenarios are presented. Thereby, 
results are based on generated single farm data on the one hand and on grouped data on the 
other hand to evaluate the aggregation error which appears when redistributive effects are 
measured by the application of grouped data.  
Liberalizing the agricultural sector has clear negative impacts on average farm income. In the 
Full_Lib scenario, the scenario with the lowest average income, 31% of all individual farms 
have negative incomes, whereas in the baseline there are only 10%. The impact on relative 
measures in this context is extensively discussed above in section 5.1.3 and will be referred to 
again when distributional results are discussed in detail. Furthermore, as already examined in 
chapter 4.2, the results should be interpreted against the background that with this strong 
reduction in average income, significant structural change such as an increase in farm size and 
farmers leaving the sector can be expected which is not depicted in the current model 
specification. 
 
                                                 
50
 This chapter was basis for the paper Deppermann et al. (2013) and some numerical results and paragraphs are 
taken unaltered. 
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 Decile groups 5.3.1.1
Table 5.2 provides an overview of the distribution of FFI in western Germany for all scenarios 
based on data for individual farms. Total farm population is segmented into decile groups 
which are ten groups of equal size with the bottom group containing 10% of farms with the 
lowest incomes and the top group containing 10% of farms with the highest incomes. In the 
column on the left (I), the baseline income of each decile group is reported. The next columns 
refer to the different liberalization scenarios under the situation in which the composition of 
the decile groups does not change: Farms that had the lowest income under the baseline 
scenario are still located in the bottom decile. 
Columns III, VI, IX, and XII present for each decile group its share in total income reduction 
for the respective scenarios. The bottom decile group under the Full_Lib scenario bears only 
3% of total income reduction and the top decile bears 23%; however, for the top decile 
income is reduced by 48% of baseline income, which is lower than the average reduction 
among all farms, 69%. 
On average, the effects of the 50_DP scenario are comparatively moderate. This is partly due 
to the high share of rented land – 68%, on average, in the baseline scenario – as well as the 
high rate of capitalisation of DPs in land prices which is assumed in FARMIS. As a result, 
land rental prices decrease significantly with a reduction of DPs, which cushions negative 
income effects especially for farms with a high share of rented land. The income effects more 
than double in the No_DP scenario compared to the 50_DP scenario because in many regions 
the full reduction of DPs is too high to completely be absorbed by the land market. Still, the 
average income reduction of a full abolishment of DPs is significantly lower (8,954 €) than 
the average loss of direct payments (18,331 €). 
Furthermore, it becomes clear that the Full_Lib scenario is not simply a sum-up of the No_DP 
and the No_Pricepol scenarios. For example, on average, the top decile loses 56,670 € in the 
No_Pricepol scenario and loses 15,105 € in the No_DP scenario, whereas under the Full 
Liberalization scenario, the top decile income decreases by 73,723 €. 
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Table 5.2: Family farm income decile groups for western Germany based on individual farm 
data. 
 50_DP scenario No_DP scenario 
Baseline 
income 
 
 
 
(I) 
Income after 50% 
DP Cut 
 
 
 
(II) 
Income 
reduction 
 
 
 
(III) 
Income 
differ-
ence 
/base 
income 
(IV) 
Income after 100% 
DP Cut 
 
 
 
(V) 
Income 
reduction 
 
 
 
(VI) 
Income 
differ-
ence 
/base 
income 
(VII) 
 
€/farm 
(av.) 
 
(Ia) 
% 
of 
all 
(Ib) 
 €/farm 
(av.) 
 
(IIa) 
% 
of all 
 
(IIb) 
% of  
total 
reduction 
 
€/farm 
(av.) 
 
(Va) 
% of 
all 
 
(Vb) 
% of 
total 
reduction 
 
1 -13,197 -3 -15,633 -4 7 -0.18 -18,043 -5 5 -0.37 
2 1,701 0 -486 0 6 1.29 -3,294 -1 6 2.94 
3 10,267 2 8,028 2 6 0.22 5,071 1 6 0.51 
4 20,607 5 16,759 4 11 0.19 11,609 3 10 0.44 
5 31,570 7 28,210 7 9 0.11 23,536 6 9 0.25 
6 41,791 9 38,133 9 10 0.09 32,600 9 10 0.22 
7 52,623 12 48,530 12 11 0.08 42,243 12 12 0.20 
8 67,286 15 63,167 15 11 0.06 56,637 16 12 0.16 
9 88,967 20 84,457 20 13 0.05 76,827 21 14 0.14 
10 152,622 34 147,241 35 15 0.04 137,517 38 17 0.10 
All 45,424 100 41,841 100 100 0.08 36,470 100 100 0.20 
 Source: Own calculations. 
Table 5.2 (continued): FFI decile groups for western Germany based on individual farm data. 
 No_Pricepol scenario Full Liberalization scenario 
Baseline 
income 
 
 
 
(I) 
Income after 
abolition of price 
policies 
 
 
(VIII) 
Income 
reduction 
 
 
 
(IX) 
Income 
difference 
/base 
income 
 
(X) 
Income after full 
liberalization 
 
 
 
(XI) 
Income 
reduc-
tion 
 
 
(XII) 
Income 
difference 
/base 
income 
 
(XIII) 
 
€/farm 
(av.) 
 
(Ia) 
% 
of 
all 
(Ib) 
€/farm 
(av.) 
 
(VIIIa) 
% of 
all 
 
(VIIIb) 
% of total 
reduction 
 
€/farm 
(av.) 
 
(XIa) 
% of 
all 
 
(XIb) 
% of 
total 
reduct. 
 
1 
-13,197 -3 -16,976 -7 2 -0.29 -21,835 -16 3 -0.65 
2 1,701 0 -3,245 -1 2 2.91 -8,340 -6 3 5.90 
3 10,267 2 4,127 2 3 0.60 -1,209 -1 4 1.12 
4 20,607 5 9,703 4 5 0.53 710 1 6 0.97 
5 31,570 7 16,396 7 7 0.48 7,136 5 8 0.77 
6 41,791 9 20,920 9 10 0.50 10,821 8 10 0.74 
7 52,623 12 26,888 11 12 0.49 15,672 11 12 0.70 
8 67,286 15 37,223 16 14 0.45 24,986 18 13 0.63 
9 88,967 20 47,241 20 19 0.47 33,615 24 18 0.62 
10 152,622 34 95,952 40 26 0.37 78,899 56 23 0.48 
All 45,424 100 23,823 100 100 0.48 14,046 100 100 0.69 
Source: Own calculations. 
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When decile group values are calculated on the basis of already grouped (FARMIS) data 
rather than on the basis of individual data, top decile groups have a lower average income and 
bottom decile groups a higher one (Table 5.3). This effect is intuitive since groups are 
generated by criterions other than income (region, type and size). When FARMIS groups are 
disaggregated, higher individual incomes of middle and low-income groups move towards 
higher decile groups and vice versa. 
Difference in the distribution of respective income reductions, however, can hardly be 
observed. While the top decile group has a lower income share by 25 percentage points in 
total income in the Full_Lib scenario, the share in total income reduction differs only by one 
percentage point. From this it can be concluded that though low individual incomes in high-
income (FARMIS) groups tend to be smaller than high incomes in low-income (FARMIS) 
groups, they have similar income losses, on average, under the different scenarios. 
Table 5.3: Differences in FFI decile groups when data are calculated based on grouped data 
compared to individual farm data (Table 5.2). 
 50_DP scenario No_DP scenario 
Baseline 
income 
 
 
 
(I) 
Income after 50% 
DP Cut 
 
 
 
(II) 
Income 
reduction 
 
 
 
(III) 
Income after 
100% DP Cut 
 
 
 
(V) 
Income 
reduction 
 
 
 
(VI) 
Differences to Table 5.2 in € or %-points respectively 
 
€/farm 
(av.) 
 
(Ia) 
% 
of 
all 
(Ib) 
 €/farm 
(av.) 
 
(IIa) 
% 
of all 
 
(IIb) 
% of  
total 
reduction 
€/farm 
(av.) 
 
(Va) 
% of 
all 
 
(Vb) 
% of total 
reduction 
1 11,890 3 11,997 3 0 12,209 3 0 
2 7,301 2 7,057 2 1 6,856 2 0 
3 8,058 2 7,235 2 2 5,803 2 3 
4 8,596 2 9,170 2 -2 10,135 3 -2 
5 7,256 2 6,864 2 1 6,096 2 1 
6 2,140 0 3,267 1 -3 4,638 1 -3 
7 
-415 0 -754 0 1 -716 0 0 
8 
-3,184 -1 -3,909 -1 2 -4,455 -1 1 
9 
-8,681 -2 -7,990 -2 -2 -7,410 -2 -1 
10 
-32,973 -7 -32,950 -8 0 -33,169 -9 0 
All 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Source: Own calculations. 
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Table 5.3 (continued): Differences in FFI decile groups when data are calculated based on grouped 
data compared to individual farm data (Table 5.2). 
 No_Pricepol scenario Full Liberalization scenario 
Baseline 
income 
 
 
 
(I) 
Income after 
abolition of price 
policies 
 
 
(VIII) 
Income 
reduction 
 
 
 
(IX) 
Income after full 
liberalization 
 
 
 
(XI) 
Income 
reduc-
tion 
 
 
(XII) 
Differences to Table 5.2 in € or %-points respectively 
 
€/farm 
(av.) 
 
(Ia) 
% 
of 
all 
(Ib) 
€/farm 
(av.) 
 
(VIIIa) 
% of 
all 
 
(VIIIb) 
% of total 
reduction 
€/farm 
(av.) 
 
(XIa) 
% of 
all 
 
(XIb) 
% of 
total 
reduct. 
1 11,890 3 11,657 5 0 12,609 9 0 
2 7,301 2 7,174 3 0 6,735 5 0 
3 8,058 2 6,364 3 1 4,208 3 1 
4 8,596 2 6,946 3 1 8,409 6 0 
5 7,256 2 3,277 1 2 2,450 2 2 
6 2,140 0 6,215 3 -2 8,984 6 -2 
7 
-415 0 3,480 1 -2 2,938 2 -1 
8 
-3,184 -1 -3,953 -2 0 -5,223 -4 1 
9 
-8,681 -2 -5,805 -2 -1 -5,506 -4 -1 
10 
-32,973 -7 -35,364 -15 1 -35,615 -25 1 
All 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Source: Own calculations. 
 Lorenz curves 5.3.1.2
Before the methodology of measuring redistributive effects as described in section 5.1.2 is 
applied, Lorenz curves of the respective scenarios are presented. Following Jenkins (1991, p. 
6) it can be stated that if two relative (absolute) Lorenz curves do not cross, the distribution 
with the relative (absolute) Lorenz curve closer to the diagonal (horizontal) unambiguously is 
more equal than the other, according to all “standard” relative (absolute) inequality measures. 
By “standard” Jenkins refers to all inequality measures that fulfil the properties introduced 
within section 5.1.1: Pigout-Dalton Transfer Principle, Symmetry, and Population Principle. 
The concept of absolute Lorenz domination originally was introduced into the literature by 
Moyes (1987). 
In Figure 5.9 relative Lorenz curves of the income distributions in 2020 based on individual 
farm data for all scenarios are presented (Lorenz curves based on grouped data are presented 
in Appendix C). Since the curves do not intersect, it can be concluded that the same ranking 
of scenarios with regard to their degree of inequality as identified by the Gini index later on 
(Table 5.4) also would have been identified by all other standard inequality measures. 
Furthermore, it becomes apparent that the lower the average income of a scenario is, the more 
unequal it is ranked in relative terms. From Figure 5.10 it becomes clear that for the absolute 
measure exactly the opposite is true. The baseline with the highest average income 
unambiguously has the most unequal distribution in absolute terms while the Full_Lib 
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scenario with the lowest average income has the lowest degree of inequality among the 
scenarios. 
 
Figure 5.9: Relative Lorenz curves for baseline and all scenarios based on individual FFI 
data. 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Figure 5.10: Absolute Lorenz curves for baseline and all scenarios based on individual FFI 
data. 
Source: Own calculations. 
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 Gini based analysis 5.3.1.3
In the following section, inequality effects of the different liberalization scenarios are 
analysed by decomposing the inequality changes into vertical and re-ranking effects and by 
measuring indices of progressivity (as described in 5.1.2). First, the results of the analysis, 
which is conducted on the basis of individual data, are analysed. This analysis reveals more 
information on inequality than the analysis based on FARMIS groups. Despite varying 
magnitudes of the single indicators, the direction of inequality effects is not substantially 
different in general. Emerging differences are discussed in more detail subsequently. 
In the 50_DP scenario (Table 5.4, section II) income is reduced by 3,583€ on average, which 
accounts for 7.8% of income in the baseline scenario. In absolute terms the DP cut leads to a 
slightly more equal situation. Very small re-ranking effects occur and the overall 
redistributive effect is also quite small. This is due to the low value of average support 
reduction rather than a low level of progressivity of the reduction. The CB measure indicates 
that support reduction is progressively distributed which means that higher incomes bear a 
higher burden of a DP cut than smaller incomes do. The results are in accordance with a priori 
expectations: farms with higher income have a greater acreage and get higher DPs. In relative 
terms we observe an opposite inequality effect. The DP cut is regressively distributed and 
leads to a more unequal distribution of income. The negative P value indicates that income 
losses are more equally distributed than initial income in the baseline scenario. Compared to 
other scenarios, P is even more negative if DPs are reduced by 50% representing a higher 
degree of regressivity of income reduction. Income losses account for a larger share in lower 
incomes compared to higher incomes. 
Similar effects can be observed in the analysis of a full abolishment of the DPs (the No_DP 
scenario, Table 5.4, section III): a more equal situation in the absolute analysis and a more 
unequal situation in the relative analysis. A doubling of the cut in DPs (from 50% to 100%) 
leads to disproportionately higher effects in the inequality analysis. A 100% cut has a less 
negative index of progressivity which indicates that a full abolishment in relative terms is less 
regressive than a 50% cut. Farms with lower income tend to be less productive and tend to be 
located in regions with relatively low land rents. Thus, low-income farms already reduce their 
production area with a 50% cut while high-income farms tend to not reduce production since 
rental prices can absorb a great share of the DP cut and gross margins are still positive. An 
additional cut of the remaining DPs hits high-income farms harder because they now also 
reduce their production area whereas low-income farms already reduced their production area. 
In the No_Pricepol scenario (Table 5.4, section IV) support cuts are pronounced in the 
livestock sector since tariffs and export subsidies are in place for several products in the 
baseline scenario and milk production is restricted due to the quota scheme. Furthermore, the 
sugar market is also heavily affected by relatively high border protection and the production 
quota that is still in place in our baseline scenario (compare sector results in section 4.2). 
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Compared to the No_DP scenario, much stronger income effects occur when price policies 
are abolished, i.e. average income is reduced by 48%.51 The overall absolute effect of 
redistribution (AR) is positive, which also indicates a positive absolute index of vertical equity 
since the absolute index of re-ranking is always non-positive. Thus, farms with higher 
incomes tend to bear a higher absolute burden from liberalization compared to farms with 
lower incomes. The re-ranking effect reduces the vertical effect by about 25%. 
In relative terms, income inequality increases compared to Baseline values. The redistributive 
effect is -0.222, which is more than double the effects in the No_DP scenario. Almost half of 
the overall effect, however, originates from re-ranking effects. Furthermore, due to a higher 
share of negative incomes compared to the No_DP scenario, comparability might be distorted 
in this case. The index of progressivity P is clearly negative, which indicates that low-income 
farms bear a larger share of the overall burden than their share of baseline income. For this 
indicator, comparability is given since it relies on the indicators CB, which incorporates 
(positive) income losses that rarely are negative, and Gx, which is the relative Gini coefficient 
of the Baseline. A comparison reveals that the abolishment of market price policies clearly is 
less regressive than the abolishment of DPs. Despite a lower regressivity, overall effects are 
more negative in the No_Pricepol scenario because average income reduction is much higher 
and the negative vertical effect is amplified by additional re-ranking effects. 
In the Full_Lib scenario (Table 5.4, section V), the liberalization policies of the No_DP and 
No_Pricepol scenarios are combined. Effects of both single scenarios go into the same 
direction, which is reflected in the results of the Full_Lib scenario. Redistributive effects of 
the combined scenario are stronger – i.e., they are more equalizing in absolute terms and more 
unequalizing in relative terms – compared to the single scenarios. Progressivity, however, is 
intermediate in the Full_Lib scenario. The observed increase in overall redistributive effects 
(more negative in relative and more positive in absolute terms) is caused by a larger scale 
factor s. However, the more than proportionally strong reaction of R partly goes back to a 
high share of negative incomes in the income distribution (see discussion in section 5.1.3).  
 Aggregation error 5.3.1.4
From Table 5.4 it can be observed that the analysis that is based on individual data and the 
one that is based on grouped FARMIS data clearly differ in terms of magnitude of the single 
indicators. Yet, the direction of inequality effects and the evaluation of policy reforms are 
similar.  
It is intuitive that both absolute and relative Gini indices are larger when calculated on the 
basis of individual data since within-group inequality is additionally included in the analysis. 
For baseline results, between-groups inequality accounts for 75% of total inequality measured 
                                                 
51
 Income effects of this size should be interpreted in light of the modelling system not allowing for changes in 
farm structure. 
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on individual basis52 while for the Full_Lib scenario between-groups inequality only covers 
59% of total inequality. 
Already, the decile group analysis revealed that some farms with comparatively low (high) 
incomes which were part of middle-class income groups before the disaggregation move to 
the lower (upper) fringe of the overall distribution after disaggregation. In return, farms with 
comparatively high (low) income which formerly were part of groups with low (high) average 
incomes ascend (descend) in the income parade. This makes clear that the ranking of incomes 
in the individual approach is different from the ranking which appears when individuals are 
ranked due to the average incomes of their groups, which is implicitly the ranking in the 
grouped data approach. For Baseline results average income is 3% lower in the lowest decile 
group and 7% higher in the top group when individual rankings are considered. 
In each scenario the overall redistributive effect is more negative in case of the relative Gini 
and less positive in absolute terms when calculated on the basis of individual data. The 
vertical effect in absolute terms is higher for all scenarios, but then more than compensated by 
an also higher re-ranking effect. In relative terms both, V and H are more negative in all 
scenarios. 
Redistributive effects, however, differ only slightly in the absolute analysis. The CB indices, 
which also determine the absolute vertical effects, in particular are close between the 
approaches. For the relative analysis, differences are higher between the two approaches. This 
is comprehensible because after disaggregation a similar degree of distribution of losses is 
combined with a higher degree of inequality in Baseline incomes since P = CB – Gx.. Thus, 
similar absolute income losses are borne by higher incomes in the upper tail of the distribution 
and by lower incomes in the lower tail of the distribution. To conclude, it seems that after the 
disaggregation of groups, individual farms change their ranks to a certain extent. However, 
farms that change ranks, on average, lose similar absolute amounts of their incomes. This in 
turn, leads to more regressive income changes in relative terms. 
The most remarkable difference occurs among the relative index of progressivity in the 
No_Pricepol scenario. It is remarkable not because of the scope of the difference but because 
of the qualitative interpretation. The analysis of between-groups inequality suggests an almost 
neutral distribution of income reductions in relative terms. Contrarily, the analysis of 
individual data shows a clear negative index which implies regressively distributed income 
losses. 
However, large differences in the relative analysis, especially between the Gy values, should 
be interpreted with caution due to a higher share of negative incomes in the individual 
analysis because several individual farms with negative incomes were ‘hidden’ in groups with 
positive average income (26% of groups in Full_Lib have negative income and 36% of 
individuals in the same scenario; for the Baseline the ratio is 5% to 13%). Thus, with a 
                                                 
52
 The ratio is the same for relative and absolute indices. 
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constant mean income (denominator) the numerator of the relative Gini can increase heavily 
due to the fact that negative incomes are allowed for. 
So far, analyses of redistributive effects were compared between individual and grouped data 
for the income indicator FFI. When instead total household income is applied as indicator 
(Table C.1 in Annex C) a slightly different picture appears. Conclusions are widely the same; 
however, due to additional off-farm income all relative Gini indices become smaller. For the 
analysis of grouped data in the No_Pricepol and the Full_Lib scenarios this leads to slightly 
positive indices of progressivity. The opposite is true for the individual data-based analysis. 
Here, the indices announce regressivity of liberalization burdens in relative terms. Thus, the 
additional disaggregation of the grouped data has a sign reversing effect on the progressivity 
index in these two scenarios. Yet, again, the higher share of negative incomes in the 
disaggregated version has to be taken into account and might relativize the differences 
between the approaches. 
In comparison, two other studies using a similar approach to account for the impacts of 
grouping denote much stronger impacts on the qualitative results. Bourguignon et al. (2005) 
combine a standard multisector CGE model with a behavioural micro-simulation model to 
account for changes in real income under different real devaluation scenarios for Indonesia. 
They contrast results based on ten groups with constant within-group inequality with results 
based on disaggregated incomes of 9,800 individual households. Their results indicate 
substantial differences between the two methodologies. They found sign reversing effects due 
to the disaggregation. In a similar study Savard (2005) compared results based on seven 
representative household groups of a CGE model with results based on additionally 
disaggregated incomes for 39,520 households. For a trade liberalization scenario for the 
Philippines he found that the two approaches “systematically produce inverse results” 
(Savard, 2005, p. 326). However, the two cited studies differ from the work at hand as they 
apply behavioural micro-models instead of accounting models for further disaggregation of 
the results and also much fewer and larger representative household groups in the aggregated 
model. Thus, the aggregation bias in the aggregated analysis is likely much larger than in the 
analysis based on 467 farm groups representing 17.2 individual farms on average. 
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Table 5.4: Decomposition of changes in FFI inequality (individual data vs. grouped data). 
 
 
Relative analysis Absolute analysis 
 
 Individual data Grouped Data Individual data Grouped Data 
I) Baseline Results      
Average income (in €)  45,424 
Gini index of income (A) Gx 0.560 0.422 25,443 19,164 
      
II) 50_DP scenario   
Average income (in €)  41,841 
Average support reduction (in €)  3,583 
Average rate of reduced support 
(support reduction/base income) s 0.078 
Gini index  (A) Gy 0.598 0.448 25,028 18,743 
Concentration index  (A) Cy 0.595 0.446 24,903 18,675 
Total redistributive effect (A) R 
-0.038 -0.026 414 422 
Index of re-ranking (A) H 
-0.003 -0.002 -125 -67 
Index of vertical equity (A) V 
-0.035 -0.024 539 489 
Index of progressivity of support 
reduction P ; CB -0.410 -0.285 0.151 0.136 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III) No_DP scenario   
Average income (in €)  36,470 
Average support reduction (in €)  8,953 
Average rate of reduced support 
(support reduction/base income) s 0.197 
Gini index  (A) Gy 0.662 0.487 24,155 17,775 
Concentration index  (A) Cy 0.649 0.480 23,662 17,496 
Total redistributive effect (A) R 
-0.102 -0.065 1,288 1,389 
Index of re-ranking (A) H 
-0.014 -0.008 -493 -279 
Index of vertical equity (A) V 
-0.089 -0.058 1,781 1,668 
Index of progressivity of support 
reduction P ; CB -0.361 -0.236 0.199 0.186 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IV) No_Pricepol scenario   
Average income (in €)  23,823 
Average support reduction (in €)  21,601 
Average rate of reduced support 
(support reduction/base income) s 0.476 
Gini index  (A) Gy 0.782 0.498 18,632 11,857 
Concentration index  (A) Cy 0.683 0.434 16,265 10,349 
Total redistributive effect (A) R 
-0.222 -0.076 6,811 7,308 
Index of re-ranking (A) H 
-0.099 -0.063 -2,367 -1,508 
Index of vertical equity (A) V 
-0.123 -0.013 9,178 8,815 
Index of progressivity of support 
reduction P ; CB -0.135 -0.014 0.425 0.408 
      
Source: Own calculations. 
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Table 5.4 (continued): Decomposition of changes in income inequality (individual data vs. 
grouped data). 
 
 
Relative analysis Absolute analysis 
 
 Individual data Grouped Data Individual data Grouped Data 
Baseline Results      
Average income (in €)  45,424 
Gini index of income (A) Gx 0.560 0.422 25,443 19,164 
      
V) Full Liberalization scenario   
Average income (in €)  14,046 
Average support reduction (in €)  31,378 
Average rate of reduced support 
(support reduction/base income) s 0.691 
Gini index  (A) Gy 1.256 0.739 17,642 10,377 
Concentration index  (A) Cy 1.005 0.582 14,111 8,179 
Total redistributive effect (A) R 
-0.696 -0.317 7,801 8,787 
Index of re-ranking (A) H 
-0.251 -0.156 -3,531 -2,198 
Index of vertical equity (A) V 
-0.445 -0.160 11,331 10,985 
Index of progressivity of support 
reduction P ; CB -0.199 -0.072 0.361 0.350 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
5.3.2 Indicator effects – family farm income versus total household income 
In this section redistributive effects are analysed based on two different concepts of income – 
family farm income and total household income. As already stated above, family farm income 
provides information on return to land, labour, and capital resources owned by the farm 
family, as well as the remuneration of entrepreneurial risk. In contrast, total household income 
additionally takes all off-farm sources into account. Since off-farm income is not depicted in 
the modelling system, observed base year values are assumed to be constant in real terms until 
2020 and for all scenarios. This assumption likely leads to an underestimation of inequality 
compensation effects of off-farm income sources because it can be expected that the 
development of off-farm income and agricultural support are negatively correlated (e.g. 
Vergara et al., 2004; Kwon et al., 2006). 
Before going into details, it is worth emphasizing that for both income concepts only the 
income base is changing while losses are remaining the same for each farm. In other words, 
the same liberalization losses calculated in the scenarios are referred to an (on average) higher 
income, since off-farm income is added as an additional constant income source. Baseline 
rankings according to the indicator FFI differ from rankings according to total household 
income because off-farm income and on-farm income are negatively correlated and some 
farms with a lower FFI overcome other farms when total household income is considered. 
Nevertheless, in Baseline results inequality is lower for total household income than for FFI. 
Thus, inequality reducing effects of additionally taking off-farm income into account are not 
overcompensated by re-ranking effects when switching from FFI to total household income as 
it is in the case of Allanson and Rocchi (2008) for example. 
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The Lorenz curves for total household income as presented in Figure 5.11 and Figure 5.12 
indicate that scenarios are ranked in the same way with regard to the degree of inequality as in 
the analysis of only FFI. A closer look at the absolute Lorenz curves, however, uncovers that 
the curve of the Full_Lib scenario lies outside all other curves for the first 3% of the 
population and inside for the remaining 97%. This denotes that absolute distances of 
cumulative household income to the mean income are larger for the smallest 3% of the 
population in the Full_Lib scenario than in all other scenarios. It also denotes that for the rest 
of the population, absolute distances of cumulative household income to the mean are smaller 
than in all other scenarios. Thus, some indices of inequality might exist which explicitly focus 
on the lower tail of the distribution and accordingly may rank distributions in a different way. 
The relative Lorenz curves reveal that the number of negative values in the distribution of 
total household income is considerably lower compared to the distribution of FFI (cf. Figure 
5.9) for all scenarios. For total household income 7% of the farms have negative incomes in 
the Baseline and 23% in the Full_Lib scenario, compared to respectively 13% and 36% of 
negative values for FFI.  
 
 
Figure 5.11: Relative Lorenz curves for baseline and all scenarios based on individual total 
household income data. 
Source: Own calculations. 
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Figure 5.12: Absolute Lorenz curves for baseline and all scenarios based on individual total 
household income data. 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
In Table 5.5 it can be observed that absolute vertical and overall effects are smaller when total 
income is applied as the indicator for all scenarios. This can be explained by the fact that 
farms with a low FFI tend to have higher income from off-farm sources and in some cases rise 
in the ranking due to the additional consideration of off-farm income. Thus, since the losses 
are distributed progressively with regard to FFI, more farms with higher absolute losses 
descend in the ranking of total income and farms with lower losses ascend in the ranking. This 
trend is also reflected in the CB indices which indicate that losses (which have the same 
average size in both analyses) are less concentrated among the high-income farms when total 
farm income is considered instead of FFI. 
Absolute differences in vertical and overall effects are stronger for scenarios in which an 
abolishment of market price support measures is involved (i.e. No_Pricepol and Full_Lib) 
compared to the scenarios with DP cuts. Here, the level of average income losses is higher 
and at the same time losses are more concentrated among high-FFI farms, which leads to 
stronger effects when switching to total income as indicator. 
In relative terms all indicators are closer to zero for the analysis of total household inequality. 
This can partly be explained by a higher average income (also leading to less negative values 
in the distribution). Thus, relative Gini coefficients are less sensitive with respect to changes 
in average income. Nevertheless, taking off-farm income sources also into account has an 
equalizing effect in relative terms due to the negative correlation of off-farm income and on-
farm income. 
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Table 5.5: Decomposition of changes in income inequality based on individual data (total household 
income vs. FFI). 
 
 
Relative analysis Absolute analysis 
 
 Total Income FFI Total Income FFI 
I) Baseline Results  52,798 45,424 52,798 45,424 Average income (in €)  
Gini index of income (A) Gx 0.468 0.560 24,714 25,443 
II) 50_DP scenario   
Average income (in €)  49,215 41,841 49,215 41,841 
Average support reduction (in €)  3,583 3,583 3,583 3,583 
Average rate of reduced support 
(support reduction/base income) s 0.068 0.078 0.068 0.078 
Gini index  (A) Gy 0.495 0.598 24,386 25,028 
Concentration index  (A) Cy 0.493 0.595 24,256 24,903 
Total redistributive effect (A) R 
-0.027 -0.038 329 414 
Index of re-ranking (A) H -0.003 
-0.003 -130 -125 
Index of vertical equity (A) V -0.025 
-0.035 459 539 
Index of progressivity of support 
reduction P ; CB -0.340 -0.410 0.128 0.151 
 
   
 
 
III) No_DP scenario   
Average income (in €)  43,844 36,470 43,844 36,470 
Average support reduction (in €)  8,953 8,953 8,953 8,953 
Average rate of reduced support 
(support reduction/base income) s 0.170 0.197 0.170 0.197 
Gini index  (A) Gy 0.54 0.662 23,688 24,155 
Concentration index  (A) Cy 0.529 0.649 23,173 23,662 
Total redistributive effect (A) R -0.072 
-0.102 1,026 1,288 
Index of re-ranking (A) H -0.012 
-0.014 -515 -493 
Index of vertical equity (A) V -0.06 
-0.089 1,541 1,781 
Index of progressivity of support 
reduction P ; CB -0.296 -0.361 0.172 0.199 
 
 
 
   
IV) No_Pricepol scenario   
Average income (in €)  31,197 23,823 31,197 23,823 
Average support reduction (in €)  21,601 21,601 21,601 21,601 
Average rate of reduced support 
(support reduction/base income) s 0.409 0.476 0.409 0.476 
Gini index  (A) Gy 0.608 0.782 18,957 18,632 
Concentration index  (A) Cy 0.518 0.683 16,158 16,265 
Total redistributive effect (A) R -0.14 
-0.222 5,757 6,811 
Index of re-ranking (A) H -0.09 
-0.099 -2,799 -2,367 
Index of vertical equity (A) V -0.05 
-0.123 8,556 9,178 
Index of progressivity of support 
reduction P ; CB -0.072 -0.135 0.396 0.425 
      
Source: Own calculations. 
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Table 5.5 (continued): Decomposition of changes in income inequality based on individual 
data (total household income vs. FFI). 
 
 
Relative analysis Absolute analysis 
 
 Total Income FFI Total Income FFI 
Baseline Results  52,798 45,424 52,798 45,424 Average income (in €)  
Gini index of income (A) Gx 0.468 0.560 24,714 25,443 
V) Full Liberalization scenario   
Average income (in €)  21,420 14,046 21,420 14,046 
Average support reduction (in €)  31,378 31,378 31,378 31,378 
Average rate of reduced support 
(support reduction/base income) s 0.594 0.691 0.594 0.691 
Gini index  (A) Gy 0.861 1.256 18,446 17,642 
Concentration index  (A) Cy 0.667 1.005 14,278 14,111 
Total redistributive effect (A) R -0.393 
-0.696 6,268 7,801 
Index of re-ranking (A) H -0.195 
-0.251 -4,168 -3,531 
Index of vertical equity (A) V -0.198 
-0.445 10,436 11,331 
Index of progressivity of support 
reduction P ; CB -0.136 -0.199 0.333 0.361 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
5.3.3 The relevance of taking into account policy-induced production and market 
responses in ex-ante inequality analysis53 
To illustrate the impact of taking into account incentive effects of agricultural policy, model-
based results are compared to those of an analysis which does not allow for any adjustments 
to take place. To estimate income changes resulting from a liberalization of the CAP without 
allowing for production and market responses, it is assumed that European domestic prices 
equal world market prices (in principle, following the procedure adopted by Allanson (2006) 
and OECD (2003)) and production patterns in the FARMIS model are fixed to those of the 
baseline scenario. In this approach, the full amount of reduction in support is still not 
translated one to one into lower farm incomes since the land price is kept variable in the 
FARMIS model and tends to decrease with declining commodity prices and DPs. Further 
reductions in input prices, such as feed and seed costs, are also still taken into account. For the 
calculation of the No_DP scenario without adjustment effects, we rely on the assumption that 
DPs are essentially decoupled from production, and thus that domestic baseline prices will not 
change. Consequently, the No_DP scenario without adjustment effects is calculated by solely 
abolishing all DPs while keeping production patterns fixed.54 
                                                 
53
 This section in parts is identical with parts of the paper Deppermann et al. (2014). 
54
 In the farm group model the link between payment entitlements and land is taken into account. In addition, the 
requirement to keep land which receives payments in good agricultural and environmental condition can have 
an impact on production in regions where agriculture would not be profitable without payments (Kilian et al., 
2012). This causes varying results compared to the version without adjustment effects. Decoupled direct 
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Since this section focuses primarily on a comparison of methodologies, the analysis is 
conducted on the basis of grouped (FARMIS) data. By omitting the additional disaggregation 
step for the calculation of individual farm data, the complexity of the analysis is reduced and 
results are easier to compare and interpret. 
In the No_DP scenario, inequality effects are generally in the same direction in both versions, 
i.e., with adjustment and without adjustment (Table 5.6, section II). Compared to the version 
without adjustment, average income losses are lower when adjustment is accounted for. This 
is because farms adjust their production patterns to the new support structure and specifically 
abstain from unprofitable activities. Compared to the version without adjustment, inequality 
decreases in both relative and absolute terms when adjustment is allowed. In absolute terms, 
however, this only occurs because of a decrease in re-ranking which offsets the lower vertical 
effect in the version with adjustment. If ranks of the baseline are held constant, higher-income 
farms tend to reduce losses marginally more by adjustment in absolute terms (ACy increases 
when adjustment is allowed for), while lower-income farms gain more in relative terms (Cy 
decreases). Higher CB values in the version with adjustment indicate that lower-income farms 
can reduce their share in the overall income losses accruing from the abolishment of DPs 
because of adjustment. 
Many individual farm characteristics explain adjustment reactions of a farm and thus the 
ability to reduce income losses from a DP cut. Factors that determine the reaction of a farm 
are: regional land prices, shares of farm owned land, individual production patterns, and gross 
margins per hectare. In the analysis at hand, there is one key factor among these attributes 
which explains why low-income farms tend to reduce their share in the overall income losses 
of all farms when adjustment is accounted for compared to the version without adjustment: in 
the sample, lower-income farms have a lower gross margin, on average, for most of the 
important products. As a consequence, due to the DP cut, lower-income farms have a higher 
share of production activities with negative gross margins, on average, compared to farms 
with a higher income. Thus, when adjustments are allowed, lower-income farms are able to 
reduce their income losses by reducing or stopping the respective production activities. 
Higher-income farms, in contrast, tend to have a higher share of production with positive 
gross margins even after the abolishment of DPs. Hence, even though adjustment is accounted 
for, higher-income farms cannot reduce their losses by simply abandoning these activities. 
Resources may be shifted to other farming activities, yet other activities are in most cases 
affected by reduced support payments as well. Thus, it can be observed that low-income 
farms tend to reduce their production to a larger extent when adjustment is allowed, compared 
to farms with higher income. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
payments may also affect production via wealth and insurance effects (Bhaskar and Beghin, 2009), however, 
these effects are not taken into account in the analysis. 
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Table 5.6: Decomposition of changes in income inequality based on (FARMIS) groups 
results (dynamically vs. statically derived FFI). 
 
 
Relative analysis Absolute analysis 
 
 with adjustment no adjustment with adjustment no adjustment 
I) Baseline Results      
Average income (in €)  45,369 
Gini index of income (A) Gx 0.422 19,149 
      
II) No_DP scenario      
Average income (in €)  36,376 33,864 36,376 33,864 
Average support reduction (in €)  8,993 11,505 8,993 11,505 
Average rate of reduced support 
(support reduction/base income) s 0.20 0.25 0.20 0.25 
Gini index  (A) Gy 0.49 0.53 17,748 17,815 
Concentration index  (A) Cy 0.48  0.51 17,467 17,427 
Total redistributive effect (A) R 
-0.07  -0.1  1,401 1,335 
Index of re-ranking (A) H 
-0.01 -0.01 -281 -388 
Index of vertical equity (A) V 
-0.06 -0.09 1,682 1,722 
Index of progressivity of support 
reduction P ; CB -0.23 -0.27 0.19 0.15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III) No_Pricepol scenario      
Average income (in €)  23,899 22,918 23,899 22,918 
Average support reduction (in €)  21,470 22,450 21,470 22,450 
Average rate of reduced support 
(support reduction/base income) s 0.47 0.49 0.47 0.49 
Gini index  (A) Gy 0.5 0.53 11,893 12,118 
Concentration index  (A) Cy 0.44 0.47 10,396 10,695 
Total redistributive effect (A) R 
-0.08 -0.11 7,256 7,032 
Index of re-ranking (A) H 
-0.06 -0.06 -1,497 -1,423 
Index of vertical equity (A) V 
-0.02 -0.04 8,753 8,454 
Index of progressivity of support 
reduction P ; CB -0.01 -0.05 0.41 0.38 
      
IV) Full Liberalization scenario      
Average income (in €)  14,191 10,510 14,191 10,510 
Average support reduction (in €)  31,178 34,859 31,178 34,859 
Average rate of reduced support 
(support reduction/base income) s 0.69 0.77 0.69 0.77 
Gini index  (A) Gy 0.74 1.09 10,455 11,498 
Concentration index  (A) Cy 0.58 0.84 8,273 8,878 
Total redistributive effect (A) R 
-0.31 -0.67 8,695 7,652 
Index of re-ranking (A) H 
-0.15 -0.25 -2,181 -2,620 
Index of vertical equity (A) V 
-0.16 -0.42 10,876 10,271 
Index of progressivity of support 
reduction P ; CB -0.07 -0.13 0.35 0.29 
Source: Own calculations. 
Note: Numerical results of the analysis with adjustment minimally differ from the figures presented above for 
the comparison between different levels of aggregation. These differences occur due to slight changes in the 
model code. However, results and conclusions are not affected. 
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A comparison of the No_Pricepol scenarios (Table 5.6, section III) with and without 
adjustment reveals similar differences found in the comparison between the No_DP scenarios. 
In the No_Pricepol scenarios, inequality decreases in comparison to the static version when 
adjustments are allowed. Lower-income farms are able to reduce income losses to a larger 
extent, on average, than higher-income farms – not only in relative terms, but also in absolute 
terms. This is indicated by a lower absolute concentration index (ACy) and a higher absolute 
vertical effect of liberalization (AV) in the version with adjustment compared to the version 
without adjustment. 
Again, adjustment reactions of farms depend on individual characteristics such as production 
patterns and factor endowments. In the No_Pricepol scenario, production patterns are even 
more relevant because product price reactions vary with commodity specific adjustment 
effects (world market prices increase, on average, when adjustment is allowed, dampening 
price cuts that accrue in the static scenario). Furthermore, due to the abolition of production 
quotas, the farm specific magnitudes of quota rents also impact adaption abilities. 
One reason for the higher reduction of losses in absolute terms in lower-income farms in the 
No_Pricepol scenario with adjustment compared to the scenario without adjustment, is an 
effect triggered by the abolishment of the milk quota. Without being restricted by the quota 
scheme, dairy production, on average, increases when adjustment is allowed.55 As a by-
product of increased dairy production, the supply of calves increases. At the same time, the 
abolishment of price policies leads to a decrease in beef prices and thus a decrease in the 
profitability of beef fattening activities. When production patterns are adjusted, this leads to a 
decrease in the demand for calves. The resulting negative price effect for calves negatively 
affect dairy farms, on average, in the scenario with adjustment compared to the scenario 
without adjustment. In our baseline scenario, prices for dairy products are high and most dairy 
farms are in the upper two income terciles. Thus, the negative income effect resulting from 
these specific market price adjustments counteracts the reduction of income losses from 
adjustments in farm production, mainly for higher-income farms. The negative income effect 
of falling calf prices also explains the lower reduction of average losses of all farms due to 
adjustment in the No_Pricepol scenario compared to the No_DP scenario. 
Nevertheless, dairy farms do not show homogenous adjustment behaviour. Some farms 
decrease dairy production because of low baseline quota rents, while others expand milk 
production because of initially high quota rents. As a consequence, some dairy farms have 
even greater losses from liberalization when production and market adjustments are allowed, 
compared to when adjustments are not allowed, given the combination of lower calf prices 
and decreased milk production due to low quota rents. Other dairy farms, however, can partly 
compensate their losses by increasing milk production. 
                                                 
55
 In the version without adjustment quantities are fixed to baseline values. 
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Another reason for the comparatively high reduction of income losses of lower-income farms 
due to adjustments in the No_Pricepol scenario is the fact that many of the farms which 
specialized in beef production are in the lowest income tercile in the baseline scenario. Since 
beef is a highly protected product in the Baseline scenario, liberalization entails a higher 
demand and a lower supply in Europe. These market adjustment effects have considerable 
positive impacts on the world market price of beef. Thus, taking market adjustment effects 
into account, price cuts for beef are lower compared to the version without adjustment effects. 
Due to these additional adjustment processes in the No_Pricepol scenario, the general pattern 
of adaption observed in the No_DP scenario – i.e., it being easier for lower-income farms to 
avoid income losses from liberalization by abandoning production activities which have 
negative margins under scenario conditions – is less important in the No_Pricepol scenario. 
In the Full_Lib scenario (Table 5.6, Section IV), differences between the version with and 
without adjustment are more distinct, both in relative and absolute terms. Similar to the 
No_Pricepol scenario, lower-income farms can reduce their losses to a greater extent due to 
adjustment processes, even in absolute terms. This is indicated by a higher index of vertical 
equity (AV) in the version with adjustment, compared to the version without adjustment. 
The more profound differences between the analysis with and without adjustment can be 
explained mainly by two effects. First, with higher average support cuts, a larger share of 
production activities obtain negative marginal incomes, which is mainly the case for less 
profitable farms with lower incomes. These losses are more readily avoided by abandoning 
unprofitable farming activities than losses caused by support cuts for products that still have 
positive marginal income effects. Second, profitable farms with a high share of quota 
products, particularly dairy farms, tend to have opposing adjustment strategies in the No_DP 
and No_Pricepol scenarios: In the former, production activities tend to be reduced because 
unprofitable land is taken out of production. In the latter, production, on average, is extended 
due to the abolishment of quota restrictions. The combination of these two opposing strategies 
leads to a lower ability of farms to reduce losses due to adjustment in the Full_Lib scenario, 
mainly for farms with a higher income. 
When adjustment effects are allowed, in all three scenarios, lower-income farms tend to 
reduce their share in overall income losses compared to the version without adjustment. In 
general, the adjustment mechanisms of factor markets might counteract this effect. This is 
particularly with an abolition of production quotas since more profitable farms tend to extend 
their production, resulting in additional costs for less profitable farms due to a demand-driven 
increase in factor prices. In our analysis, however, this effect is less distinct and other effects 
dominate the results. 
In the No_Pricepol and the Full_Lib scenarios, lower-income farms, on average, are able to 
avoid liberalization losses to a greater extent due to adjustment processes compared to higher-
income farms – even in absolute terms. This effect is a rather specific feature of the empirical 
analysis for western Germany and is mainly caused by the dampening market price effect, 
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particularly for farms that specialize in beef production and that tend to have low Baseline 
incomes, and the negative effect of lower calf prices for dairy farms which tend to have 
middle or high incomes in the Baseline scenario. 
Furthermore, farm specific production patterns, regional factor markets, and individual factor 
endowments determine the ability of farms to adapt to new market structures and to avoid 
income losses. For these factors, however, no general distinction between low and high 
income farms can be made based on our model results. 
From the empirical analysis, it can be concluded that taking adjustment effects into account 
clearly has an impact on the dimension of inequality indicators. When comparing analyses 
that ignore adjustment effects to ones that do not, the largest differences are found in the 
Full_Lib scenario. Nevertheless, in all of the scenarios, distributional effects have the same 
directional impact both in the static analysis and in the analysis with adjustment effects. In 
general, the evaluation and ranking of the different reform scenarios with respect to their 
impact on income equality is similar regardless of adjustment effects. 
 
5.3.4 Discussion 
To conclude, it can be said that the results of the calculated scenarios are robust with regard to 
the tested aggregation levels, income indicators and the inclusion of behavioural effects, at 
least with regard to the direction of redistributive effects. Only when total household income 
is applied does a further disaggregation of grouped results lead to sign reversing effects for 
vertical effects of two scenarios. Still, results differ substantially in magnitude, mostly when 
different levels of aggregation are compared with each other. 
Results are in line with most of the existing literature. An abolishment of market price support 
and/or direct payments would decrease absolute income differences in the agricultural sector 
because high-income farms lose higher amounts of money. On the other hand, low-income 
farms would have to bear a higher share of the burden in relative terms. With regard to the 
different policy instruments, it turns out that the abolishment of market price support is more 
progressive in absolute terms and less regressive in relative terms than the abolishment of 
DPs. 
A caveat of the analysis is clearly the static way in which the micro-model disaggregates the 
grouped results. Due to this approach, individual income changes are to a certain extent 
determined by changes in production patterns of the respective farm groups at the meso-level. 
Furthermore, no structural change is implemented in the modelling system. This likely has an 
effect on the analysis of income distribution since farms with large negative incomes would 
probably leave the sector and average farm size would increase. Moreover, the adaption of 
new production technologies is not considered in the analysis.  
In addition, several assumptions regarding the development of agricultural markets until the 
final year of the analysis have to be made for the generation of the Baseline scenario. It is 
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well-known that redistributive effects are influenced by the distribution of income in the base 
situation (Lerman and Yitzhaki, 1995). Thus, it should be kept in mind that any ex-ante 
analysis implies a certain extent of uncertainty. 
 
 
6 Subgroup decomposition of inequality effects in the western 
German agricultural sector 
In section 2.2.2 the terms between-groups inequality and within-group inequality were 
introduced to substantiate the claim that inequality is systematically underestimated when it is 
measured on the basis of grouped data. After the detailed explanation of how individual farm 
income data are generated in this work and after an extensive analysis of redistributive effects 
of CAP liberalization, now a subgroup decomposition of inequality indices is undertaken. To 
give a more detailed picture of the underlying processes of inequality changes, individual 
farms are grouped according to different farm characteristics to reveal the contribution of 
inequality within the groups and between the groups to overall inequality. Total farm 
population is decomposed into subgroups according to farm types and in a second analysis, 
according to regional criteria. 
 Methodology 6.1
The literature generally distinguishes between inequality measures which are additively 
decomposable into only two components and measures which yield three components. 
Generalized Entropy indices, among others, belong to the first group. They can be 
decomposed into one component containing inequality within groups and another one 
containing inequality between groups. Inequality between groups in this context is accounted 
for by substituting all individual incomes within a given group by the groups mean income. In 
summary, both components yield the overall inequality level (for an overview and axiomatic 
derivations see Deutsch and Silber, 1999). Such a measure can be represented by equation (1) 
in section 2.2.2:   	 	
	 + . 
The Gini coefficient, both in absolute and in relative terms, is decomposable into a measure of 
inequality within groups and a measure of inequality between group means only if subgroup 
populations do not overlap. Two subgroups do not overlap if all members of the group with 
the lower mean income are poorer than the poorest member of the richer group. Such a 
situation is depicted in Figure 6.1b. 
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Figure 6.1: Overlapping of Distributions. 
 NB: Vertical lines depict mean incomes of subgroups. 
 Source: Milanovic (2002). 
 
In the case of overlapping group distributions (represented in Figure 6.1a) a third term appears 
when the Gini coefficient is decomposed. With G depicting the Gini coefficient, GW the 
within-group inequality component, GB the between-group inequality component, and OV the 
overlapping term it counts: 
(21)    W BG G G OV= + + . 
Bhattacharya and Mahalanobis (1967) were among the first authors using the Gini 
decomposition by subgroups in their analysis of household consumption in India. Other 
authors followed suit, with each proposing a new technical decomposition methodology or 
interpretation (see Deutsch and Silber (1998), Monti (2007), and Radaelli (2010) for historical 
outlines of the development of decomposing the Gini coefficient by subgroups). For a long 
time the methodology was discussed controversially, especially because of the overlapping 
term which was seen as a rather disturbing term not containing any valuable information. 
Often, two-term decomposable indices were considered as superior. Mookherjee and 
Shorrocks (1982, p. 889) for instance write about the overlapping term: “However, there still 
remains […] the ‘interaction effect’ […], which is impossible to interpret with any precision, 
except to say that it is the residual necessary to maintain the identity. Furthermore, the way in 
Income
Income
A B C
A B C
a) Large Overlap Component in Gini Decomposition
b) Small Overlap Component in Gini Decomposition
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which it reacts […] is so obscure that it can cause the overall Gini value to respond 
perversely”. Lambert and Aronson (1993) provide a geometrical analysis of the overlapping 
term within the Lorenz diagram. They interpret OV as a term which accounts for the re-
ranking which is “necessary to form the true income parade, from the poorest to the overall 
richest” (p. 1222) when in the initial situation individuals are ranked in ascending order within 
subgroups and subgroups in ascending order with regard to their mean income. However, they 
did not see the Gini coefficient “rehabilitated” and suggest Generalized Entropy measures for 
the analysis of inequality sources (p. 1225). 
In other papers, however, the overlapping term is appreciated as a source of additional 
information (e.g. Dagum, 1997; Lambert and Decoster, 2005). Dagum (1997, p. 519) suggests 
that between groups inequality is more accurately depicted when overlapping is explicitly 
taken into consideration. To “take the income means of the subpopulation as their 
representative values to estimate inequality between subpopulations […] is inappropriate for 
the income distributions of the subpopulations often differ in variance and asymmetry”. 
Yitzhaki and Lerman (1991) and Yitzhaki (1994) explore the link between income 
distribution and income stratification. Yitzhaki (1994) develops an index of stratification 
based on the overlapping of subgroup distributions. However, the stratification index and the 
between-groups component in this literature differ from the ‘traditional’ approach in the sense 
of Bhattacharya and Mahalanobis (1967) and others. Gradín (1999, 2000) develops an 
indicator which is very similar to Yitzhaki’s (1994) indicator, but which is rooted in the 
‘traditional’ approach. 
Monti (2007) shows that results of the decomposition approaches proposed by Mookherjee 
and Shorrocks (1982), Lambert and Aronson (1993), and Dagum (1997) are numerically 
equivalent. Radaelli (2010, p. 82) refers to this (specifically, to Dagum’s) approach as the 
“most widespread Gini index decomposition currently applied in a subgroups framework”. 
This approach is also applied in the work at hand and is presented in detail below. Equations 
are taken from Monti (2007)56 who shows that the overlapping term can be further 
decomposed as a weighted sum of overlapping between each pair of groups. Equations are 
adopted where it seemed appropriate to the style of Radaelli (2010) to increase intelligibility. 
Using the same notations as before with xi representing the income of individual i (i = 
1,2,3,…,n) and µ the average income, the relative Gini coefficient can be expressed as: 
(22)   2
1 1
1
2 2
n n
i j
i j
G x x
n µ µ
= =
∆
= − =∑∑   
with ∆ indicating Gini’s mean difference, which represents the average distance between all 
possible pairs of income in the distribution. Now, let us consider a segmentation of the total 
population n into k mutually exclusive subgroups with nk members, an average income of µk, 
                                                 
56
 Monti (2007) in turn builds on the equations presented in Dagum (1997). 
105 
 
and the total number of groups K. The mean difference among all members of group k is 
denoted ∆kk. Then, the relative Gini index for each group k is represented by: 
(23) 2
1 1
1
2 2
k kn n
kk
kk ki kj
i jk k k
G x x
n µ µ
= =
∆
= − =∑∑   
and total within-group inequality is subsumed in GW, which is defined as 
(24)   W kk k k
k
G G p s=∑  
with pk representing the population share of group k in overall population and sk its share in 
overall income. Accounting for the fact that all individuals within one group build pairs (and 
thus cause inequality) not only with members of the same group but also with all other 
members of the total population, a Gini ratio is presented which accounts for inequality 
between members of group k and group h, but not within the subgroups: 
(25)   
1 1
1 k hn n kh
kh ki hj hk
i jk h k h k h
G x x G
n n ( )µ µ µ µ
= =
∆
= − = =
+ +
∑∑ . 
Based on equation (25) the gross Gini component GGB is defined, subsuming inequality that 
occurs between groups and excluding the inequality within the groups: 
(26)   GB kh k h
k h k
G G p s
≠
=∑∑  
Gross inequality between groups GGB is further decomposable. The component GB represents 
net inequality between groups and is obtained by substituting all individual incomes within a 
given group by the respective groups’ mean income. The second term OV is a component that 
reflects the degree of overlapping of distributions. Thus: 
(27)   GB BG G OV= +  
with 
(28)   1
2B k h k hk h
G p pµ µ
µ
= −∑∑  
and 
(29)   1 ( )kh k h k h
k h k k h
OV p sµ µ
µ µ≠
= ∆ − −
+
∑∑ . 
Above, the decomposition methodology was introduced for the relative Gini coefficient. In 
the work at hand the absolute Gini coefficient is additionally used. Thus, absolute versions of 
the inequality components are derived in the following. We know that the relative Gini 
coefficient is equal to the absolute Gini divided by mean income. Thus, we easily can see that: 
(30) W B W BAG G G G OV AG AG AOVµ µ µ µ= = + + = + +  
and thus, from equations (23) and (24) 
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(31) 2W kk k k kk k
k k
AG G p s AG ( p )µ= =∑ ∑ ,with 2
kk
kkAG
∆
=
 and k kk
n
s
n
µ
µ
= . 
Furthermore, multiplying (28) and (29) by mean income yields: 
(32) 1
2B k h k hk h
AG p pµ µ= −∑∑  
and 
(33) 1 ( )kh k h k h
k h k k h
AOV p sµ µ µ
µ µ≠
= ∆ − −
+
∑∑  
1
2 1
( ) ( )K k kh k h hk h k
k h h k
k h k h h k
p s p s
µ µ µ µµ
µ µ µ µ
−
= =
∆ − − ∆ − −
= +
+ +
∑∑  
1
2 1
( )K k kh k h
k h h k
k h k h
( p s p s )µ µµ
µ µ
−
= =
∆ − −
= +
+
∑∑  
1
2
2 1
K k
k h
kh k h
k h
n n ( )
n
µ µ
−
= =
= ∆ − −∑∑ .57 
The three presented Gini components so far, (A)GW, (A)GB and (A)OV sum up to the total 
(absolute) Gini coefficient and thus, represent the shares of inequality which are caused by the 
respective types when divided by the overall coefficient. (A)GW itself is a weighted sum of 
Gini ratios representing inequality within the single groups. (A)GB and (A)OV are, 
respectively, weighted sums of Gini ratios representing inequality between each single pair of 
groups when individual incomes are replaced by group means, and overlapping that occurs 
between each pair of groups (as was shown by Monti, 2007). These (unweighted) single ratios 
henceforth shall be denoted as ‘fractional Ginis’ to highlight the fact that a Gini coefficient is 
calculated by only taking a fraction of the overall population into consideration. 
Relative ‘fractional Ginis’ are defined as [Gkk] for within group inequality, as [│µk- µh│/ (µk+ 
µh)] for the between group inequality and as [(∆kh -│µk- µh│)/(µk+ µh)] for the overlapping 
term. The absolute versions are defined as [AGkk], [│µk- µh│/2], and [(∆kh -│µk- µh│)/2] in 
respective order. By weighting a Gini equivalent with its respective weight and dividing it by 
the overall Gini coefficient one calculates the share in overall inequality that is respectively 
caused by inequality within a group, inequality between the means of two specific groups or 
overlapping of two specific groups with each other (Monti, 2007; Mussard, 2004). As an 
example, I show for the share of overall inequality which is caused by overlapping between 
group k and group h, that it depends only on the distances between the considered incomes 
and has the same numerical value in the relative (term 1) and the absolute version (term 2): 
                                                 
57
 By observing that: ( ) 2k h h k k h k hp s p s n n / nµ µ µ + = +  (Monti, 2007, p. 7). 
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By observing that 1 1
k hn n
ki hj k h
i j
kh k h
k h
( x x )
n n
µ µ
µ µ = =
− − −
∆ − − =
∑∑
, 
(34) 
2 2 1 1
2
1 1
1
2
2
k hn n
kh k hk h k h ki hj k hkh k h
i j
kh n n
i j
i j
n n n n ( x x )( ) ( )
n nshare _OV
x x
µ µ µ µµ µµ
µ
= =
= =
∆ − −
− − −∆ − −
= = =∆ ∆
−
∑∑
∑∑

. 
Regarding the interpretation of the overlapping term, Lambert and Aronson (1993) recognize 
that it would be higher the closer the means of the subpopulations. They state that the term 
OV is “at once a between groups and a within groups effect [which] measures a between 
groups phenomenon, overlapping, that is generated by inequality within groups” and which is 
“a phenomenon with intrinsic economic interest”. (p. 1224). Shorroks and Wan (2005) 
conclude that a reduced overlapping component is likely to translate into increasing between 
group inequality, but that this relation is not an unambiguous one since distances between 
subgroup means do not necessarily have to increase when overlapping is reduced. 
A link between the overlapping term and the concepts of stratification and segmentation is 
established by Yitzhaki and Lerman (1991) and Yitzhaki (1994). In their works, overlapping 
is interpreted as non-stratification. Based on this insight, Yitzhaki (1994) develops a clearly 
defined index of overlapping that is consistently integrated in the framework of a Gini 
decomposition. Thereby, the Gini is decomposed into three terms. However, only the within-
groups inequality component is numerically equal to the one presented by Dagum (1997) and 
others. Yitzhaki (1994) emphasises the importance of the measurement of stratification in 
connection with income inequality by linking it to the inequality tolerance of a society. He 
points out with reference to Runciman (1966) that inequality tolerance is higher in stratified 
societies. Furthermore, he suggests the application of his index in the field of market 
segmentation or to measure the “segmentation of the students’ population by school … 
[which] is an important factor which determines the ability to predict students’ performance 
from knowing their school” (p. 149). 
The between-groups and the overlapping components are differently defined. Still, the two 
different ways of Gini decomposition are closely related, which is demonstrated by Milanovic 
and Yitzhaki (2002) and by Monti and Santoro (2009, 2011). 
Gradin (1999, 2000) develops an overlapping index which is close to the index of Yitzhaki 
(1994) but is rooted in the ‘traditional’ approach of Gini decomposition proposed by 
Bhattacharya and Mahalanobis (1967), Dagum (1997), and others. In his work he utilizes 
overlapping within his framework to estimate polarization by subgroup characteristics in 
Spain. His index is based on the decomposition approach presented above. It is presented in 
the following section and is later on applied in the empirical analysis of the work at hand. 
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Milanovic (2002) utilizes the Gini decomposition methodology to analyse composition of 
world income. He connects the overlapping component to the stratification literature of 
Yitzhaki and Lerman (1991) and Yitzhaki (1994) and interprets it as ‘homogeneity’ of 
population. He concludes that “…[t]he more important the ‘overlapping’ component  
compared to the other two, the more homogeneous the population – or differently put, the less 
one’s income depends on where she lives” (p. 70).  
Pyatt (1976) and Mussard and Savard (2012) go one step further and recognize a link between 
overlapping and incentives. Pyatt connects overlapping to the decision of an individual to 
migrate from one group to another group. Mussard and Savard refer to overlapping as ‘good 
inequality’. They argue that “For instance, in the case of wage inequalities, we have some 
close interrelations with incentives. Hence, if some individuals of the poorest groups feel 
deprived compared to other groups, they may increase their effort to earn more than the 
members of the richest groups” (p. 1239). Even though their argument may not be 
straightforward because considering the exact opposite effect (e.g. resignation in the poorest 
group) is also possible, it stresses the impact that overlapping might have on incentives. 
In the work at hand, different scenarios of agricultural policy reforms are analysed regarding 
their impacts on individual farm incomes. One interesting analysis regarding subgroup 
decomposition is now to decompose farms by type of their specialization and analyse the 
impacts on inequality within subgroups. Furthermore, it is of interest, how the subgroups 
relate to each other.  
A certain degree of overlapping between the different farm type groups can be expected a 
priori; however, the extent of overlapping between the subgroups and especially the impact of 
different reforms cannot be anticipated. The relation between the groups might on its own be 
of interest to a policy maker to anticipate unintended policy effects. Moreover, based on the 
links between incentives and overlapping as presented before, an interesting interpretation 
might be with regard to structural change in the agricultural sector. As stated earlier, structural 
change is not implemented in the modelling system, but due to an inequality decomposition 
analysis of model results some developments might be anticipated. In general, two types of 
structural changes can be identified: structural change in terms of farm exits and increasing 
average farms size and structural change in terms of farm specialization (as described for 
instance in Gocht et al., 2012). When a subgroup characterised by a specific farm type has a 
comparatively low average income and is also segmented at the lower part of the income scale 
with no or little overlapping to other subgroups, disproportionally many farm exits (or 
downgrades to part time farms) might accrue among farmers of this specific farm type. 
Moreover, the incentives to change the specialization of the farm might be higher if the 
farmer observes that most of the farms with the same specialization have lower incomes then 
farms with other specializations (i.e. the overlapping component is small). Of course, the 
individual decision of a farm exit or change in farm specialization depends on many factors 
and clearly more research is needed to test the link between overlapping and structural 
change. 
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Another possibility to group farms is by region. Below, both a farm type and a regional 
decomposition analysis for scenario results are carried out. Before the presentation of 
empirical results, the overlapping index of Gradin (1999, 2000) is presented in more detail in 
the following lines. 
Gradin (2000, p. 464) introduces an overlapping index Okh for the k-th group with respect to 
the h-th group as: 
(35)   0 0
0 0
h k k h
kh
k k
x y dF ( y )dF ( x )
O
x y dF ( y )dF ( x )
µ µ∞ ∞
∞ ∞
− − −
=
−
∫ ∫
∫ ∫
 
with Fk denoting the cumulative distribution of group k. Gradìn (2000) notes that the 
denominator is equal to the absolute Gini coefficient of the k-th group and that the index is 
group-symmetric only if both subgroups share the same absolute Gini. The term in the 
numerator is numerically equal to the absolute version of the overlapping index as expressed 
(in discrete form) in equation (33). Gradín’s formulation of the index is only defined for non-
negative values. Since in the work at hand incomes can be negative, the index is calculated as 
AOVkh / AGkk, where the numerator refers to the absolute overlapping between the groups k 
and h and the denominator is the absolute Gini coefficient of group k. 
Thus, the overlapping between two subpopulations is expressed in relation to the absolute 
Gini of one of the subpopulations. Properties of the index are described by Gradìn (2000, p. 
464), given that µh ≥ µk: “(1) Okh and  Ohk are non-negative and unbounded. They are equal to 
0 if, and only if, there is no overlap between both groups, and by definition Okk = 1. (2) The 
larger the share of people in h with incomes below the richest person in k, the higher the Okh. 
The larger the share of people in group k with incomes above the poorest person in h, the 
higher the Ohk. […] (4) Given the distribution of k, Okh reaches its maximum if all income in 
the group h is concentrated on one individual”.58 
The overlapping index of group k with all the other groups is defined as: 
(36)    
1
K
k kh h
h
O O p
=
=∑ . 
This index indicates the overlapping of group k with the overall distribution, including group 
k itself. Thus, its minimum value is the population share of group k, since Okk = 1 per 
definition. 
The aggregated overlapping index for all subpopulations is a weighted average of Ok: 
(37)    
1
K
k k
k
O O p
=
=∑ . 
                                                 
58
 In the original version, Gradín (2000) uses Iij instead of Okh. 
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As shown by Gradìn (1999), the index of overlapping can consistently be integrated in the 
Gini decomposition: 
(38) B k kk k
k
G G s G O= +∑ . 
With equations (30) and (31) we can verify that the absolute Gini can be decomposed 
equivalently, without changing the formulation of the overlapping index O: 
(39)    B k kk k
k
AG AG p AG O= +∑ . 
The fact that the minimum value of Ok is the population share of the group k, as described 
above, hampers comparability between the different groups regarding their degree of 
stratification. Thus, for comparison of the overlapping between group k and the rest of the 
population simply an index Ok,rest in the sense of equation (33) is computed where group k is 
compared with one other group in which the rest of the population is subsumed. 
 Empirical analysis 6.2
In the following, an empirical analysis of scenario results using the Gini decomposition is 
presented. Total farm population is decomposed into subgroups according to farm types 
which are defined by the predominant commodity specialization of a farm. Farms are 
classified according to standard gross margins in the base year of the modelling exercise and 
cannot switch their status during the simulation period. Farms are mutually exclusively 
assigned to one of the following groups (acronyms in parenthesis): 
• Dairy farms (DF) 
• Pig and poultry farms (PP) 
• Arable farms (AF) 
• Other grazing livestock farms (GL) 
• Permanent crops farms (PC) 
• Mixed farms (MF). 
In Table 6.1 aggregated results of an analysis of decomposed inequality effects by farm types 
are presented. Since the same scenarios are considered as presented in the chapters before, we 
already know that relative inequality increases and absolute inequality decreases with 
increasing average income losses. 
Within groups, inequality strongly correlates with overall inequality: increasing relative and 
decreasing absolute inequality can on average be found within the subgroups. The within-
groups inequality component constantly amounts to circa one fifth of overall inequality for all 
scenarios. Cuts in DPs slightly increase the relative and absolute between-groups Ginis and 
also the share of between-groups inequality in overall inequality. The share and the value of 
the absolute overlapping component decrease slightly while in relative terms the value of the 
overlapping component is increased. In absolute terms, this indicates that average distances 
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within subgroups are reduced but distances between group means are increased. This 
combination leads to a reduction of overlapping. Since the relative Gini is equal to the 
absolute Gini divided by mean income, we can conclude that absolute changes are 
overcompensated by a reduced mean income in relative terms for the within-groups inequality 
and the overlapping components while the increase of the between-groups Gini is amplified. 
Unlike for within-groups inequality, the shares of between-groups inequality and overlapping 
are not constant for all scenarios. Strongest differences to baseline shares can be observed in 
the No_Pricepol scenario. Here, the share of between-groups inequality decreases to 23% and 
overlapping rises to 57% starting from 39% and 41% in the baseline, respectively. Disparities 
between group means are significantly reduced, especially in absolute terms. Together with an 
almost constant share of inequality within the groups this drives the share of overlapping in 
overall inequality. Following the argumentation of Milanovic (2002), the farm population is 
more homogenous after the abolishment of market price policies and farm income depends 
less on the specialization of the farm. Regarding the share of inequality components, the 
Full_Lib scenario shows intermediate result between the No_DP and the No_Pricepol 
scenarios. 
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Table 6.1: Aggregate results of farm type decomposition (based on FFI). 
BL 50_DP No_DP No_PP Full_Lib 
 
Average income (€) 45,424 41,841 36,470 23,823 14,046 
 
    
RELATIV 
Gini 
0.56 0.598 0.662 0.782 1.256 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Gini-Within 
0.109 0.115 0.126 0.156 0.244 
19% 19% 19% 20% 19% 
Gini-Between 
0.22 0.248 0.283 0.178 0.375 
39% 41% 43% 23% 30% 
Overlapping 
0.231 0.235 0.254 0.449 0.636 
41% 39% 38% 57% 51% 
 
 
    
ABSOLUT 
Abs. Gini 25,443 25,028 24,155 18,632 17,642 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Abs. Gini-Within 
4,934 4,808 4,595 3,711 3,433 
19% 19% 19% 20% 19% 
Abs. Gini-Between 
10,003 10,376 10,314 4,232 5,269 
39% 41% 43% 23% 30% 
Abs. Overlapping 
10,505 9,845 9,246 10,687 8,940 
41% 39% 38% 57% 51% 
 
 
    O
_Gradin 
 
0.678 0.662 0.653 0.812 0.753 
       
Source: own calculations. 
 
Due to the high deviations of results of the No_Pricepol scenario in comparison to the 
Baseline, this scenario is discussed in greater detail in the following paragraphs. Detailed 
results for all other scenarios are presented in Table D.1 to Table D.7 in Annex D. 
Disaggregated results are only presented for absolute inequality because of the prevalence of 
negative incomes in some subgroups. In the Full_Lib scenario, for example, average income 
for other grazing livestock farms is negative in 2020. These effects are difficult to interpret. 
Furthermore, the share of inequality that is caused by different inequality components is 
independent from the concept of inequality measurement (cf. equation (34)) and basic 
conclusions can be drawn either way. 
At first, detailed results for the Baseline are presented in Table 6.2. Subsequently, Table 6.3 
shows results for the No_Pricepol scenario and in Table 6.4 changes between Baseline and 
No_Pricepol results are presented. The reason for the significant decrease in between-groups 
inequality can be easily discerned by looking at changes in average group income in Table 
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6.4. The group with the former highest income – dairy farms – lose 60% of their income when 
market price policies are abolished, which is due in great part to the removal of the milk 
production quota. The group with the former second highest income – pig and poultry farms – 
lose only 25% on average, however, this group only accounts for 6% of the farm population 
while dairy farms account for 32%. On the other side of the income spectrum, the group with 
the lowest income (grazing livestock farms) loses 68% of income on average but accounts 
only for 11% of overall population while the second lowest income group (arable farms) have 
to bear only losses of 39% on average and represent 20% of the population. Thus, on average 
income disparities between group means are reduced. Furthermore, permanent crop farms 
hardly lose income because the bulk of their produced commodities is not affected by 
agricultural policy or not depicted as variable in the modelling system, e.g. wine or fruit 
production. 
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Table 6.2: Detailed results of farm type decomposition in 2020 for the Baseline scenario. 
BASELINE AF DF GL MF PP PC 
Average Income (€) 28,787 68,825 19,514 42,982 54,175 31,421 
Income share 0.12 0.48 0.05 0.21 0.07 0.07 
Farm population 31,762 51,376 17,135 36,376 9,445 15,979 
Population share 0.20 0.32 0.11 0.22 0.06 0.10 
% Contribution to Gini and Absolute Gini 
 
 
AF DF GL MF PP PC SUM 
Within k,k 3.4% 9.2% 0.8% 4.9% 0.4% 0.8% 19.5% 
Between k,h AF      7.2% 
DF 4.9%      14.5% 
GL 0.4% 3.2%    5.3% 
MF 1.2% 3.6% 1.1%    6.7% 
PP 0.6% 0.5% 0.4% 0.3%   2.1% 
PC 0.1% 2.3% 0.2% 0.5% 0.3% 3.4% 
Overlapping k,h AF      8.8% 
DF 2.4%      9.5% 
GL 1.3% 0.7%    3.8% 
MF 3.0% 3.9% 1.1%    10.6% 
PP 0.6% 1.4% 0.2% 1.1% 3.6% 
PC 1.5% 1.1% 0.5% 1.5% 0.3% 4.9% 
 
 
       100% 
Absolute fractional Ginis 
 
 
AF DF GL MF PP PC Average 
Within k,k 22,753 23,241 17,293 24,699 26,800 20,204 
Between k,h AF      11,565 
DF 20,019     17,131 
GL 4,636 24,656    14,486 
MF 7,098 12,922 11,734   9,830 
PP 12,694 7,325 17,331 5,597 9,578 
PC 1,317 18,702 5,954 5,780 11,377 9,736 
Overlapping k,h AF      14,293 
DF 9,652     11,080 
GL 15,717 5,425    10,302 
MF 17,486 13,831 11,427   15,382 
PP 14,469 18,872 9,086 20,557 16,765 
PC 20,314 9,118 13,378 17,370 14,155 14,432 
          
NB: Values of between-groups inequality and overlapping for the same groups are symmetric. For reasons of clearness only 
half of the table is filled.  
DF – Dairy farms; MF – Mixed farms; PP – Pig and poultry farms; AF – Arable farms; GL – Grazing livestock farms; PC – 
Permanent crop farms 
Source: own calculations. 
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Table 6.3: Detailed results of farm type decomposition in 2020 for the No_Pricepol scenario. 
No_Pricepol AF DF GL MF PP PC 
Average Income (€) 17,542 27,339 6,309 25,047 40,832 30,943 
Income share 0.14 0.36 0.03 0.24 0.10 0.13 
Farm population 31,762 51,376 17,135 36,376 9,445 15,979 
Population share 0.20 0.32 0.11 0.22 0.06 0.10 
% Contribution to Gini and Absolute Gini 
 
 
AF DF GL MF PP PC SUM 
Within k,k 4.0% 8.2% 0.8% 5.5% 0.4% 1.0%  19.9% 
        
Between k,h AF        4.5% 
DF 1.6%       4.9% 
GL 0.6% 1.9%      5.0% 
MF 0.9% 0.4% 1.2%     3.5% 
PP 0.7% 0.7% 0.6% 0.6%    2.8% 
PC 0.7% 0.3% 0.7% 0.4% 0.2%   2.3% 
        
Overlapping k,h AF        11.7% 
DF 4.4%       16.0% 
GL 1.2% 1.1%      4.0% 
MF 3.9% 6.4% 1.1%     14.6% 
PP 0.8% 1.4% 0.2% 1.1%    4.0% 
PC 1.4% 2.7% 0.4% 2.1% 0.5%   7.1% 
 
 
       100% 
Absolute fractional Ginis 
AF DF GL MF PP PC Average 
Within k,k 19,339 15,151 12,736 20,394 23,864 20,029   
        
Between k,h AF        5,383 
DF 4,898       4,246 
GL 5,617 10,515      9,792 
MF 3,752 1,146 9,369     3,662 
PP 11,645 6,746 17,262 7,893    9,031 
PC 6,701 1,802 12,317 2,948 4,944   4,589 
        
Overlapping k,h AF        13,892 
DF 13,326       13,765 
GL 10,890 5,985      7,856 
MF 16,517 16,879 8,887     15,639 
PP 12,448 13,751 6,099 15,201    13,383 
PC 13,812 15,895 6,528 17,402 17,727   14,837 
          
NB: Values of between-groups inequality and overlapping for the same groups are symmetric. For reasons of clearness only 
half of the table is filled.  
DF – Dairy farms; MF – Mixed farms; PP – Pig and poultry farms; AF – Arable farms; GL – Grazing livestock farms; PC – 
Permanent crop farms 
Source: own calculations. 
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Table 6.4: Results of farm type decomposition in 2020 for the No_Pricepol scenario in 
comparison to Baseline results in 2020. 
No_Pricepol / 
BASELINE AF DF GL MF PP PC 
Average Income (€) 0.61 0.40 0.32 0.58 0.75 0.98 
          
Relative to Baseline (% Contribution to Gini and Absolute Gini) 
 
 
AF DF GL MF PP PC SUM 
Within k,k 1.18 0.89 1.00 1.12 1.00 1.25  1.02 
        
Between k,h AF        0.63 
DF 0.33       0.34 
GL 1.50 0.59      0.94 
MF 0.75 0.11 1.09     0.52 
PP 1.17 1.40 1.50 2.00    1.33 
PC 7.00 0.13 3.50 0.80 0.67   0.68 
        
Overlapping k,h AF        1.33 
DF 1.83       1.68 
GL 0.92 1.57      1.05 
MF 1.30 1.64 1.00     1.38 
PP 1.33 1.00 1.00 1.00    1.11 
PC 0.93 2.45 0.80 1.40 1.67   1.45 
 
 
        
Relative to Baseline (Absolute fractional Ginis) 
 
 
AF DF GL MF PP PC Average 
Within k,k 0.85 0.65 0.74 0.83 0.89 0.99   
        
Between k,h AF        0.47 
DF 0.24       0.25 
GL 1.21 0.43      0.68 
MF 0.53 0.09 0.80     0.37 
PP 0.92 0.92 1.00 1.41    0.94 
PC 5.09 0.10 2.07 0.51 0.43   0.47 
        
Overlapping k,h AF        0.97 
DF 1.38       1.24 
GL 0.69 1.10      0.76 
MF 0.94 1.22 0.78     1.02 
PP 0.86 0.73 0.67 0.74    0.80 
PC 0.68 1.74 0.49 1.00 1.25   1.03 
          
NB: Values of between-groups inequality and overlapping for the same groups are symmetric. For reasons of clearness only 
half of the table is filled.  
DF – Dairy farms; MF – Mixed farms; PP – Pig and poultry farms; AF – Arable farms; GL – Grazing livestock farms; PC – 
Permanent crop farms 
Source: own calculations. 
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In the aggregate results it was observed that changes in within-group inequality are 
proportional to the overall development of inequality. By looking at disaggregated results we 
can observe that the average numbers conceal some information. Table 6.4 shows that within-
group inequality prominently decreases for the group of dairy farms when price policies are 
abolished while for some other groups like permanent crop farms, a changed inequality within 
the group can hardly be detected. In the Baseline the group of dairy farms accounts for 9.2% 
of overall inequality due to within-group inequality (Table 6.2). By replacing individual 
incomes of dairy farmers by the mean income of all dairy farmers, overall inequality would be 
reduced by at least 9.2% (further reductions in overlapping are expected but cannot be exactly 
quantified). This conclusion can be drawn since “overlap cannot rise as the result of a within-
group rich-to-poor money transfer” (Lambert and Decoster, 2005, p. 8), between-groups 
inequality would be constant, and within-group inequality would vanish. 
The group of dairy farms has the largest share of within-group and between-group inequality 
and the second largest share of inequality caused by overlapping with other groups. However, 
when looking at absolute fractional Ginis, we can observe that within-group and overlapping 
values are not among the highest and thus, high shares in overall inequality are mainly caused 
by the high population share of the group. The fractional Gini for between-groups inequality 
in contrast is the highest among the groups which reflects the comparatively high average 
income of dairy farms. After the abolishment of price policies we can see from Table 6.3 and 
Table 6.4 that for inequality caused by dairy farms, a reduction in within-group inequality and 
between-groups inequality is partly compensated by an increased overlapping term. 
Table 6.5 reveals that dairy farms have the smallest overlap with the group of grazing 
livestock farms, which have the smallest average subgroup income. The last column of Table 
6.5 shows the overlapping index Ok,rest when a group is compared with an aggregate of all 
other groups but the group itself. The group of dairy farms has the smallest value among all 
farms in the Baseline. Thus, we can conclude that in the Baseline this is the most clearly 
stratified group in the agricultural sector. The index of overlapping relates the overlapping 
component between two groups to the within-group inequality of one of the groups; thus, 
ceteris paribus, the smaller the amount of inequality within the group, the higher the index. 
This may reflect the perception of overlapping of the group members. The same amount of 
overlapping may be more strongly perceived by all members of a group with small within-
group inequality than by members of a group with high inequality. The former group is more 
homogenous and thus relations to other members may be perceived to be stronger than in the 
latter group where members may recognize links to other members more loosely since 
distances within the group are large. 
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Table 6.5: Disaggregate results of the overlapping index of farm type decomposition for the 
Baseline and the No_Pricepol scenario. 
O_Gradin k,h 
 
O_Gradin,k= 
∑j O_Gradin,k,h * ph 
O
_Gradín k,rest 
          
Baseline  
 
AF DF GL MF PP PC  
AF 0.424 0.691 0.769 0.636 0.893 0.70 0.63 
DF 0.415 0.233 0.595 0.812 0.392 0.64 0.48 
GL 0.909 0.314 0.661 0.525 0.774 0.64 0.60 
MF 0.708 0.560 0.463 0.832 0.703 0.71 0.62 
PP 0.540 0.704 0.339 0.767 0.528 0.65 0.63 
PC 1.005 0.451 0.662 0.860 0.701 0.74 0.71 
 
No_Pricepol  
 
AF 0.689 0.563 0.854 0.644 0.714 0.77 0.72 
DF 0.880 0.395 1.114 0.908 1.049 0.94 0.91 
GL 0.855 0.470 0.698 0.479 0.513 0.66 0.62 
MF 0.810 0.828 0.436 0.745 0.853 0.82 0.77 
PP 0.522 0.576 0.256 0.637 0.743 0.59 0.56 
PC 0.690 0.794 0.326 0.869 0.885 0.77 0.74 
          
NB: DF – Dairy farms; MF – Mixed farms; PP – Pig and poultry farms; AF – Arable farms; GL – Grazing livestock farms; 
PC – Permanent crop farms. 
Source: own calculations. 
In the second-to-last column of Table 6.5, the weighted average of all single comparisons is 
presented. Here, the value for the index of dairy farms is very close to the groups of other 
grazing livestock farms, and pig and poultry producers. This is the case because in the 
weighted average the overlapping of each group with itself is included. The overlapping of 
one group with itself by definition is one and thus, the group contributes its full weight (the 
population share) to the index. Thus, the high share of dairy farms in the sample cushions the 
degree of segregation of their group. 
It should be noted that even though the group of dairy farms seems to be the most separated, a 
considerable amount of overlapping still appears between this group and the other groups. For 
a better understanding of this concept, histograms of two distributions are presented in Figure 
6.2. One histogram refers to the frequency of dairy farms in different income intervals in the 
Baseline and the other refers to all other farms in the Baseline. 
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Figure 6.2: Histogram of incomes of milk farmers in the Baseline in 2020 in comparison to 
all other farms. 
Source: own calculations. 
 
Compared to the distribution of all other farms, the distribution of dairy farms is shifted to the 
right. The area of overlapping, however, is high and it can be seen that the between-groups 
inequality, which is measured by replacing all incomes by their respective group income 
means, would clearly understate the inequality between all members of the two groups. 
After price policies are abolished, the distribution of dairy farms lies almost in the center of 
the distribution of all other farms, which is depicted in Figure 6.3. This is also reflected by the 
overlapping term in Table 6.5, which increases from the lowest value in the Baseline to the 
highest in the No_Pricepol scenario. 
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Figure 6.3: Histogram of incomes of milk farmers in the No_Pricepol scenario in 2020 in 
comparison to all other farms. 
Source: own calculations. 
 
The only group whose overlapping term decreases when market price policies are abolished is 
the class of pig and poultry farms. In the Baseline, pig and poultry farmers are the group with 
the second highest average income. Due to relatively moderate losses (Table 6.4) they become 
the group with the highest average income after price policies are abolished. Thus, 
comparatively high values of between-group inequality and comparatively low overlapping 
values occur. The relatively moderate losses emerge because pig production in this group is 
predominant and pig meat prices only decrease slightly compared to other products when 
price policies are abolished. From Table 6.4 and Table 6.5 we can observe that overlapping 
with all other groups except for the group of permanent crops farms is reduced in the 
No_Pricepol scenario. Particularly with dairy farmers, overlapping is reduced since the two 
groups had a high overlapping component in the Baseline but develop differently with regard 
to average income under scenario conditions. 
The only exceptional group for which increasing overlapping with the group of pig and 
poultry producers is reported, is the group of permanent crops farms. Permanent crops farms 
are able to almost keep their average Baseline incomes under scenario conditions. Since mean 
incomes of the two groups are closer to each other after the abolishment of price policies and 
at the same time within-group inequality is only slightly reduced, between-groups inequality 
is reduced and overlapping is increased. 
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Nevertheless, in general, the group of pig and poultry farms tends to be more separated from 
the majority of the other groups in the No_Pricepol scenario. However, given its population 
share of 6% this effect is overcompensated by the narrowing effects of the other groups in the 
aggregate results. 
A decomposition analysis for regional subgroups is also carried out. Groups are constructed 
according to eight59 western German Federal Laender, namely Nordrhein-Westfalen (NR), 
Niedersachsen (NS), Schleswig-Holstein (SH), Bayern (BA), Baden-Württemberg (BW), 
Hessen (HE), Saarland (SL) and Rheinland-Pfalz (RP). 
Compared to the farm type decomposition, the regional decomposition clearly reveals higher 
overlapping components already in the Baseline. Thus, farm specialization matters more for 
the expected income of a farm than the region where a farm is located. Nevertheless, regions 
with a higher frequency of large dairy farms (Niedersachsen and Schleswig-Holstein) tend to 
have a higher average income and slightly lower overlapping with other regions in the 
Baseline. Effects of liberalization scenarios on the composition of overall inequality are less 
pronounced in the regional analysis. Detailed results for the regional subgroup decomposition 
are presented in Annex D (Table D.8 until Table D.18). 
Furthermore, aggregated results of farm type and regional decomposition analyses are 
presented for total household income rather than FFI in Annex D in Table D.19 and Table 
D.20, respectively. Farm type groups with lower average FFI tend to have a higher additional 
non-farm income. It follows that the share of the between-groups income component 
decreases and the share of overlapping increases when total household income is taken into 
account, especially in the No_Pricepol and the Full_Lib scenarios. 
The regional decomposition of total household income inequality reveals very similar 
aggregate patterns like the analysis based on the indicator FFI. Overlapping, however, is 
slightly more important for total household income in the No_Pricepol and the Full_Lib 
scenarios. 
  
                                                 
59
 The cities of Hamburg and Bremen have the status of a Federal Land. However, due to their small size, 
Hamburg is added to the larger Federal Land of Schleswig-Holstein and Bremen is added to Niedersachsen.  
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7 Summary and conclusions 
In this last chapter, the presented work shall be summarized and conclusions shall be drawn. 
Furthermore, some weaknesses and caveats are addressed and future research areas are 
proposed. 
 Background and achievement 7.1
In recent decades agricultural support in Europe has increasingly shifted from market price 
support measures to budgetary payments. This development has made support more visible 
and it has raised public attention to the distribution of support, which in turn increased 
political awareness of the topic. Thus, the redistributive effects of agricultural policy and 
further reforms of agricultural policy have become more important in political terms. 
Furthermore, the analysis of effects of agricultural policy on the income distribution among 
farmers is also of intrinsic economic interest. 
While in many other policy fields it is a common practice to analyse redistributive effects 
before a reform is implemented, the bulk of the literature regarding policy induced 
redistributive effects in the agricultural sector is carried out ex post. 
Since the aggregation of data may create a significant bias when redistributive effects are 
analysed (Bourguignon et al., 2005; Savard, 2005), many standard tools that are developed for 
policy analysis in the agricultural sector are not suitable for distribution analyses. 
Furthermore, the CAP is a sector wide policy which may influence (world market) prices of 
agricultural products. A pure microanalysis would thus not be able to take these effects into 
account properly. 
In agricultural economics, however, some approaches do exist to model redistributive effects 
in an ex-ante way. For example, Keeney and Beckman (2009), Keeney (2009), and Hertel et 
al. (2007) combine CGE model results with a large farm household data survey for the U.S.; 
however, they map results from one representative regional household to disaggregated farm 
households, resulting in equal behavioural adjustments of all individual farms. Furthermore, 
in principle, it is possible to model income changes at the single farm level which are induced 
by sectoral policies with the LEI model funnel presented by van Tongeren (2000) and 
Woltjers et al. (2011). Moreover, several model chains have been developed which account 
for behaviour at the single farm level (e.g. Louhichi and Valin, 2012, Helming and Schrijver, 
2008). These attempts, however, are mostly restricted to certain farm types and to the best 
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knowledge of the author no analysis of redistributive effects60 has been undertaken by the 
application of these tools so far. 
Against this background, in the work at hand a tool is developed which enables the consistent 
assessment of CAP reform induced impacts on individual farm incomes while simultaneously 
taking sectoral adjustments into account and thus, facilitates an ex-ante analysis of 
redistributive effects in the western German agricultural sector. To this end, two pre-existing 
large-scale simulation models are linked and extended by a newly developed micro model. 
The model chain is then applied to different CAP liberalization scenarios. 
The additional implementation of a meso-model which allows for individual adjustment of 
production patterns of different farm groups, introduces a high degree of heterogeneity in the 
analysis and distinguishes the work from previous research on ex-ante measurement of 
redistributive impacts of agricultural policy (Keeney and Beckman, 2009; Keeney, 2009; 
Hertel et al., 2007). Moreover, the application of agricultural sector models allows for a more 
detailed depiction of farm production processes. Nevertheless, the approach applied in 
previous research allows for the adjustment of non-farm incomes which are assumed to be 
constant in the work at hand. 
After changes in individual incomes are calculated in a first step by the modelling system for 
different scenarios, model results are analysed in a second step by the application of a 
methodology for the measurement of redistributive effects which was originally developed for 
the analysis of tax reforms and has also been used to assess redistributive effects of 
agricultural policy (e.g. Allanson, 2006, 2008). This methodology is applied for the first time 
in an ex-ante analysis of redistributive effects in the agricultural sector. For the analysis of 
redistributive effects, scenario results are evaluated relative to the income distribution of the 
Baseline scenario where the CAP is still in place. 
To account for different conceptual impacts of inequality analysis on results, the analysis is 
carried out at different aggregation levels, for different income classifications, and for income 
data generated in a static way in comparison to data generated by the modelling system.  
Additionally, the Gini inequality index is decomposed by subgroups to conduct a more 
detailed inequality analysis and to detect underlying developments which are not visible 
through the analysis of overall inequality effects. The methodology facilitates the analysis of 
the degree of separation between subgroups and the importance of the grouping attribute for 
the expected income of a farm. 
                                                 
60
 As already specified above, the term ‘redistributive effects‘ in this case explicitly refers to the evaluation of a 
new income distribution with regard to another income distribution and the assessment of progressivity or related 
concepts. It does not refer to the pure calculation of income changes in different regions or for different farm 
types, as for example presented in Louhichi and Valin (2012). 
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 Major results 7.2
It can be stated that inequality effects are robust with regard to the conceptual differences 
tested for, at least in terms of the direction of inequality changes. All calculated liberalization 
scenarios lead to decreasing absolute income differences among western German farms in 
2020 because high-income farms lose higher absolute amounts of money than small-income 
farms. However, relative to their Baseline incomes low-income farms tend to lose a higher 
share compared to high-income farms which leads to increasing relative inequality due to 
liberalization. Only one exemption from this pattern of results exists, namely, if grouped 
results are disaggregated and total household income is considered instead of FFI.  
In general, when inequality is considered with regard to FFI, inequality indices are 
significantly higher after the disaggregation of the grouped data, already in the Baseline. This 
is intuitive since within-group inequality is additionally included in the analysis. 
Redistributive indicators show less equalizing effects of the same reform in absolute terms 
and stronger unequalizing effects in relative terms when data are disaggregated. However, 
differences in absolute redistributive effects are small. For the relative analysis, differences 
are more pronounced because after disaggregation a similar degree of distribution of absolute 
losses is compared to a higher degree of inequality in Baseline incomes. Thus, similar 
absolute income losses have to be borne by higher incomes in the upper tail of the distribution 
and by lower incomes in the lower tail of the distribution. Large differences in relative terms, 
however, should be interpreted with caution due to a higher share of negative incomes in the 
disaggregated distribution. 
Despite these differences, total effects head in the same direction in both the analyses, based 
on grouped and disaggregated data, when FFI is the variable under consideration. When 
instead total household income is applied, conclusions are widely the same, but for two 
exceptions. For the analysis of grouped data in the No_Pricepol and the Full_Lib scenarios, 
slightly positive indices of progressivity are presented while for the individual data-based 
analysis the opposite is true, i.e. indices of progressivity are negative. This is because the 
adding of off-farm incomes to FFI as a constant positive income variable has an inequality 
decreasing effect on all relative Gini coefficients, for grouped as well as disaggregated data. 
For the analysis based on grouped data, initial total household income is more equally 
distributed than absolute income losses. In comparison, the analysis of disaggregated data 
reveals that absolute income losses are similarly distributed but initial income inequality 
increases after disaggregation so that losses are regressively distributed in relative terms. 
Thus, different directions of relative redistributive effects between the group-based and the 
disaggregated data-based analyses are triggered by the increase of initial inequality of 
household incomes rather than by a change of the distribution of income losses. 
A comparison explicitly undertaken to examine the differences between an inequality analysis 
of the variable FFI and an analysis of the variable total household income reveals 
comparatively small differences between inequality indices in absolute terms and stronger 
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differences in relative terms. In absolute terms, losses are slightly less concentrated among the 
high-income farms when total farm income is considered instead of FFI. This can be 
explained by the fact that farms with a low FFI tend to have higher income from off-farm 
sources and tend to rise in the ranking due to the additional consideration of off-farm income. 
Thus, since losses are distributed progressively with regard to FFI, more farms with higher 
absolute losses descend in the ranking of total income and vice versa, i.e. farms with lower 
absolute losses ascend in the ranking. 
In relative terms all inequality indicators are less pronounced for the analysis of the variable 
total household income. This can partly be explained by less negative values in the 
distribution. Consequently, relative Gini coefficients are less sensitive with respect to changes 
in average income. Nevertheless, taking off-farm income sources additionally into account 
has an equalizing effect in relative terms due to the negative correlation of off-farm income 
and on-farm income. 
Moreover, the relevance of taking into account policy-induced production and market 
responses in ex-ante inequality analysis was assessed in this work. Since most of the existing 
literature regarding distributional effects of agricultural policy is static in nature, it has been 
attempted to quantify the bias that occurs when behavioural effects are neglected. From the 
empirical analysis, it can be concluded that taking adjustment effects into account clearly has 
an impact on the magnitude of the inequality indices. Overall inequality is lower in absolute 
as well as relative terms and losses are distributed more progressively/less regressively in the 
different scenarios when adjustment is taken into consideration. When comparing the static 
analysis to the model based analysis, the largest differences can be observed for the Full_Lib 
scenario which also causes the strongest reductions in average incomes. Nevertheless, in all of 
the scenarios, distributional effects have the same directional impact both in the static analysis 
and in the analysis with adjustment effects. In general, the evaluation and ranking of the 
different reform scenarios with respect to their impact on income equality is similar regardless 
of adjustment effects. In all scenarios with adjustment effects, some evidence is found that 
lower-income farms have a lower share in total income losses compared to the static analysis. 
Among other scenario-specific reasons, this is because it is easier for lower-income farms to 
reduce income losses from liberalization by abandoning production activities that have 
negative margins under scenario conditions compared to higher-income farms that often have 
still positive marginal incomes for great parts of their production activities. 
Again, the comparison of relative inequality analyses has to be undertaken with caution since 
negative incomes appear in all of the distributions under consideration and the relative Gini 
coefficient reacts more sensitively in this case, which might relativize the differences between 
the approaches in relative terms. 
With regard to the different policy instruments, it turns out that the abolishment of market 
price support is more progressive in absolute terms and less regressive in relative terms than 
the abolishment of DPs. This is because income redu
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market price support is more unequally distributed (a higher share of losses in the upper tail of 
the distribution and a lower share in the lower tail) than losses caused by the abolishment of 
DPs. 
Even though the defined minimum requirement of a CAP reform, i.e. a positive redistributive 
effect in absolute terms, is fulfilled in all conducted scenarios, it is difficult to give policy 
recommendations based solely on this analyses since redistributive effects are only one 
concern of agricultural policy. The developed modelling tool is mainly suited to observe 
(unintended) distributional effects of CAP reforms, which are intended rather, to complement 
other policy analyses than being the sole decision criterion. In general, it can be stated that 
DPs are better suited to shape redistributive policy effects than market price support 
instruments since eligibility can more easily be coupled to specific farm features. 
Nevertheless, each reform proposal needs to be evaluated individually. 
From a methodological point of view further contributions could be made to the existing 
literature. The iterative coupling procedure applied in this work can be found in several other 
publications, as well. Nevertheless, only few examples exist (e.g. Britz and Witzke, 2012) 
where a partial equilibrium model of the agricultural sector (ESIM) is linked to a more 
disaggregated programming model (FARMIS). The specificity of this work is that agricultural 
production of only one out of several countries depicted in the partial equilibrium model is 
substituted by another, more detailed model. Due to this approach, even significant changes in 
production in FARMIS cause only minor price reactions in ESIM since prices are determined 
by worldwide or European-wide supply quantities. Germany is a small country in economic 
terms for most of the depicted commodities. For only a few products where a considerable 
share of world supply is produced in Germany, price effects can be observed. Additionally, 
the iteration procedure matters for non-tradable products. Another picture probably would 
emerge if more or all countries were substituted by more disaggregated programming models. 
Additionally, a decomposition of inequality effects of CAP liberalization by subgroups is 
carried out in this work, which to the best knowledge of the author is done for the first time 
with regard to the agricultural sector. When the Gini coefficient is decomposed, three 
inequality components can be defined: inequality within subgroups, inequality between 
subgroup means and a term that arises when distributions of subgroups are overlapping. From 
the overlapping term the state of segregation of the farm population with regard to subgroups 
can be derived. Furthermore, a more detailed picture of the underlying processes of inequality 
changes can be revealed with this methodology. 
In a first analysis subgroups refer to farm types and in a second analysis subgroups refer to the 
region a farm is located in. Based on this analysis, for example, the importance of the group 
of dairy farmers for inequality effects is discovered. Furthermore, there is some evidence that 
farm specialization matters more for the expected income of a farm than the region where a 
farm is located. 
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 Limitations and outlook 7.3
Finally, some limitations of the work at hand and resulting future research options shall be 
addressed. In the modelling system only one small country of the worldwide agricultural 
sector, which is depicted in the partial equilibrium model, is substituted by a more 
disaggregated programming model. Thus, quantity changes of the programming model cause 
only small price changes for most tradable commodities in the partial equilibrium model and 
for these commodities the iterative coupling mostly is of limited value. The substitution of 
additional countries by more disaggregated models would increase feedback effects emerging 
at the micro level and thus increase the detailedness of the analysis. 
Generally, incentive effects are accounted for in the analysis due to the application of the 
introduced modelling chain. In reality, however, additional adjustment processes are likely to 
occur which are not depicted in the current version of the models. Structural change, for 
example, is implemented only exogenously in the programming model. This has an effect on 
the analysis of income distribution since farms with large negative incomes would likely leave 
the sector in reality and average farm size would increase. In addition, the adaption of new 
production technologies is not considered in the analysis. This drawback of the current 
modelling tool could be addressed by the endogenizing of structural changes in the 
programming model. 
Another limitation of the analysis is clearly the static nature of the micro-model. Due to this 
approach individual income changes are affected by changes in production patterns of the 
respective farm groups at the meso-level. 
A related caveat is almost inevitable and common in all similar analyses because only 
observed units can be modelled and complete population surveys hardly exist on the national 
level. Even though the analysis is conducted for an already high number of farms, one 
simulated farm still represents more than 20 farms of the overall farm population. To account 
for this fact, simulated farms are weighted by an aggregation factor and it is implicitly 
assumed that one simulated farm reacts representatively for many others. Thus, representative 
agent and micro-simulation approaches cannot always be sharply distinguished (Lofgren et 
al., 2003). 
In addition, several assumptions regarding the development of agricultural markets until the 
final year of the analysis have to be made for the generation of the Baseline scenario. It is 
well-known that redistributive effects are influenced by the distribution of income in the base 
situation (Lerman and Yitzhaki, 1995). Thus, it should be kept in mind that any ex-ante 
analysis implies a certain extent of uncertainty and that results are affected by the choice of 
behavioural parameters and by base year conditions. 
Moreover, interactions with other sectors of the economy are neglected by the applied 
modelling system which consists solely of agricultural sector models. This limitation could be 
overcome by the additional integration of a CGE model into the modelling system. However, 
128 
 
given the relatively small share of agriculture in overall GDP and workforce in Europe and 
especially Germany, impacts on factor prices (except for land, which is taken into 
consideration by the presented modelling chain) should be limited. 
Furthermore, off-farm income is not adapted, but assumed to be constant in the analysis. This 
assumption has rather strong impacts at the micro level and likely leads to an underestimation 
of inequality compensation effects of off-farm income sources because it can be expected that 
the development of off-farm income and agricultural support are negatively correlated (e.g. 
Vergara et al., 2004; Kwon et al., 2006). To overcome this weakness, a micro-simulation 
model depicting the labour allocation decision of farm households could additionally be 
applied in the analysis of redistributive effects of CAP liberalization. 
Summing up, this work provides an innovative combination and extension of different 
simulation models which enables the ex-ante measurement of income changes for individual 
farms. This information in turn facilitates the measurement of redistributive effects in the 
agricultural sector taking behavioural effects into account. The new modelling system is able 
to answer questions which might become more relevant for coming reforms of the CAP. In 
combination with advanced methodologies for the measurement of redistributive effects and 
for the decomposition of inequality indices, the tool can provide valuable contributions to the 
development and design of agricultural policy. 
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Appendix A – Steering file 
*Baselinename 
$setglobal BASELINENAME "fap_new" 
*scenario name 
*$setglobal scenario "baseline" 
*$setglobal scenari "baseline" 
$setglobal scenario "full_lib" 
 
*full scenario name in Farmis result files 
$setglobal scenarioname "%Baselinename%_%scenario%" 
 
*$setglobal Lice "D:\Lizenz\gamslice.txt" 
$setglobal Inequality_path "E:\Agrarpolitik\KOPPLUNG\GESAMTMODELL\INEQUALITY" 
 
**********************for FARMIS****************************************************** 
$setglobal Farmis_Path "E:\Agrarpolitik\KOPPLUNG\GESAMTMODELL\FARMIS" 
$setglobal scenario_file "scenario_DE_test.xls" 
*DE_test auf BL Ebene 
 
$setglobal report_file "Project_files\DE_test\_report_data\report_DE_DE" 
$setglobal report_file_groups "Project_files\DE_DFG_0608\_report_data\report_DE_DE" 
* DE_DFG_0608 - Gruppenebene 
************************************************************************************** 
 
***********************for ESIM******************************************************* 
$setglobal ESIM          "E:\Agrarpolitik\KOPPLUNG\GESAMTMODELL\ESIM" 
$setglobal ESIM_path     "E:\Agrarpolitik\KOPPLUNG\GESAMTMODELL" 
$setglobal save_file     "E:\Agrarpolitik\KOPPLUNG\GESAMTMODELL\ESIM_2019" 
$setglobal ESIM_FOLDER   "./ESIM/" 
 
*$setglobal version       "esim_fix" 
$setglobal version       "esim_calib" 
************************************************************************************** 
 
$set gamsparm "ide=%gams.ide% lo=%gams.lo% errorlog=%gams.errorlog% errmsg=1" 
 
$include map_price_yield.inc 
$include map_quantities.inc 
 
set time /base, 2020 /; 
set results /r_pd, r_area, r_supp /; 
set results_comm /r_hdem, r_sdem, r_fdem, r_tuse, r_pd, r_pdem, r_supp, r_area, r_yiel /; 
set results_cc / landpr1 /; 
 
Parameter 
farmis_quant(IND) 
esim_quant(esim_pr) 
esim_prices(esim_pr) 
esim_inc(esim_pr) 
FARMIS_Price(FARMIS_pr) 
esim_yield(esim_pr) 
farmis_yield(farmis_pr) 
chk_diff(*,*,*) 
sum_chk_diff 
counter 
intercept_ge(esim_pr) 
first_quant(esim_pr) 
farmis_first_quant 
esim_vgl(time,esim_pr,results) 
vgl_ohne_iter 
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; 
 
farmis_quant(IND)       = 0; 
esim_quant(esim_pr)     = 0; 
esim_prices(esim_pr)    = 0; 
FARMIS_Price(FARMIS_pr) = 0; 
esim_yield(esim_pr)     = 0; 
farmis_yield(farmis_pr) = 0; 
 
Parameter 
r_comm(*,*,*,*) 
r_cc(*,*,*) 
; 
 
set cc /GE /; 
 
Set iter 
/0*100/ 
; 
 
Scalar turn; 
turn = 0; 
Scalar el; 
Scalar infl_rate; 
 
Parameter 
iter_results(iter,*,*); 
 
chk_diff(iter,"esim_quant",esim_pr) = 0; 
 
PARAMETER REPORT_SECTOR(*,*); 
REPORT_SECTOR("BAS","dummy")=0; 
REPORT_SECTOR("%scenarioname%","dummy")=0; 
PARAMETER REPORT_SECTOR_FARM(*,*); 
 
Parameter 
CH_PRICE(*,*,*,*,*) 
CH_YIELD(*,*,*,FARMIS_pr); 
 
Parameter 
exog_area; 
 
* Introduction of area used for growing Energy Maize in FARMIS in 2020 
execute_load '%Farmis_Path%\%report_file%', REPORT_SECTOR; 
exog_area = REPORT_SECTOR("%scenarioname%","L_EMAIZE") -  
REPORT_SECTOR("BAS","L_EMAIZE"); 
 
execute_unload '.\ESIM\Exog_area.gdx' exog_area; 
 
*1) First stand-alone run of ESIM to generate a price/yield vector 
execute 'gams.exe esim.gms Wdir=%ESIM% %gamsparm% user1="%scenario%" 
user2="%BASELINENAME%" user3="%ESIM_FOLDER%" s=%save_file%'; 
*license=%Lice% 
el = errorlevel; 
display "errorlevel", el; 
if (el<>0, abort "ERROR" ); 
 
*1a) execute only for 2020: 
execute 'gams.exe simulation_2020.gms Wdir=%ESIM% %gamsparm%  r=%save_file% '  ; 
*license=%Lice% 
el = errorlevel; 
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display "errorlevel", el; 
if (el<>0, abort "ERROR" ); 
 
* Price and Yield changes as well as conversion into nominal terms already done in ESIM!!! 
execute_LOAD '.\esim\esim_p_y.gdx', esim_prices, esim_yield, esim_vgl, infl_rate, esim_inc; 
 
execute_load '.\esim\results.gdx', r_comm, r_cc; 
 
iter_results("0","r_hdem",esim_pr)  =  r_comm("GE","2020",esim_pr,"r_hdem") ; 
iter_results("0","r_supp",esim_pr)  =  r_comm("GE","2020",esim_pr,"r_supp") ; 
iter_results("0","r_sdem",esim_pr)  =  r_comm("GE","2020",esim_pr,"r_sdem") ; 
iter_results("0","r_fdem",esim_pr)  =  r_comm("GE","2020",esim_pr,"r_fdem") ; 
iter_results("0","r_pdem",esim_pr)  =  r_comm("GE","2020",esim_pr,"r_pdem") ; 
iter_results("0","r_pd",esim_pr)  =  r_comm("GE","2020",esim_pr,"r_pd") ; 
iter_results("0","r_tuse",esim_pr)  =  r_comm("GE","2020",esim_pr,"r_tuse") ; 
iter_results("0","r_area",esim_pr)  =  r_comm("GE","2020",esim_pr,"r_area") ; 
iter_results("0","r_yiel",esim_pr)  =  r_comm("GE","2020",esim_pr,"r_yiel") ; 
iter_results("0","r_landpr1",esim_pr) =  r_cc("GE","2020","r_landpr1"); 
 
iter_results("0","esim_prices",esim_pr) =  esim_prices(esim_pr); 
iter_results("0","av_esim_pr",esim_pr)  =  esim_prices(esim_pr); 
iter_results("0","esim_inc",esim_pr)    =  esim_inc(esim_pr); 
iter_results("0","av_esim_inc",esim_pr) =  esim_inc(esim_pr); 
 
iter_results("0","real_esim_prices",esim_pr) =  esim_prices(esim_pr) / infl_rate ; 
iter_results("0","real_av_esim_pr",esim_pr)  =  esim_prices(esim_pr) / infl_rate ; 
iter_results("0","real_esim_inc",esim_pr)    =  esim_inc(esim_pr)    / infl_rate ; 
iter_results("0","real_av_esim_inc",esim_pr) =  esim_inc(esim_pr)    / infl_rate ; 
 
display iter_results; 
 
*Prices for Calibration in the first run 
execute_unload '.\%version%\av_price.gdx' esim_prices, infl_rate, esim_inc; 
 
***************************************************** 
****        START ITERATION LOOP       ***** 
***************************************************** 
 
Repeat( 
 
turn = turn+1; 
 
* Mapping of prices and yield from ESIM results to FARMIS categories 
FARMIS_Price(FARMIS_pr) $ SUM(map_farmis_esim(farmis_pr,esim_pr),1) 
   = 
100*SUM(map_farmis_esim(farmis_pr,esim_pr),esim_prices(esim_pr))/SUM(map_farmis_esim(farmis_pr,esim
_pr),1)-100; 
display   FARMIS_Price; 
 
FARMIS_YIELD(FARMIS_y) $ SUM(map_farmis_esim(farmis_y,ESIM_Y),1) 
    = 
100*SUM(map_farmis_esim(farmis_y,ESIM_Y),ESIM_Yield(ESIM_Y))/SUM(map_farmis_esim(farmis_y,ESI
M_Y),1)-100; 
display   FARMIS_YIELD; 
 
CH_PRICE("DE","GROWTHRATE","CON","%scenarioname%",FARMIS_pr) = 
FARMIS_Price(FARMIS_pr); 
execute_unload 'temp_price.gdx',CH_PRICE; 
EXECUTE 'GDXXRW temp_price.gdx o=%Farmis_Path%\_scenario_data\%scenario_file% par=CH_PRICE 
rng=price_sce!a4 merge' 
; 
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CH_YIELD("DE","GROWTHRATE","%scenarioname%",FARMIS_pr) = FARMIS_YIELD(FARMIS_pr); 
execute_unload 'temp_yield.gdx',CH_YIELD; 
EXECUTE 'GDXXRW temp_yield.gdx o=%Farmis_Path%\_scenario_data\%scenario_file% par=CH_YIELD 
rng=yield_sce!b3 merge' 
; 
 
*3a) Run FARMIS on laender level with ESIM prices and yields to determin young livestock prices 
execute 'copy %Farmis_Path%\4_project_DE_test.gms %Farmis_Path%\4_project.gms' 
execute 'copy %Farmis_Path%\Project_files\DE_test\4_Farmis_steering_KopplungESIM.gms 
%Farmis_Path%\Project_files\DE_test\4_Farmis_steering.gms' 
execute 'gams.exe 3_farmis_main.gms Wdir=%Farmis_Path% Cdir=%Farmis_Path% %gamsparm% --
Xscenario %Scenario% --XBaselinename %Baselinename%'; 
el = errorlevel; 
display "errorlevel", el; 
if (el<>0, abort "ERROR" ); 
 
*get young livestock prices 
execute_load '%Farmis_Path%\%report_file%', REPORT_SECTOR_FARM,REPORT_SECTOR; 
 
***************************************************************************************** 
*---from here comment out in case of not using the group specific version of FARMIS ----* 
***************************************************************************************** 
*$ontext 
CH_PRICE("DE","GROWTHRATE","CON","%scenarioname%",youngani2) $ 
sum(map_yani_prices(youngani2,yaniprices),REPORT_SECTOR_FARM("BAS",yaniprices)) 
                                 = sum(map_yani_prices(youngani2,yaniprices), 
                                      (REPORT_SECTOR_FARM("%scenarioname%",yaniprices)-
REPORT_SECTOR_FARM("BAS",yaniprices))/REPORT_SECTOR_FARM("BAS",yaniprices)*100); 
execute_unload 'temp_price.gdx',CH_PRICE; 
EXECUTE 'GDXXRW temp_price.gdx o=%Farmis_Path%\_scenario_data\%scenario_file% par=CH_PRICE 
rng=price_sce!a4 merge' 
 
*3b) Run FARMIS owith ESIM prices and yields and equilibrium young livestock prices 
execute 'copy %Farmis_Path%\4_project_DE_DFG0608.gms %Farmis_Path%\4_project.gms' 
execute 'copy %Farmis_Path%\Project_files\DE_DFG_0608\4_Farmis_steering_KopplungESIM.gms 
%Farmis_Path%\Project_files\DE_DFG_0608\4_Farmis_steering.gms' 
execute 'gams.exe 3_farmis_main.gms Wdir=%Farmis_Path% Cdir=%Farmis_Path% --Xscenario %Scenario% -
-XBaselinename %Baselinename%' 
 
* Mapping of FARMIS results to ESIM products 
execute_load '%Farmis_Path%\%report_file_groups%', REPORT_SECTOR; 
 
*$offtext 
************************************* 
* ----- comment out until here -----* 
************************************* 
 
farmis_quant(IND) $ REPORT_SECTOR("BAS",IND) = 
REPORT_SECTOR("%scenarioname%",IND)/REPORT_SECTOR("BAS",IND); 
display farmis_quant; 
 
exog_area = REPORT_SECTOR("%scenarioname%","L_EMAIZE") - 
REPORT_SECTOR("BAS","L_EMAIZE"); 
execute_unload '.\%version%\Exog_area.gdx' exog_area; 
 
esim_quant(esim_pr)$ SUM(map_quantities(esim_pr,IND),1) = 
SUM(map_quantities(esim_pr,IND),farmis_quant(IND)); 
display esim_quant; 
 
execute_unload '.\%version%\esim_change.gdx' esim_quant; 
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*4) Run ESIM with fixed supply side 
execute 'gams.exe simulation_2020_%version%.gms Wdir=%ESIM_path%\%version%  %gamsparm%  
r=%save_file%  '; 
*license=%Lice% 
el = errorlevel; 
display "errorlevel", el; 
if (el<>0, abort "ERROR" ); 
 
execute_LOAD '.\%version%\esim_p_y.gdx', esim_prices, esim_yield, intercept_ge, infl_rate, esim_inc; 
 
execute_load '.\%version%\results.gdx', r_comm, r_cc; 
 
* Storage of intermediate iteration results 
loop(iter$((ord(iter)-1) = turn), 
iter_results(iter,"farmis_quant",IND)$farmis_quant(IND)             =  farmis_quant(IND)       ; 
iter_results(iter,"esim_quant",esim_pr)$esim_quant(esim_pr)         =  esim_quant(esim_pr)     ; 
iter_results(iter,"esim_prices",esim_pr)$esim_prices(esim_pr)       =  esim_prices(esim_pr)    ; 
iter_results(iter,"FARMIS_Price",farmis_pr)$FARMIS_Price(FARMIS_pr) =  FARMIS_Price(FARMIS_pr) ; 
iter_results(iter,"esim_yield",esim_pr)$esim_yield(esim_pr)         =  esim_yield(esim_pr)     ; 
iter_results(iter,"farmis_yield",farmis_pr)$farmis_yield(farmis_pr) =  farmis_yield(farmis_pr) ; 
iter_results(iter,"intercept_ge",esim_pr)$intercept_ge(esim_pr)     =  intercept_ge(esim_pr)   ; 
 
iter_results(iter,"esim_inc",esim_pr)$esim_inc(esim_pr)     =  esim_inc(esim_pr)   ; 
 
iter_results(iter,"r_hdem",esim_pr)  =  r_comm("GE","2020",esim_pr,"r_hdem") ; 
iter_results(iter,"r_supp",esim_pr)  =  r_comm("GE","2020",esim_pr,"r_supp") ; 
iter_results(iter,"r_sdem",esim_pr)  =  r_comm("GE","2020",esim_pr,"r_sdem") ; 
iter_results(iter,"r_fdem",esim_pr)  =  r_comm("GE","2020",esim_pr,"r_fdem") ; 
iter_results(iter,"r_pdem",esim_pr)  =  r_comm("GE","2020",esim_pr,"r_pdem") ; 
iter_results(iter,"r_pd",esim_pr)    =  r_comm("GE","2020",esim_pr,"r_pd") ; 
iter_results(iter,"r_tuse",esim_pr)  =  r_comm("GE","2020",esim_pr,"r_tuse") ; 
iter_results(iter,"r_area",esim_pr)  =  r_comm("GE","2020",esim_pr,"r_area") ; 
iter_results(iter,"r_yiel",esim_pr)  =  r_comm("GE","2020",esim_pr,"r_yiel") ; 
iter_results(iter,"r_landpr1",esim_pr) =  r_cc("GE","2020","r_landpr1"); 
 
iter_results(iter,"real_esim_prices",esim_pr) =  esim_prices(esim_pr) / infl_rate ; 
iter_results(iter,"real_av_esim_pr",esim_pr)  =  esim_prices(esim_pr) / infl_rate ; 
iter_results(iter,"real_esim_inc",esim_pr)    =  esim_inc(esim_pr)    / infl_rate ; 
iter_results(iter,"real_av_esim_inc",esim_pr) =  esim_inc(esim_pr)    / infl_rate ; 
 
chk_diff(iter,"esim_prices",esim_pr) = 0; 
chk_diff(iter,"esim_prices",esim_pr)$(iter_results(iter-1,"esim_prices",esim_pr) gt 0) 
         = round( (iter_results(iter,"esim_prices",esim_pr) -  iter_results(iter-1,"esim_prices",esim_pr)) ,3); 
 
counter(esim_pr) = 0; 
counter(esim_pr)$(abs(chk_diff(iter,"esim_prices",esim_pr)) le 0.01) = 1; 
display chk_diff; 
 
*for the use in FARMIS to anticipate convergence 
 
esim_prices(esim_pr) =  0.5 * esim_prices(esim_pr) + 0.5 * iter_results(iter-1,"av_esim_pr",esim_pr); 
 
esim_inc(esim_pr) =  0.5 * esim_inc(esim_pr) + 0.5 * iter_results(iter-1,"av_esim_inc",esim_pr); 
 
iter_results(iter,"av_esim_pr",esim_pr)$esim_prices(esim_pr)       =  esim_prices(esim_pr)    ; 
iter_results(iter,"av_esim_inc",esim_pr)$esim_inc(esim_pr)       =  esim_inc(esim_pr)    ; 
 
*loop iter end 
); 
 
execute_unload '.\%version%\av_price.gdx' esim_prices, infl_rate, esim_inc; 
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display counter; 
until(  ((sum(esim_pr,counter(esim_pr)) eq card(esim_pr)) or (turn = 15)) 
*Until end 
) 
 
*Repeat end 
); 
******** 
execute_unload "res_%version%_%BASELINENAME%_%scenario%.gdx", iter_results; 
execute_unload '.\INEQUALITY\inflation.gdx' infl_rate; 
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Appendix B – Mapping of commodities between FARMIS and 
ESIM 
Table B.1: Mapping of commodities between ESIM and FARMIS. 
ESIM FARMIS 
Poultry Broiler meat; Other poultry meat; Poultry meat from laying hens 
  Pork Pork meat; Sows meat 
  Potatoes Potatoes 
  Beef Beef from a bull; Beef from a heifer 
 
Meat from slaughtered cows (dairy cull suckler) 
 
Veal from fattening calves 
  Corn Grain maize 
  Milk Milk 
  Wheat Soft wheat; Summer wheat; Winter wheat 
  Rye Rye 
  Durum Durum wheat 
  Eggs Eggs from laying hens 
  Rapeseed Rapeseed; Oilseeds for energy; Non Food (Oilseeds) 
  Barley Summer barley; Winter barley; Feeding cereals 
  Rap meal Feeding stuffs (by-products) energy-rich 
  Sun meal; Gluten feed Feeding stuffs (by-products) other 
  SMP Milk replacer 
  Soymeal Feeding stuffs (by-products) protein-rich 
  Other Grains Oats; Other cereals; Triticale 
  Sunseed Sunseed; Other oils 
  Sheep Meat from sheep and goat for fattening 
 
Wool from sheep 
  Sugar Sugar beet 
Source: Own Compilation. 
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Appendix C – Additional results of analysing redistributive effects 
 
 
Figure C. 1: Relative Lorenz curves for baseline and all scenarios based on grouped data. 
Source: Own compilation. 
 
 
Figure C.2: Absolute Lorenz curves for baseline and all scenarios based on grouped data. 
Source: Own compilation.  
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Table C.1: Decomposition of changes in total household income inequality (individual data 
vs. grouped data). 
 
 
Relative analysis Absolute analysis 
 
 Individual data Grouped Data Individual data Grouped Data 
VI) Baseline Results      
Average income (in €)  52,798 
Gini index of income (A) Gx 0.468 0.32 24,714 17,128 
      
VII) 50_DP scenario   
Average income (in €)  49,215 
Average support reduction (in €)  3,583 
Average rate of reduced support 
(support reduction/base income) s 0.068 
Gini index  (A) Gy 0.495 0.34 24,386 16,758 
Concentration index  (A) Cy 0.493 0.34 24,256 16,670 
Total redistributive effect (A) R -0.027 
-0.02 329 370 
Index of re-ranking (A) H -0.003 0.00 -130 -88 
Index of vertical equity (A) V -0.025 
-0.01 459 458 
Index of progressivity of support 
reduction P ; CB -0.34 -0.20 0.128 0.13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VIII) No_DP scenario   
Average income (in €)  43,844 
Average support reduction (in €)  8,953 
Average rate of reduced support 
(support reduction/base income) s 0.17 
Gini index  (A) Gy 0.54 0.36 23,688 15,894 
Concentration index  (A) Cy 0.529 0.35 23,173 15,551 
Total redistributive effect (A) R -0.072 
-0.04 1,026 1,234 
Index of re-ranking (A) H -0.012 
-0.01 -515 -343 
Index of vertical equity (A) V -0.06 
-0.03 1,541 1,577 
Index of progressivity of support 
reduction P ; CB -0.296 -0.148 0.172 0.176 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IX) No_Pricepol scenario   
Average income (in €)  31,197 
Average support reduction (in €)  21,601 
Average rate of reduced support 
(support reduction/base income) s 0.409 
Gini index  (A) Gy 0.608 0.33 18,957 10,165 
Concentration index  (A) Cy 0.518 0.27 16,158 8,367 
Total redistributive effect (A) R -0.14 0.00 5,757 6,964 
Index of re-ranking (A) H -0.09 
-0.06 -2,799 -1,798 
Index of vertical equity (A) V -0.05 0.06 8,556 8,761 
Index of progressivity of support 
reduction P ; CB -0.072 0.081 0.396 0.406 
      
Source: own calculations. 
 
 
 
146 
 
Table C.1 continued: Decomposition of changes in total household income inequality 
(individual data vs. grouped data). 
 
 
Relative analysis Absolute analysis 
 
 Individual data Grouped Data Individual data Grouped Data 
Baseline Results      
Average income (in €)  52,798 
Gini index of income (A) Gx 0.468 0.32 24,714 17,128 
      
X) Full Liberalization scenario   
Average income (in €)  21,420 
Average support reduction (in €)  31,378 
Average rate of reduced support 
(support reduction/base income) s 0.594 
Gini index  (A) Gy 0.861 0.43 18,446 9,145 
Concentration index  (A) Cy 0.667 0.29 14,278 6,303 
Total redistributive effect (A) R -0.393 
-0.10 6,268 7,983 
Index of re-ranking (A) H -0.195 
-0.13 -4,168 -2,841 
Index of vertical equity (A) V -0.198 0.03 10,436 10,825 
Index of progressivity of support 
reduction P ; CB -0.136 0.021 0.333 0.34 
Source: own calculations. 
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Appendix D – Subgroup decomposition results 
Table D.1: Disaggregate results of the overlapping index of farm type decomposition for the 
Baseline and the scenarios 50_DP, No_DP and Full_Lib. 
O_Gradin k,h 
 
O_Gradin,k= 
∑j O_Gradin,k,h * 
ph 
O
_Gradín k,rest 
          
Baseline  
 
AF DF GL MF PP PC  
AF 0.424 0.691 0.769 0.636 0.893 0.70 0.63 
DF 0.415 0.233 0.595 0.812 0.392 0.64 0.48 
GL 0.909 0.314 0.661 0.525 0.774 0.64 0.60 
MF 0.708 0.560 0.463 0.832 0.703 0.71 0.62 
PP 0.540 0.704 0.339 0.767 0.528 0.65 0.63 
PC 1.005 0.451 0.662 0.860 0.701 0.74 0.71 
 
50_DP  
AF DF GL MF PP PC  
AF  0.392 0.733 0.750 0.602 0.821  0.68 0.60 
DF 0.363  0.224 0.555 0.796 0.398  0.62 0.45 
GL 0.919 0.304  0.657 0.509 0.714  0.63 0.59 
MF 0.670 0.535 0.468  0.81 0.761  0.70 0.61 
PP 0.488 0.696 0.329 0.735  0.548  0.63 0.61 
PC 0.880 0.461 0.611 0.914 0.725   0.73 0.70 
          
No_DP  
AF DF GL MF PP PC  
AF  0.374 0.738 0.741 0.577 0.738  0.67 0.58 
DF 0.334  0.225 0.531 0.809 0.441  0.62 0.44 
GL 0.870 0.296  0.624 0.476 0.609  0.60 0.55 
MF 0.649 0.520 0.464  0.787 0.865  0.70 0.61 
PP 0.448 0.703 0.314 0.699  0.595  0.62 0.59 
PC 0.747 0.499 0.523 1.001 0.775   0.73 0.70 
          
Full_Lib          
AF DF GL MF PP PC    
AF  0.627 0.621 0.813 0.575 0.529  0.73 0.66 
DF 0.762  0.384 1.053 0.864 0.817  0.87 0.82 
GL 0.866 0.441  0.670 0.438 0.355  0.63 0.58 
MF 0.753 0.802 0.445  0.696 0.671  0.78 0.72 
PP 0.427 0.528 0.233 0.559  0.845  0.54 0.51 
PC 0.470 0.596 0.226 0.643 1.009   0.61 0.56 
          
NB: Values of between-groups inequality and overlapping for the same groups are symmetric. For reasons of clearness only 
half of the table is filled.  
DF – Dairy farms; MF – Mixed farms; PP – Pig and poultry farms; AF – Arable farms; GL – Grazing livestock farms; PC – 
Permanent crop farms. 
Source: own calculations. 
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Table D. 2: Detailed results of farm type decomposition in 2020 for the 50_DP scenario. 
50_DP AF DF GL MF PP PC 
Average Income (€) 23,346 66,219 15,810 38,527 51,089 30,212 
Income share 0.11 0.5 0.04 0.21 0.07 0.07 
Farm population 31,762 51,376 17,135 36,376 9,445 15,979 
Population share 0.20 0.32 0.11 0.22 0.06 0.10 
% Contribution to Gini and Absolute Gini 
AF DF GL MF PP PC SUM 
Within k,k 3.3% 9.2% 0.8% 4.8% 0.4% 0.8%  19.3% 
        
Between k,h AF        7.8% 
DF 5.3%       15.4% 
GL 0.3% 3.4%      5.5% 
MF 1.3% 3.9% 1.1%     7.0% 
PP 0.6% 0.6% 0.4% 0.3%    2.1% 
PC 0.3% 2.2% 0.3% 0.4% 0.2%   3.4% 
        
Overlapping k,h AF        8.2% 
DF 2.1%       8.9% 
GL 1.3% 0.7%      3.8% 
MF 2.8% 3.6% 1.1%     10.1% 
PP 0.6% 1.4% 0.2% 1.0%    3.5% 
PC 1.4% 1.1% 0.5% 1.6% 0.3%   4.9% 
 
 
       100% 
Absolute fractional Ginis 
AF DF GL MF PP PC Average 
Within k,k 21,325 23,009 17,015 23,893 26,325 19,887   
        
Between k,h AF        12,492 
DF 21,436       17,846 
GL 3,768 25,204      14,554 
MF 7,591 13,846 11,359     10,126 
PP 13,872 7,565 17,639 6,281    10,003 
PC 3,433 18,003 7,201 4,158 10,439   9,632 
        
Overlapping k,h AF        12,893 
DF 8,352       10,281 
GL 15,635 5,165      9,969 
MF 15,999 12,776 11,183     14,555 
PP 12,845 18,325 8,661 19,355    15,938 
PC 17,508 9,164 12,156 18,184 14,428   13,915 
          
NB: Values of between-groups inequality and overlapping for the same groups are symmetric. For reasons of clearness only 
half of the table is filled.  
DF – Dairy farms; MF – Mixed farms; PP – Pig and poultry farms; AF – Arable farms; GL – Grazing livestock farms; PC – 
Permanent crop farms. 
Source: own calculations. 
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Table D.3: Results of farm type decomposition in 2020 for the 50_DP scenario in comparison 
to Baseline results in 2020. 
50_DP / BASELINE AF DF GL MF PP PC 
Average Income (€) 0.81 0.96 0.81 0.90 0.94 0.96   
          
Relative to Baseline (% Contribution to Gini and Absolute Gini) 
 
 
AF DF GL MF PP PC SUM 
Within k,k 0.97 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.00  0.99 
        
Between k,h AF        1.08 
DF 1.08       1.06 
GL 0.75 1.06      1.04 
MF 1.08 1.08 1.00     1.04 
PP 1.00 1.20 1.00 1.00    1.00 
PC 3.00 0.96 1.50 0.80 0.67   1.00 
        
Overlapping k,h AF        0.93 
DF 0.88       0.94 
GL 1.00 1.00      1.00 
MF 0.93 0.92 1.00     0.95 
PP 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.91    0.97 
PC 0.93 1.00 1.00 1.07 1.00   1.00 
 
 
        
Relative to Baseline (Absolute fractional Ginis) 
 
 
AF DF GL MF PP PC Average 
Within k,k 0.94 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.98   
        
Between k,h AF        1.08 
DF 1.07       1.04 
GL 0.81 1.02      1.00 
MF 1.07 1.07 0.97     1.03 
PP 1.09 1.03 1.02 1.12    1.04 
PC 2.61 0.96 1.21 0.72 0.92   0.99 
        
Overlapping k,h AF        0.90 
DF 0.87       0.93 
GL 0.99 0.95      0.97 
MF 0.91 0.92 0.98     0.95 
PP 0.89 0.97 0.95 0.94    0.95 
PC 0.86 1.01 0.91 1.05 1.02   0.96 
          
NB: Values of between-groups inequality and overlapping for the same groups are symmetric. For reasons of clearness only 
half of the table is filled.  
DF – Dairy farms; MF – Mixed farms; PP – Pig and poultry farms; AF – Arable farms; GL – Grazing livestock farms; PC – 
Permanent crop farms. 
Source: own calculations. 
 
150 
 
Table D.4: Detailed results of farm type decomposition in 2020 for the No_DP scenario. 
No_DP AF DF GL MF PP PC 
Average Income (€) 17,469 60,447 9,578 32,544 46,406 29,054 
Income share 0.09 0.53 0.03 0.2 0.07 0.08 
Farm population 31,762 51,376 17,135 36,376 9,445 15,979 
Population share 0.20 0.32 0.11 0.22 0.06 0.10 
% Contribution to Gini and Absolute Gini 
AF DF GL MF PP PC SUM 
Within k,k 3.2% 9.2% 0.8% 4.7% 0.4% 0.8%  19.1% 
        
Between k,h AF        8.4% 
DF 5.5%       15.6% 
GL 0.3% 3.5%      5.8% 
MF 1.4% 4.1% 1.1%     7.2% 
PP 0.7% 0.5% 0.5% 0.4%    2.3% 
PC 0.5% 2.0% 0.4% 0.2% 0.2%   3.3% 
        
Overlapping k,h AF        7.6% 
DF 1.9%       8.8% 
GL 1.3% 0.7%      3.6% 
MF 2.7% 3.5% 1.0%     10.0% 
PP 0.5% 1.4% 0.2% 1.0%    3.5% 
PC 1.2% 1.3% 0.4% 1.8% 0.4%   5.1% 
 
 
       100% 
Absolute fractional Ginis 
AF DF GL MF PP PC Average 
Within k,k 19,813 22,176 16,810 22,640 25,502 19,576   
        
Between k,h AF        12,854 
DF 21,489       17,552 
GL 3,946 25,435      15,036 
MF 7,538 13,951 11,483     9,915 
PP 14,469 7,021 18,414 6,931    10,002 
PC 5,793 15,697 9,738 1,745 8,676   8,917 
        
Overlapping k,h AF        11,567 
DF 7,407       9,707 
GL 14,631 4,981      9,256 
MF 14,689 11,773 10,496     13,783 
PP 11,431 17,939 8,000 17,814    15,150 
PC 14,631 9,777 10,241 19,589 15,176   13,679 
          
NB: Values of between-groups inequality and overlapping for the same groups are symmetric. For reasons of clearness only 
half of the table is filled.  
DF – Dairy farms; MF – Mixed farms; PP – Pig and poultry farms; AF – Arable farms; GL – Grazing livestock farms; PC – 
Permanent crop farms. 
Source: own calculations. 
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Table D.5: Results of farm type decomposition in 2020 for the No_DP scenario in 
comparison to Baseline results in 2020. 
No_DP / BASELINE AF DF GL MF PP PC 
Average Income (€) 0.61 0.88 0.49 0.76 0.86 0.92   
          
Relative to Baseline (% Contribution to Gini and Absolute Gini) 
AF DF GL MF PP PC SUM 
Within k,k 0.94 1.00 1.00 0.96 1.00 1.00  0.98 
        
Between k,h AF        1.17 
DF 1.12       1.08 
GL 0.75 1.09      1.09 
MF 1.17 1.14 1.00     1.07 
PP 1.17 1.00 1.25 1.33    1.10 
PC 5.00 0.87 2.00 0.40 0.67   0.97 
        
Overlapping k,h AF        0.86 
DF 0.79       0.93 
GL 1.00 1.00      0.95 
MF 0.90 0.90 0.91     0.94 
PP 0.83 1.00 1.00 0.91    0.97 
PC 0.80 1.18 0.80 1.20 1.33   1.04 
 
 
        
Relative to Baseline (Absolute fractional Ginis) 
AF DF GL MF PP PC Average 
Within k,k 0.87 0.95 0.97 0.92 0.95 0.97   
        
Between k,h AF        1.11 
DF 1.07       1.02 
GL 0.85 1.03      1.04 
MF 1.06 1.08 0.98     1.01 
PP 1.14 0.96 1.06 1.24    1.04 
PC 4.40 0.84 1.64 0.30 0.76   0.92 
        
Overlapping k,h AF        0.81 
DF 0.77       0.88 
GL 0.93 0.92      0.90 
MF 0.84 0.85 0.92     0.90 
PP 0.79 0.95 0.88 0.87    0.90 
PC 0.72 1.07 0.77 1.13 1.07   0.95 
          
NB: Values of between-groups inequality and overlapping for the same groups are symmetric. For reasons of clearness only 
half of the table is filled.  
DF – Dairy farms; MF – Mixed farms; PP – Pig and poultry farms; AF – Arable farms; GL – Grazing livestock farms; PC – 
Permanent crop farms. 
Source: own calculations. 
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Table D.6: Detailed results of farm type decomposition in 2020 for the Full_Lib scenario. 
Full_Lib AF DF GL MF PP PC 
Average Income (€) 5,167 17,430 -3,696 14,058 32,840 28,700 
Income share 0.07 0.39 -0.03 0.22 0.14 0.20 
Farm population 31,762 51,376 17,135 36,376 9,445 15,979 
Population share 0.20 0.32 0.11 0.22 0.06 0.10 
% Contribution to Gini and Absolut Gini 
AF DF GL MF PP PC SUM 
Within k,k 3.8% 8.1% 0.8% 5.3% 0.4% 1.1%  19.5% 
        
Between k,h AF        6.0% 
DF 2.2%       6.7% 
GL 0.5% 2.0%      5.3% 
MF 1.1% 0.7% 1.2%     4.6% 
PP 0.9% 0.8% 0.6% 0.7%    3.1% 
PC 1.3% 1.0% 1.0% 0.9% 0.1%   4.3% 
        
Overlapping k,h AF        10.2% 
DF 3.8%       14.2% 
GL 1.3% 1.0%      3.9% 
MF 3.5% 6.0% 1.1%     13.2% 
PP 0.6% 1.3% 0.2% 1.0%    3.7% 
PC 1.0% 2.1% 0.3% 1.6% 0.6%   5.6% 
 
 
       100% 
Absolute fractional Ginis 
AF DF GL MF PP PC Average 
Within k,k 17,248 14,194 12,362 18,628 23,204 19,442   
        
Between k,h AF        6,687 
DF 6,131       5,419 
GL 4,431 10,563      9,919 
MF 4,446 1,686 8,877     4,659 
PP 13,836 7,705 18,268 9,391    9,979 
PC 11,766 5,635 16,198 7,321 2,070   8,396 
        
Overlapping k,h AF        11,426 
DF 10,818       11,579 
GL 10,705 5,450      7,194 
MF 14,025 14,948 8,287     13,346 
PP 9,913 12,260 5,415 12,967    11,941 
PC 9,129 11,591 4,386 12,497 19,611   10,955 
          
NB: Values of between-groups inequality and overlapping for the same groups are symmetric. For reasons of clearness only 
half of the table is filled.  
DF – Dairy farms; MF – Mixed farms; PP – Pig and poultry farms; AF – Arable farms; GL – Grazing livestock farms; PC – 
Permanent crop farms. 
Source: own calculations. 
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Table D.7: Results of farm type decomposition in 2020 for the Full_Lib scenario in 
comparison to Baseline results in 2020. 
Full_Lib / BASELINE AF DF GL MF PP PC 
Average Income (€) 0.18 0.25 -0.19 0.33 0.61 0.91   
          
Relative to Baseline (% Contribution to Gini and Absolute Gini) 
 
 
AF DF GL MF PP PC SUM 
Within k,k 1.12 0.88 1.00 1.08 1.00 1.38  1.00 
        
Between k,h AF        0.83 
DF 0.45       0.46 
GL 1.25 0.63      1.00 
MF 0.92 0.19 1.09     0.69 
PP 1.50 1.60 1.50 2.33    1.48 
PC 13.00 0.43 5.00 1.80 0.33   1.26 
        
Overlapping k,h AF        1.16 
DF 1.58       1.49 
GL 1.00 1.43      1.03 
MF 1.17 1.54 1.00     1.25 
PP 1.00 0.93 1.00 0.91    1.03 
PC 0.67 1.91 0.60 1.07 2.00   1.14 
 
 
        
Relative to Baseline (Absolute fractional Ginis) 
 
 
AF DF GL MF PP PC Average 
Within k,k 0.76 0.61 0.71 0.75 0.87 0.96   
        
Between k,h AF        0.58 
DF 0.31       0.32 
GL 0.96 0.43      0.68 
MF 0.63 0.13 0.76     0.47 
PP 1.09 1.05 1.05 1.68    1.04 
PC 8.93 0.30 2.72 1.27 0.18   0.86 
        
Overlapping k,h AF        0.80 
DF 1.12       1.05 
GL 0.68 1.00      0.70 
MF 0.80 1.08 0.73     0.87 
PP 0.69 0.65 0.60 0.63    0.71 
PC 0.45 1.27 0.33 0.72 1.39   0.76 
          
NB: Values of between-groups inequality and overlapping for the same groups are symmetric. For reasons of clearness only 
half of the table is filled.  
DF – Dairy farms; MF – Mixed farms; PP – Pig and poultry farms; AF – Arable farms; GL – Grazing livestock farms; PC – 
Permanent crop farms. 
Source: own calculations. 
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Table D.8: Aggregate results of regional subgroup decomposition (based on FFI). 
BL 50_DP No_DP No_PP Full_Lib 
 
Average income (€) 45,424 41,841 36,470 23,823 14,046 
 
    
RELATIV 
Gini 
0.56 0.598 0.662 0.782 1.256 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Gini-Within 
0.105 0.112 0.124 0.146 0.232 
19% 19% 19% 19% 18% 
Gini-Between 
0.116 0.128 0.141 0.121 0.197 
21% 21% 21% 15% 16% 
Overlapping 
0.339 0.358 0.397 0.514 0.827 
61% 60% 60% 66% 66% 
ABSOLUT 
Abs. Gini 25,443 25,028 24,155 18,632 17,642 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Abs. Gini-Within 4,767 4,690 4,529 3,488 3,259 
19% 19% 19% 19% 18% 
Abs. Gini-Between 5,288 5,373 5,137 2,893 2,768 
21% 21% 21% 16% 16% 
Abs. Overlapping 15,388 14,965 14,489 12,251 11,614 
60% 60% 60% 66% 66% 
 
     
O
_Gradin 
 
0.839 0.833 0.836 0.884 0.887 
       
 Source: own calculations. 
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Table D.9: Disaggregate results of the overlapping index of regional subgroup 
decomposition. 
O_Gradin k,h O_Gradin,k=  
∑j O_Gradin,k,h * 
ph 
O
_Gradín 
k,rest 
Baseline            
 
NR NS SH BA BW HE SL RP  
NR  0.88 0.81 0.72 0.7 0.73 0.66 0.66  0.78 0.75 
NS 0.79  0.92 0.55 0.54 0.57 0.51 0.51  0.67 0.61 
SH 0.64 0.81  0.45 0.45 0.47 0.42 0.42  0.56 0.54 
BA 0.99 0.84 0.78  0.97 1.02 0.91 0.92  0.95 0.92 
BW 0.82 0.72 0.67 0.84  0.95 0.9 0.89  0.84 0.82 
HE 0.86 0.75 0.7 0.88 0.96  0.92 0.93  0.87 0.86 
SL 0.92 0.79 0.74 0.93 1.06 1.08  0.99  0.93 0.93 
RP 0.93 0.80 0.75 0.94 1.05 1.09 1.00   0.94 0.93 
50_DP            
 NR NS SH BA BW HE SL RP    
NR  0.89 0.83 0.71 0.67 0.67 0.58 0.65  0.77 0.74 
NS 0.8  0.93 0.55 0.53 0.53 0.46 0.51  0.67 0.61 
SH 0.66 0.82  0.46 0.44 0.44 0.38 0.43  0.57 0.54 
BA 0.97 0.85 0.8  0.94 0.95 0.82 0.92  0.94 0.91 
BW 0.81 0.72 0.68 0.83  0.98 0.89 0.88  0.84 0.81 
HE 0.83 0.73 0.7 0.86 0.99  0.89 0.91  0.86 0.85 
SL 0.83 0.73 0.7 0.86 1.05 1.02  0.91  0.87 0.87 
RP 0.92 0.81 0.76 0.94 1.02 1.02 0.89   0.93 0.92 
No_DP            
 NR NS SH BA BW HE SL RP    
NR  0.91 0.84 0.7 0.65 0.63 0.51 0.68  0.77 0.73 
NS 0.81  0.92 0.55 0.53 0.51 0.41 0.54  0.67 0.61 
SH 0.67 0.83  0.46 0.44 0.43 0.35 0.45  0.57 0.55 
BA 0.96 0.87 0.8  0.94 0.91 0.73 0.97  0.95 0.92 
BW 0.81 0.74 0.69 0.84  0.97 0.79 0.87  0.85 0.82 
HE 0.81 0.74 0.69 0.85 1.01  0.82 0.88  0.85 0.84 
SL 0.77 0.71 0.66 0.8 0.97 0.96  0.82  0.81 0.81 
RP 0.93 0.84 0.78 0.96 0.97 0.94 0.75   0.93 0.92 
No_Pricepol            
 
NR NS SH BA BW HE SL RP    
NR  1.02 0.92 0.68 0.73 0.64 0.55 0.91  0.82 0.79 
NS 0.85  0.92 0.6 0.64 0.57 0.5 0.8  0.74 0.68 
SH 0.83 0.98  0.56 0.61 0.53 0.46 0.77  0.71 0.70 
BA 0.99 1.04 0.9  1.09 0.95 0.8 0.84  0.99 0.99 
BW 0.88 0.93 0.82 0.91  0.88 0.77 0.78  0.90 0.89 
HE 0.89 0.94 0.82 0.9 1.01  0.86 0.77  0.91 0.91 
SL 0.91 0.98 0.84 0.91 1.04 1.03  0.76  0.93 0.93 
RP 1.09 1.15 1.03 0.69 0.77 0.66 0.55   0.87 0.86 
Full_Lib            
 
NR NS SH BA BW HE SL RP    
NR  1.08 0.99 0.65 0.74 0.58 0.43 0.88  0.81 0.78 
NS 0.87  0.93 0.6 0.67 0.54 0.43 0.84  0.75 0.70 
SH 0.92 1.07  0.59 0.68 0.53 0.4 0.9  0.77 0.76 
BA 0.98 1.13 0.97  1.09 0.89 0.63 0.8  1.01 1.01 
BW 0.91 1.02 0.9 0.88  0.78 0.58 0.77  0.91 0.89 
HE 0.88 1.03 0.88 0.89 0.97  0.73 0.72  0.92 0.91 
SL 0.77 0.95 0.77 0.75 0.84 0.86  0.6  0.80 0.79 
RP 0.97 1.15 1.07 0.58 0.69 0.52 0.37   0.80 0.78 
 
           
Source: own calculations. 
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Table D.10: Detailed results of regional subgroup decomposition in 2020 for the Baseline. 
Baseline NR NS SH BA BW HE SL RP 
Average Income (€) 49,524 60,307 70,290 40,643 35,400 37,651 36,902 37,340 
Income share 0.15 0.22 0.08 0.32 0.12 0.05 0.004 0.07 
Farm population 22,029 26,723 8,572 57,355 23,957 9,255 713 13,469 
Population share 0.14 0.16 0.05 0.35 0.15 0.06 0.004 0.08 
% Contribution to Gini and Absolute Gini 
NR NS SH BA BW HE SL RP SUM 
Within k,k 2.0% 3.3% 0.4% 10.1% 2.0% 0.3% 0.0% 0.5%  18.6% 
          
Between k,h NR          2.7% 
NS 0.5%         5.2% 
SH 0.3% 0.2%        2.6% 
BA 0.8% 2.3% 1.1%       5.0% 
BW 0.6% 1.2% 0.5% 0.5%      2.8% 
 HE 0.2% 0.4% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0%     0.9% 
 SL 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%    0.0% 
RP 0.3% 0.6% 0.3% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%   1.4% 
          
Overlapping k,h NR          9.5% 
NS 2.2%         10.4% 
SH 0.6% 1.0%        3.8% 
BA 3.8% 4.0% 1.2%       17.1% 
 BW 1.5% 1.6% 0.5% 4.1%      9.5% 
 HE 0.6% 0.7% 0.2% 1.7% 0.7%     4.3% 
SL 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0%    0.2% 
RP 0.8% 0.9% 0.3% 2.2% 1.0% 0.4% 0.0%   5.6% 
 
 
         100% 
Absolute fractional Ginis 
NR NS SH BA BW HE SL RP Average 
  
Within k,k 27,982 31,284 35,312 20,499 23,689 23,638 20,062 20,027 
          
Between k,h NR          5,701 
NS 5,392         9,543 
SH 10,383 4,991        13,128 
BA 4,440 9,832 14,824       5,614 
BW 7,062 12,454 17,445 2,621      5,881 
 HE 5,936 11,328 16,319 1,496 1,126     4,505 
 SL 6,311 11,703 16,694 1,871 751 375    4,503 
RP 6,092 11,483 16,475 1,651 970 156 219   4,723 
          
Overlapping k,h NR          20,905 
NS 24,584         19,052 
SH 22,613 28,700        19,056 
BA 20,196 17,300 15,937       18,907 
 BW 19,493 17,022 15,925 19,889      19,334 
 HE 20,357 17,720 16,455 20,871 22,580     20,359 
SL 18,400 15,870 14,768 18,714 21,361 21,666    18,656 
RP 18,562 16,014 14,972 18,793 21,124 21,890 19,955    18,613 
Source: own calculations. 
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Table D.11: Detailed results of regional subgroup decomposition in 2020 for the 50_DP scen. 
50_DP NR NS SH BA BW HE SL RP 
Average Income (€) 46,750 56,611 65,890 37,289 31,507 32,207 29,820 34,221 
Income share 0.15 0.22 0.08 0.32 0.11 0.04 0.003 0.07 
Farm population 22,029 26,723 8,572 57,355 23,957 9,255 713 13,469 
Population share 0.14 0.16 0.05 0.35 0.15 0.06 0.004 0.08 
% Contribution to Gini and Absolute Gini 
NR NS SH BA BW HE SL RP SUM 
Within k,k 2.0% 3.4% 0.4% 10.1% 2.0% 0.3% 0.0% 0.5%  18.7% 
          
Between k,h NR          0.0% 
NS 0.4%         5.2% 
SH 0.3% 0.2%        2.6% 
BA 0.9% 2.3% 1.1%       5.3% 
BW 0.6% 1.2% 0.5% 0.6%      3.0% 
 HE 0.2% 0.5% 0.2% 0.2% 0.0%     1.1% 
 SL 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%    0.0% 
RP 0.3% 0.6% 0.3% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0%   1.5% 
          
Overlapping k,h NR        0.8%  9.6% 
NS 2.2%       0.9%  10.3% 
SH 0.7% 1.0%      0.3%  3.9% 
BA 3.8% 4.0% 1.2%     2.2%  16.8% 
 BW 1.5% 1.6% 0.5% 4.0%    1.0%  9.5% 
 HE 0.6% 0.6% 0.2% 1.5% 0.8%   0.4%  4.1% 
SL 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0%  0.0%  0.2% 
RP 0.8% 0.9% 0.3% 2.2% 1.0% 0.4% 0.0%   5.6% 
 
 
         100% 
Absolute fractional Ginis 
NR NS SH BA BW HE SL RP Average 
  
Within k,k 27,728 31,073 35,207 20,170 22,800 22,376 19,373 19,821 
          
Between k,h NR          5,894 
NS 4,931         9,431 
SH 9,570 4,639        12,696 
BA 4,731 9,661 14,301       5,740 
BW 7,622 12,552 17,191 2,891      6,072 
 HE 7,272 12,202 16,841 2,541 350     5,230 
 SL 8,465 13,396 18,035 3,734 843 1,193    6,037 
RP 6,264 11,195 15,834 1,534 1,357 1,007 2,201   4,739 
          
Overlapping k,h NR          20,386 
NS 24,763         18,826 
SH 23,073 28,846        19,090 
BA 19,634 17,176 16,052       18,380 
 BW 18,446 16,390 15,566 19,024      18,543 
 HE 18,523 16,430 15,554 19,142 22,255     18,972 
SL 16,142 14,223 13,520 16,569 20,381 19,815    16,801 
RP 18,153 15,986 15,151 18,622 20,167 20,315 17,625    18,228 
Source: own calculations. 
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Table D.12: Results of regional subgroup decomposition in 2020 for the 50_DP scenario in 
comparison to Baseline results in 2020. 
50_DP / Baseline NR NS SH BA BW HE SL RP 
Average Income (€) 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.92 0.89 0.86 0.81 0.92 
Relative to Baseline (% Contribution to Gini and Absolute Gini) 
NR NS SH BA BW HE SL RP SUM 
  
Within k,k 1.00 1.03 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 - 1.00  1.01 
          
Between k,h NR          - 
NS 0.80         1.00 
SH 1.00 1.00        1.00 
BA 1.13 1.00 1.00       1.06 
BW 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.20      1.07 
 HE 1.00 1.25 1.00 2.00 -     1.22 
 SL - - - - - -    - 
RP 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 - - -   1.07 
          
Overlapping k,h NR          1.01 
NS 1.00         0.99 
SH 1.17 1.00        1.03 
BA 1.00 1.00 1.00       0.98 
 BW 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98      1.00 
 HE 1.00 0.86 1.00 0.88 1.14     0.95 
SL - - - 1.00 1.00 -    1.00 
RP 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -   1.00 
 
 
          
Relative to Baseline (Absolute fractional Ginis) 
NR NS SH BA BW HE SL RP Average 
  
Within k,k 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.98 0.96 0.95 0.97 0.99 
          
Between k,h NR          1.03 
NS 0.91         0.99 
SH 0.92 0.93        0.97 
BA 1.07 0.98 0.96       1.02 
BW 1.08 1.01 0.99 1.10      1.03 
 HE 1.23 1.08 1.03 1.70 0.31     1.16 
 SL 1.34 1.14 1.08 2.00 1.12 3.18    1.34 
RP 1.03 0.97 0.96 0.93 1.40 6.46 10.05   1.00 
          
Overlapping k,h NR          0.98 
NS 1.01         0.99 
SH 1.02 1.01        1.00 
BA 0.97 0.99 1.01       0.97 
 BW 0.95 0.96 0.98 0.96      0.96 
 HE 0.91 0.93 0.95 0.92 0.99     0.93 
SL 0.88 0.90 0.92 0.89 0.95 0.91    0.90 
RP 0.98 1.00 1.01 0.99 0.95 0.93 0.88    0.98 
Source: own calculations. 
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Table D.13: Detailed results of regional subgroup decomposition for the No_DP scenario. 
No_DP NR NS SH BA BW HE SL RP 
Average Income (€) 41,733 50,433 59,015 31,932 26,679 26,075 21,263 30,501 
Income share 0.16 0.23 0.09 0.31 0.11 0.04 0.003 0.07 
Farm population 22,029 26,723 8,572 57,355 23,957 9,255 713 13,469 
Population share 0.14 0.16 0.05 0.35 0.15 0.06 0.004 0.08 
% Contribution to Gini and Absolute Gini 
NR NS SH BA BW HE SL RP SUM 
Within k,k 2.1% 3.4% 0.4% 10.1% 2.0% 0.3% 0.0% 0.6%  18.9% 
          
Between k,h NR          2.9% 
NS 0.4%         5.1% 
SH 0.3% 0.2%        2.5% 
BA 1.0% 2.2% 1.0%       5.1% 
BW 0.6% 1.2% 0.5% 0.6%      3.0% 
 HE 0.3% 0.5% 0.2% 0.2% 0.0%  0.0% 0.0%  1.2% 
 SL 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 
RP 0.3% 0.6% 0.3% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0%   1.4% 
          
Overlapping k,h NR          9.5% 
NS 2.3%         10.5% 
SH 0.7% 1.0%        3.9% 
BA 3.7% 4.1% 1.2%       16.9% 
 BW 1.5% 1.6% 0.5% 4.0%      9.3% 
 HE 0.5% 0.6% 0.2% 1.5% 0.7%     3.9% 
SL 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0%    0.1% 
RP 0.8% 0.9% 0.3% 2.3% 1.0% 0.4% 0.0%   5.7% 
 
 
         100% 
Absolute fractional Ginis 
NR NS SH BA BW HE SL RP Average 
  
Within k,k 26,827 30,426 33,825 19,430 21,733 20,886 17,742 19,586 
          
Between k,h NR          5,763 
NS 4,350         8,903 
SH 8,641 4,291        11,902 
BA 4,901 9,250 13,541       5,488 
BW 7,527 11,877 16,168 2,627      5,813 
 HE 7,829 12,179 16,470 2,929 302     5,535 
 SL 10,235 14,585 18,876 5,335 2,708 2,406    7,637 
RP 5,616 9,966 14,257 716 1,911 2,213 4,619   4,191 
          
Overlapping k,h NR          19,643 
NS 24,527         18,533 
SH 22,666 28,113        18,552 
BA 18,648 16,851 15,485       17,779 
 BW 17,555 16,092 15,026 18,349      17,816 
 HE 16,957 15,547 14,505 17,717 21,029     17,621 
SL 13,642 12,519 11,772 14,129 17,223 17,089    14,341 
RP 18,139 16,502 15,327 18,882 18,989 18,363 14,625   18,103 
Source: own calculations. 
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Table D.14: Results of regional subgroup decomposition in 2020 for the No_DP scenario in 
comparison to Baseline results in 2020. 
No_DP / Baseline NR NS SH BA BW HE SL RP 
Average Income (€) 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.79 0.75 0.69 0.58 0.82 
Relative to Baseline (% Contribution to Gini and Absolute Gini) 
NR NS SH BA BW HE SL RP SUM 
  
Within k,k 1.05 1.03 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 - 1.20  1.02 
          
Between k,h NR          1.07 
NS 0.80         0.98 
SH 1.00 1.00        0.96 
BA 1.25 0.96 0.91       1.02 
BW 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.20      1.07 
 HE 1.50 1.25 1.00 2.00 -     1.33 
 SL - - - - - -    - 
RP 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 - - -   1.00 
          
Overlapping k,h NR          1.00 
NS 1.05         1.01 
SH 1.17 1.00        1.03 
BA 0.97 1.03 1.00       0.99 
 BW 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98      0.98 
 HE 0.83 0.86 1.00 0.88 1.00     0.91 
SL - - - 1.00 0.00 -    0.50 
RP 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.05 1.00 1.00 -   1.02 
 
 
          
Relative to Baseline (Absolute fractional Ginis) 
NR NS SH BA BW HE SL RP Average 
  
Within k,k 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.92 0.88 0.88 0.98 
          
Between k,h NR          1.01 
NS 0.81         0.93 
SH 0.83 0.86        0.91 
BA 1.10 0.94 0.91       0.98 
BW 1.07 0.95 0.93 1.00      0.99 
 HE 1.32 1.08 1.01 1.96 0.27     1.23 
 SL 1.62 1.25 1.13 2.85 3.61 6.42    1.70 
RP 0.92 0.87 0.87 0.43 1.97 14.19 21.09   0.89 
          
Overlapping k,h NR          0.94 
NS 1.00         0.97 
SH 1.00 0.98        0.97 
BA 0.92 0.97 0.97       0.94 
 BW 0.90 0.95 0.94 0.92      0.92 
 HE 0.83 0.88 0.88 0.85 0.93     0.87 
SL 0.74 0.79 0.80 0.75 0.81 0.79    0.77 
RP 0.98 1.03 1.02 1.00 0.90 0.84 0.73    0.97 
Source: own calculations. 
 
161 
 
Table D.15: Detailed results of regional subgroup decomposition for the No_Pricepol 
scenario in 2020. 
No_Pricepol NR NS SH BA BW HE SL RP 
Average Income (€) 27,549 31,049 33,592 19,715 19,084 17,216 15,306 28,086 
Income share 0.16 0.22 0.08 0.29 0.12 0.04 0.003 0.10 
Farm population 22,029 26,723 8,572 57,355 23,957 9,255 713 13,469 
Population share 0.14 0.16 0.05 0.35 0.15 0.06 0.004 0.08 
% Contribution to Gini and Absolute Gini 
NR NS SH BA BW HE SL RP SUM 
Within k,k 2.1% 3.7% 0.4% 9.7% 2.0% 0.3% 0.0% 0.6%  18.8% 
          
Between k,h NR          2.0% 
NS 0.2%         3.3% 
SH 0.1% 0.1%        1.4% 
BA 1.0% 1.8% 0.7%       4.4% 
BW 0.5% 0.8% 0.3% 0.1%      2.0% 
 HE 0.2% 0.3% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0%     0.8% 
 SL 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%    0.0% 
RP 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.7% 0.3% 0.1% 0.0%   1.3% 
          
Overlapping k,h NR          10.4% 
NS 2.6%         12.7% 
SH 0.7% 1.1%        4.3% 
BA 3.7% 4.7% 1.3%       17.6% 
 BW 1.6% 2.1% 0.6% 4.4%      10.3% 
 HE 0.6% 0.7% 0.2% 1.5% 0.7%     4.0% 
SL 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0%    0.1% 
RP 1.2% 1.5% 0.4% 1.9% 0.9% 0.3% 0.0%   6.2% 
 
 
         100% 
Absolute fractional Ginis 
NR NS SH BA BW HE SL RP Average 
Within k,k 20,891 25,051 23,341 14,438 17,276 15,084 12,686 17,521 
          
Between k,h NR          3,245 
NS 1,750         4,487 
SH 3,022 1,272        5,157 
BA 3,917 5,667 6,938       3,574 
BW 4,232 5,982 7,254 316      2,925 
 HE 5,166 6,916 8,188 1,249 934     3,512 
 SL 6,121 7,871 9,143 2,205 1,889 955    4,277 
RP 269 1,481 2,753 4,185 4,501 5,435 6,390   3,175 
          
Overlapping k,h NR          16,475 
NS 21,303         17,134 
SH 19,276 22,985        16,226 
BA 14,245 14,976 13,053       14,318 
 BW 15,285 15,988 14,145 15,670      15,319 
 HE 13,407 14,186 12,367 13,645 15,277     13,701 
SL 11,590 12,450 10,634 11,529 13,256 13,047    11,825 
RP 19,096 20,089 17,992 12,144 13,441 11,540 9,600   15,100 
Source: own calculations. 
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Table D.16: Results of regional subgroup decomposition in 2020 for the No_Pricepol 
scenario in comparison to Baseline results in 2020. 
No_Pricepol / Baseline NR NS SH BA BW HE SL RP 
Average Income (€) 0.56 0.51 0.48 0.49 0.54 0.46 0.41 0.75 
Relative to Baseline (% Contribution to Gini and Absolute Gini) 
NR NS SH BA BW HE SL RP SUM 
  
Within k,k 1.05 1.12 1.00 0.96 1.00 1.00 - 1.20  1.01 
          
Between k,h NR          0.74 
NS 0.40         0.63 
SH 0.33 0.50        0.54 
BA 1.25 0.78 0.64       0.88 
BW 0.83 0.67 0.60 0.20      0.71 
 HE 1.00 0.75 0.50 1.00 -     0.89 
 SL - - - - - -    - 
RP 0.00 0.17 0.33 3.50 - - -   0.93 
          
Overlapping k,h NR          1.09 
NS 1.18         1.22 
SH 1.17 1.10        1.13 
BA 0.97 1.18 1.08       1.03 
 BW 1.07 1.31 1.20 1.07      1.08 
 HE 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.88 1.00     0.93 
SL - - - 1.00 0.00 -    0.50 
RP 1.50 1.67 1.33 0.86 0.90 0.75 -   1.11 
 
 
          
Relative to Baseline (Absolute fractional Ginis) 
NR NS SH BA BW HE SL RP Average 
  
Within k,k 0.75 0.80 0.66 0.70 0.73 0.64 0.63 0.87 
          
Between k,h NR          0.57 
NS 0.32         0.47 
SH 0.29 0.25        0.39 
BA 0.88 0.58 0.47       0.64 
BW 0.60 0.48 0.42 0.12      0.50 
 HE 0.87 0.61 0.50 0.83 0.83     0.78 
 SL 0.97 0.67 0.55 1.18 2.52 2.55    0.95 
RP 0.04 0.13 0.17 2.53 4.64 34.84 29.18   0.67 
          
Overlapping k,h NR          0.79 
NS 0.87         0.90 
SH 0.85 0.80        0.85 
BA 0.71 0.87 0.82       0.76 
 BW 0.78 0.94 0.89 0.79      0.79 
 HE 0.66 0.80 0.75 0.65 0.68     0.67 
SL 0.63 0.78 0.72 0.62 0.62 0.60    0.63 
RP 1.03 1.25 1.20 0.65 0.64 0.53 0.48    0.81 
Source: own calculations. 
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Table D.17: Detailed results of regional subgroup decomposition for the Full_Lib scenario. 
Full_Lib NR NS SH BA BW HE SL RP 
Average Income (€) 18,245 19,888 20,340 9,808 10,683 6,537 1,119 21,448 
Income share 0.18 0.23 0.08 0.25 0.11 0.03 0.0004 0.13 
Farm population 22,029 26,723 8,572 57,355 23,957 9,255 713 13,469 
Population share 0.14 0.16 0.05 0.35 0.15 0.06 0.004 0.08 
% Contribution to Gini and Absolute Gini 
NR NS SH BA BW HE SL RP SUM 
Within k,k 2.1% 3.8% 0.3% 9.3% 2.0% 0.2% 0.0% 0.7%  18.4% 
          
Between k,h NR          2.1% 
NS 0.1%         2.9% 
SH 0.0% 0.0%        0.9% 
BA 1.2% 1.7% 0.6%       4.8% 
BW 0.4% 0.6% 0.2% 0.1%      1.8% 
 HE 0.3% 0.4% 0.1% 0.2% 0.1%     1.3% 
 SL 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%    0.0% 
RP 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 1.0% 0.4% 0.2% 0.0%   1.8% 
          
Overlapping k,h NR          10.3% 
NS 2.7%         13.3% 
SH 0.8% 1.1%        4.6% 
BA 3.5% 4.9% 1.4%       17.2% 
 BW 1.7% 2.3% 0.6% 4.2%      10.3% 
 HE 0.5% 0.7% 0.2% 1.3% 0.6%     3.6% 
SL 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0%    0.1% 
RP 1.1% 1.6% 0.5% 1.8% 0.9% 0.3% 0.0%   6.2% 
 
 
         100% 
Absolute fractional Ginis 
NR NS SH BA BW HE SL RP Average 
  
Within k,k 19,924 24,688 21,436 13,081 16,223 13,002 11,103 18,070 
          
Between k,h NR          3,180 
NS 822         3,682 
SH 1,048 226        3,420 
BA 4,218 5,040 5,266       3,627 
BW 3,781 4,603 4,828 437      2,663 
 HE 5,854 6,675 6,901 1,636 2,073     4,007 
 SL 8,563 9,385 9,611 4,345 4,782 2,709    6,492 
RP 1,602 780 554 5,820 5,383 7,456 10,165   4,037 
          
Overlapping k,h NR          15,586 
NS 21,551         17,175 
SH 19,675 22,879        16,267 
BA 12,859 14,758 12,743       13,221 
 BW 14,697 16,499 14,565 14,313      14,500 
 HE 11,480 13,398 11,419 11,587 12,651     11,844 
SL 8,583 10,561 8,577 8,306 9,355 9,520    8,822 
RP 17,537 20,826 19,344 10,508 12,505 9,402 6,693   14,150 
Source: own calculations. 
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Table D.18: Results of regional subgroup decomposition in 2020 for the Full_Lib scenario in 
comparison to Baseline results in 2020. 
Full_Lib / Baseline NR NS SH BA BW HE SL RP 
Average Income (€) 0.37 0.33 0.29 0.24 0.30 0.17 0.03 0.57 
Relative to Baseline (% Contribution to Gini and Absolute Gini) 
NR NS SH BA BW HE SL RP SUM 
Within k,k 1.05 1.15 0.75 0.92 1.00 0.67 - 1.40  0.99 
          
Between k,h NR          0.78 
NS 0.20         0.56 
SH 0.00 0.00        0.35 
BA 1.50 0.74 0.55       0.96 
BW 0.67 0.50 0.40 0.20      0.64 
 HE 1.50 1.00 0.50 2.00 -     1.44 
 SL - - - - - -    - 
RP 0.33 0.17 0.00 5.00 - - -   1.29 
          
Overlapping k,h NR          1.08 
NS 1.23         1.28 
SH 1.33 1.10        1.21 
BA 0.92 1.23 1.17       1.01 
 BW 1.13 1.44 1.20 1.02      1.08 
 HE 0.83 1.00 1.00 0.76 0.86     0.84 
SL - - - 1.00 0.00 -    0.50 
RP 1.38 1.78 1.67 0.82 0.90 0.75 -   1.11 
 
 
          
Relative to Baseline (Absolute fractional Ginis) 
NR NS SH BA BW HE SL RP Average 
  
Within k,k 0.71 0.79 0.61 0.64 0.68 0.55 0.55 0.90 
          
Between k,h NR          0.56 
NS 0.15         0.39 
SH 0.10 0.05        0.26 
BA 0.95 0.51 0.36       0.65 
BW 0.54 0.37 0.28 0.17      0.45 
 HE 0.99 0.59 0.42 1.09 1.84     0.89 
 SL 1.36 0.80 0.58 2.32 6.37 7.22    1.44 
RP 0.26 0.07 0.03 3.53 5.55 47.79 46.42   0.85 
          
Overlapping k,h NR          0.75 
NS 0.88         0.90 
SH 0.87 0.80        0.85 
BA 0.64 0.85 0.80       0.70 
 BW 0.75 0.97 0.91 0.72      0.75 
 HE 0.56 0.76 0.69 0.56 0.56     0.58 
SL 0.47 0.67 0.58 0.44 0.44 0.44    0.47 
RP 0.94 1.30 1.29 0.56 0.59 0.43 0.34    0.76 
Source: own calculations. 
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Table D.19: Aggregate results of farm type decomposition (based on total household 
income). 
BL 50_DP No_DP No_PP Full_Lib 
 
Average income (€) 52,798 49,215 43,844 31,197 21,420 
 
    
RELATIV 
Gini 
0.47 0.496 0.54 0.608 0.861 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Gini-Within 
0.093 0.097 0.106 0.123 0.172 
20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 
Gini-Between 
0.16 0.18 0.196 0.077 0.16 
34% 36% 36% 13% 19% 
Overlapping 
0.21 0.22 0.239 0.408 0.529 
45% 45% 44% 67% 61% 
ABSOLUT 
Abs. Gini 
24,714 24,368 23,688 18,957 18,446 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Abs. Gini-Within 
4,890 4,795 4,632 3,832 3,677 
20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 
Abs. Gini-Between 
8,520 8,730 8,574 2,396 3,429 
34% 36% 36% 13% 19% 
Abs. Overlapping 
11,304 10,861 10,482 12,729 11,341 
45% 45% 44% 67% 61% 
 
     
O
_Gradin 
 
0.711 0.702 0.699 0.901 0.849 
       
 Source: own calculations. 
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Table D.20: Aggregate results of regional subgroup decomposition (based on total 
household income). 
BL 50_DP No_DP No_PP Full_Lib 
 
Average income (€) 52,798 49,215 43,844 31,197 21,420 
 
    
RELATIV 
Gini 
0.468 0.495 0.54 0.608 0.861 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Gini-Within 
0.087 0.092 0.101 0.115 0.163 
19% 19% 19% 19% 19% 
Gini-Between 
0.102 0.109 0.116 0.08 0.098 
22% 22% 21% 13% 11% 
Overlapping 0.279 0.294 0.323 0.413 0.601 
60% 59% 60% 68% 70% 
ABSOLUT 
Abs. Gini 
24,714 24,386 23,688 18,957 18,446 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Abs. Gini-Within 4,607 4,549 4,431 3,594 3,488 
19% 19% 19% 19% 19% 
Abs. Gini-Between 5,369 5,371 5,074 2,488 2,090 
22% 22% 21% 13% 11% 
Abs. Overlapping 14,738 14,465 14,183 12,875 12,868 
60% 59% 60% 68% 70% 
 
     
O
_Gradin 
 
0.83 0.827 0.832 0.903 0.918 
       
 Source: own calculations. 
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